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Abstract
As digital evidence becomes increasingly significant to criminal investigations, so does the
importance of adopting the most effective approach to examining it. An ineffective exami-
nation can result in evidence not being identified. Even if evidence is noted, connections
may not be made between the disparate values. This thesis proposes a new classification
system to gauge, select and compare digital evidence from a variety of sources. It performs
this using a type of model called an ontology. This is used to map the potential location of
evidence on digital devices - applying a code to each piece that is identified. The codes
are then used for selection of the artefacts that are most appropriate to enquiries based
on the investigative Who, What, When, Where, How and Why questions. Any evidence
with the same code can be compared. In applying this ontology it is demonstrated how
investigations are made more effective, and the reliability of any recovered evidence can
be more easily understood.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As technology becomes further embedded into modern life it generates increasing amounts
of digital traces. The traces, also known as “artefacts”, shed light on how, when, where
and by whom the technology was used. This information can become useful evidence in
the investigation of criminal offences. This thesis describes a new approach for locating
and exploiting these artefacts.
To understand why this fresh approach is required, it is useful to consider the perspective
of a person trying to conduct an examination of a digital device to look for evidence. Before
starting to look at any potential source, the following questions need to be considered:
• What records are available on this source?
• Of these records, which ones will assist my investigation and how do I use them?
• How do I know with certainty what these records represent?
The issues of volume and variety are commonly cited as the key problems of digital
evidence. Volume, because of the increasing number of digital devices encountered in
society which also have expanding storage capacities. Variety, because of the ever changing
nature of technology and the difficulty in keeping pace with it.
But this thesis argues that these are aggravating factors not the root cause of the






The first problem is knowing what data is available and, of this data, which of it is
potentially useful? The distinction of the helpful data from the superfluous is dependent
on knowing the description and location of potential evidential artefacts. The description
is particularly important for, without it, how will any artefact be identified? Tools and
methods can be built to handle extra volume - improving speed and efficiency - but they
will be of little use without first identifying a target. This problem exists with any evidential
source - even a piece of paper. Without knowing what you are looking for, how will you
know when you have found it?
Selection
The second problem stems from the first - even if you have a complete set of descriptions
of potentially useful artefacts how can those that assist a particular enquiry be sieved from
the total set identified? Unless this is done then the examiner is not able to concentrate
on those artefacts that assist an investigation and discard those that do not. This wastes
resource.
Correlation
The third problem stems from the use of evidential artefacts. Whilst there are occasions
where words on a page or in an email may prove useful in documenting a person’s state of
mind, a large part of any evidential examination is comparison - understanding whether
one value matches another. Examples of physical evidence are shown in table 1.1. So this
ability to compare the artefacts’ values to see if they match is key to effective examination.
The idea is to understand what can be compared and how to perform this comparison.
This problem exists where there is any disparity between evidential sources but increasing
variety compounds it.
Reliability
The fourth problem takes into account not just whether a particular value has been accu-
rately copied and what it represents but also the reasoning for this representation. For
example, a date and time is seen on a computer and labelled as the first time it was con-
nected to a particular network. But what is the justification for saying this and is this
assertion always accurate? For without this assurance, there is an uncertain provenance to
the evidence. If this is carried through to a criminal trial it could lead to a miscarriage of
justice where a person is wrongly convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.
At present, there is no central source of information to reference about the availability
of artefacts, no system for selecting the artefact relevant to a particular case, no method for
allowing easy comparison of artefact data and no method for documenting the provenance
of an artefact and its representation. This leaves a gap which the approach outlined in this
thesis aims to fill.
1.1 Hypothesis 3
Table 1.1 (Based on material sourced from [100, p. 19]
Common forensic science techniques and their uses
Forensic Technique What Does It Show? Why is this useful?
Tool Marks - comparing
the marks on an implement
against those found, for
example, on a window that
was forced open
Can show a particular
tool made a mark on a
place or a person
Links a person found
in possession of a tool
with a crime scene
Ballistic striation marks -
comparing the marks made
by gun barrel on
ammunition rounds against
those found at a scene or in
a body
That a particular
firearm fired a round of
ammunition
Links a person found
in possession of a
firearm to a shooting
Finger Marks - comparing
finger mark impressions
found at a crime scene to
the finger prints of a person
Shows a particular
person touched an
object or other person
Links a person to a
crime scene
DNA - comparing DNA
traces found at a crime
scene to those of a person
Can show a particular
person was present at a
place at some time
Demonstrates the
presence of person at a
place
1.1 Hypothesis
In consideration of the highlighted problems, the hypothesis being evaluated is that:
an ontology can improve the effective examination of digital evidence
in large criminal cases.
The research requirements for this evaluation are as follows:
• conduct a thorough examination of the issues that need to be addressed to see an
improvement in examination;
• formulate an ontology to address these issues;
• test the ontology to assess its impact on existing tools and processes; and
• gauge which aspects of the approach are effective.
1.2 Research questions 4
The first requirement - a thorough examination of the issues to be addressed - is detailed
at Chapter 2. This gives rise to Research Questions for each of the identified four problems




• RQ1: Can a classification system be devised that allows for the documentation of
digital evidence artefacts and facilitates their extraction and comparison?
Availability
• RQ2: How can this classification system allow for differing digital sources and
rapid changes in technology?
Selection
• RQ3: Is it possible for this classification system to reduce the volume of digital
evidence that requires examination?
• RQ4: Can this classification system allow for the selection of artefacts based on
investigative criteria as opposed to technical ones?
Correlation
• RQ5: Can the classification system allow for successful comparison of artefacts
irrespective of their source or originating format?
• RQ6: Can the classification system allow the use of any tools to process evidence?
Reliance
• RQ7: Can the classification system provide for the provenance of these artefacts to
be established?
1.3 Clarity of terminology
There are a number of technical terms used in this thesis and, for clarity, these will now be
outlined.
1.3.1 Digital Evidence
The term ‘Digital Evidence’ is discussed at length in section 2.6 but for the purposes of
introducing the topic it represents, “Information stored or transmitted in binary form that
may be relied upon in court.” [67, Pg 113]
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1.3.2 Digital Forensics
The process by which this evidence comes to be collected and presented to a court of law
is digital forensics - the term ‘Forensic’ means ‘relating to or denoting the application
of scientific methods and techniques to the investigation of crime / relating to courts of
law.’[234]
It should be noted that the word ‘forensic’ is often used in the Information Technology
field to mean any type of investigation - particularly regarding computer networks - but
this use is not replicated in other areas of Forensic Science and is not intended for the
purposes of this thesis.
There is a difference between the data that users explicitly create on devices – such
as pictures and documents - and records that are created about the actual use of these
devices - meta-data And it is these latter records that principally concern the fields of
digital evidence and computer forensics.
As noted by Walden,[254]:
investigators are generally more concerned with data generated by the tech-
nology itself, such as machine logs, than the content of the data that has been
supplied to, and processed by, the technology. This so-called ’meta-data’
describes and gives information about other data and will be generated by
different elements within each of the computers and networks that process the
content.
This thesis will also make this distinction between user-generated data, such as the
documents, spreadsheets and emails, and system meta-data as earlier referenced by Walden
- concentrating on the latter.
1.3.3 Artefact
The term “artefact” is used frequently in this dissertation. Dictionaries [47, 188] are
relatively settled in defining the term as an object, made by a human, with some sort of
cultural or historical interest. The term is widened - possibly abused - in the field of digital
forensics to cover not only human actions but also those by machines as they interact. For
example, the records left by one computer as it communicates with another.
When considering archaeological artefacts from a prior civilisation, it is not just, for
example, a piece of pottery that is of interest but where it was found, its position and what
else was found along side it.
Similarly, whilst all digital devices - by their very definition - use binary as a funda-
mental recording tool, a digital forensic artefact is more than this binary code. The way in
which this code is interpreted as, for example, a photograph or document and the place in
which it is stored on a device all go to the interpretation of what this binary means.
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Finally, a short clarification on spelling. The commonly used version of the word in
the United Kingdom (UK) is “artefact” whilst in the US, and possibly elsewhere, it is
“artifact”. Since this dissertation is written in the UK, the first definition will be used unless
directly quoting from a source that uses the alternate.
1.3.4 Ontologies
The term Ontology is described at length, later, in section 3.2.3. As a working definition,
in the field of knowledge representation, an ontology is a means of describing a conceptual
view of something - for example how animals can be categorised into different groups.
Classes and sub-classes are used to provide a structure and members - “instances” - are
placed within this structure.
Logical statements are made about these classes: one example would be the properties
an instance must fulfil to be included in a particular sub-class - for example, a member
of the “mammal” class must have the property “has sweat glands”. Another would be
stating that if an instance was a member of one particular sub-classes then it cannot also
be a member of another - as example a member of the “mammal” class cannot also be a
member of the “reptile class”.
1.4 Previously published material
1. Addressing the Increasing Volume and Variety of Digital Evidence Using an Ontol-
ogy. IEEE Joint Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference 2014 [34]
2. DESO: Addressing volume and variety in large-scale criminal cases. The Interna-
tional Journal of Digital Forensics and Incident Response, Volume 15 [35]
1.5 Structure of this thesis
Chapter 2 provides a background to the research. This covers the process of criminal
investigation and then an introduction to evidence. Three current forensic disciplines are
covered in depth: Fingerprints, Ballistics and DNA. This is to understand the factors that
have influenced them and any lessons that could be learned from their development.
Digital Evidence is then introduced - what the term means and how this material is
used in an investigation. After a consideration of some challenges posed by the increasing
volume and variety of material, there is discussion on tools. This covers both the tools
used to examine digital evidence and prior research on them.
The Chapter ends with a conclusion that some form of classification would assist the
field of digital evidence. Research Questions are set.
Chapter 3 is focussed research on methods to classify and document digital evidence.
After a discussion on terminology, the Chapter looks at Digital Evidence models before
1.5 Structure of this thesis 7
considering ontologies. Both ontologies from within and outside the Digital Evidence
field are considered. But none are found as a complete answer to address the Research
Questions.
In Chapter 4 the Digital Evidence Semantic Ontology (DESO) is set out as an answer.
First there is an overview of the ontology’s structure before considering one of its classes:
Location. This shows how artefacts can be documented and also how the structure for this
documentation can be developed as technology advances.
Chapter 5 continues the description of DESO by introducing the remaining two classes:
Type Identifier and Reference. These are used to select Digital Evidence artefacts, compare
their data and assess their reliability.
Chapter 6 tests DESO by understanding how it can assist the use of common forensic
tools when addressing a sample scenario. This application is evaluated in Chapter 7.
The lessons learned from this evaluation are brought forward to Chapter 8 which details
further work.




This chapter provides an introduction on topics relevant to digital evidence. It covers the
following areas:
• A description of criminal investigations - the processes used to conduct them and
the conditions that must be fulfilled;
• A description of “forensics” - first a clarification of terminology followed by the role
it plays in criminal investigations. The field as a whole will first be discussed - not
just digital evidence. This is because developments and challenges in other fields
may be relevant to digital evidence;
• The specific field of digital evidence will then be introduced - first from a broad
basis, including the various fora in which it is used - and then focussing on its use in
criminal investigations. This first, brief, introduction to the arena is useful because it
defines the problems addressed by this thesis;
• There is a then a description of previous attempts to mitigate and solve the described
problems; and
• Finally, conclusions followed by a statement of the problem that will be addressed
by the research and measures of success by which it should be judged.
2.1 What is a criminal investigation and how is it
conducted?
A criminal investigation is “an effective search for material to bring an offender to justice”
[70]. This can take a number of forms but, at its simplest, this is an enquiry into whether a
crime has been committed and, if so, who could have committed it.
An investigation is, simply, a process followed to achieve the investigative objectives -
as illustrated in Figure 2.1. As can be seen, the process is an iterative one which starts with












Fig. 2.1 The Investigative Process [70, p. 65]
the actual formation of the objectives. Knowledge is gained by the process of asking the
simple questions: who, what, when, where, how and why? (“5WH”) [70]. As questions
are answered, the objectives may change.
For instance, if a person’s dead body is found, the first investigative objective will
always be is this death suspicious? In furtherance of this objective, the question to be
asked is how did this person die? It could be simply that they died of natural causes such
as a heart attack or they were suffering from terminal cancer. Enquiries with, for example,
the Doctor treating the deceased could confirm this. An examination of the body and the
scene may support this hypothesis.
But if there is any suspicion then it may become a criminal investigation and the next
objective will be: who played a part in this person’s death? Questions such as where the
person was before they died, who this person met and the time that they died might be
further investigated.
In a further investigative cycle the objective may be establishing the evidence that
strengthens or weakens the case that a certain person committed this act. So the questions
to be asked include: where was the suspect at the time of the person’s death?
In each one of these iterative cycles, the answers to the 5WH questions may be garnered
by making connections between various pieces of information. Examples are:
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• Public transport records show the suspect alighting at a bus stop near the deceased’s
house at a pertinent time;
• a piece of paper containing the victim’s handwriting is found on the suspect; and
• a cigarette containing the suspect’s DNA was found at the victim’s house.
For an investigation to be effective, these connections must be made and then enquiries
conducted. Further, because the objectives can change over time, the investigator may
have to review the available evidence on multiple occasions - the area of interest changes
as knowledge increases.
An investigation is not a formally defined linear process where the end result, and the
steps to achieve this result, can be predicted at the start. Instead it is iterative and modular
and these modules are selected and adapted along the way. Any solution to the examination
of digital evidence must be nimble in its ability to adapt to these changing needs of an
investigation.
2.2 What is evidence?
The scope of evidence that can be admitted by a Court is rather wide - defined as: “for the
purpose of determining the existence or non-existence of facts in issue” [151, p.21]. This
includes oral evidence from witnesses, documentary evidence, which often includes digital
material, and “things” - such as a knife used to stab a victim.
For evidence to be admitted in Court it must be “relevant” - making “ the [facts in
issue] more or less probable” [246]. In other words, if it can have some bearing on the
facts being decided in the court case, it is relevant.
The collection and examination of non-oral evidence is often labelled as “forensics”
and it is to this area that the thesis now turns. First, a discussion on terminology followed
by consideration of the role that forensics plays in the criminal investigation process.
Finally, there will be a brief inspection of non-digital forensic techniques as a foundation
for the later discussion on digital evidence.
2.3 Forensics - terminology and use
Forensic science is science used for the purposes of the law. [136]
Whilst this is a relatively clear definition, it is worth briefly examining the terminology
used in the forensics field - not only from a perspective of accuracy but also because it
provides a useful window into the problems that are later seen with Digital Evidence.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the problem. At one side is effectively, the generalist investigators.
These personnel will interview witnesses, process exhibits and / or examine crime scenes -
collecting items for examination.






















Fig. 2.2 Illustrating the balance between knowledge of the case and specialist knowledge
of scientific techniques
At the other side are scientists who are relatively divorced from the investigation - they
will have a detailed knowledge of their own specific area and of the appropriate standards
and methodologies that must be applied when interpreting the results. In this respect they
may even have their own terminology to describe their findings.
In between, there are roles across this spectrum as the range moves from knowledge of
the case to knowledge of a specialist scientific area. 1
There are problems that arise when this situation is viewed from two different per-
spectives: before examination (availability and selection of tests) and after (correlation of
results).
2.3.1 Availability of evidence
The specialist scientist will have a detailed knowledge of the tests that could be performed
in their specific area of expertise. Further, it has been argued [177] that the separation of
the scientist from the investigation avoids the possibility of cognitive bias - being unduly
influenced by a desire to help the investigator.
But, if this separation is to be effective, it relies on the investigator requesting the
correct tests on the items submitted to the laboratory.
To date, no documented method has been identified for making the translation between
investigative objectives and available tests.
1The term “criminalistics” is one used principally in the US and has a variety of meanings[46, 81] but
broadly appears to be a synonym for forensic science.
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2.3.2 Correlation of evidence
Analogous to the availability of evidence is correlation. Once the various tests have
been conducted, how can the results be combined and compared to make the connections
outlined at section 2.1? For instance, the handwriting on a note in the suspect’s possession
is compared to a specimen of writing that has been identified as being written by the victim.
If scientists are totally divorced from the investigation, and each other, Roux et al [212]
warn about the creation of silos of knowledge. This leads to fragmentation because the
findings from disparate experts are not correlated and effectively applied to the investigation.
As evidence they note previous failures documented in a report on the “9-11” terrorist attack
in the US [150]. This report noted how data from various sources were not integrated.
This does not mean there should be no specialists - or that they should be integrated in
the investigation. Instead it argues that their specialist results should be capable of easy
assimilation and comparison by investigators.
The point to be made is that if the field of forensic science was totally compiled of
expert scientists conducting tests and then reporting them using field-specific terminology,
it is left to the investigator to make sense of these results and understand their significance
within the context of the investigation. This can lead to inaccuracy and missed evidential
opportunities.
2.3.3 Summary of problem
In essence, the problem facing the forensics field is as follows:
• without sufficient expertise in a field there will be insufficient knowledge of all the
tests that could be conducted;
• without sufficient expertise in a field, test results may be interpreted incorrectly;
• without sufficient knowledge of the investigation there will difficulty in knowing
which tests will be most appropriate to advance enquiries; and
• if test results are not comparable across disciplines then valuable connections can be
missed
This will become evident not just in the next section covering traditional forensic
disciplines, but also digital evidence.
2.4 Traditional forensics and developments
It has been argued that the start of, what we would now call, “forensics” dated from the
AD 700s when the Chinese used finger prints in the identification of documents and clay
pots [141]. This section will not be a history of the field from this time but will draw
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on a selection of the disciplines - some noted earlier in Table 1.1 - to understand how
these fields operate and how they have developed. The intention is to understand whether
anything can be learned and applied to the more recent field of digital evidence.
The forensic disciplines chosen are the examination of friction ridge skin analysis -
also called “fingerprints”, DNA and ballistics. The choice has been influenced by these
disciplines still being in wide spread use - a point that will be covered at the end of this
section.
2.4.1 Fingerprints
Fingerprint analysis is one of the longest used identification methods due, simply, to
it being known for longer. Whilst finger prints are commonly viewed as a method of
evidencing the presence of a particular person at a location, the criminal justice system is
also heavily reliant on it for proving previous criminal convictions. The history is traced
by the US Department of Justice’s “Fingerprint Source Book” [171].
Finger prints have been used for identification since, as earlier reported, the AD 700s
but the first recorded classification system for them was not until the late 1800s by Alphonse
Bertillon [171, pg 5-4]. This was later discarded for being insufficiently distinctive and
granular.
The next advance was work by Galton in 1892 where he discussed various classification
approaches [103, chapter 5]. This included not just how to classify fingerprints but also their
persistence, evidential weight and indexing. His findings were summarised: a “systematic,
understandable, and applicable system of fingerprint classification had to be developed.”
[171, pg 5-6].
Differing classification systems were developed in various jurisdictions over the next
century to allow comparison - the driver for change being the desire for Automated
Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) as the number of records increased. The AFIS
scans any available fingerprints on a system and returns a set number of those that may
match the fingerprints being assessed. The examiner can then review these and make a
final confirmation.
The problem was that there was no standard amongst the AFIS vendors - reportedly due
to budgetary and commercial competition factors. This caused problems both domestically
and internationally in allowing an exchange of data.
Over time, however, standards were developed. In 1993 the American National
Standards Institute [10] created a classification that was adopted by Interpol in 1996 -
meaning that it was used by at least 181 countries outside the US [154, p.40]. The standard
works on two levels: one, a protocol for the transmission of fingerprint images - essentially
the raw data; and two, a vocabulary and transmission protocol for exchanging data about
the features - or minutia - contained within the images. Over the years various revisions
have been introduced with the latest published in 2016 [163].
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The transmission of both the raw data and the features within it is not efficient - if just
the features could be accurately defined and recorded then transmitting these alone without
the raw data would reduce transmission time.
But the classification of fingerprints is not a straightforward process as they are biomet-
rics - the measurement of a biological characteristic. Whilst a vocabulary for describing
features can be agreed, the application of this vocabulary can vary amongst vendors [177,
pg276]. The US National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) has approached
this problem by developing a template for recording minutia and a testing programme,
“Minex III” [170], against which various AFIS vendors can test the accuracy of their coding
algorithms. Results are publicly available.
There are points that can be taken from the development of fingerprint standards:
• right from the start of fingerprint comparison, a classification system was required to
index and compare them;
• as volume increased, this classification had to change to allow standardisation and
machine reading; and
• standardisation was not a simple task - indeed taking many years - because of
commercial as opposed to technical difficulties. Resolution came from central
standard setting and testing by a government agency.
2.4.2 Ballistics
Valier [250] details a history of firearms examination - or ballistics - dating back to 1835
when Henry Goddard started to compare rifling in gun barrels against marks on discharged
bullets.
Like fingerprints, ballistics has developed a classification system and this has allowed
the creation of Integrated Ballistic Identification Systems (IBIS). Weapons can be classified
by class characteristics such as: the diameter of the ammunition; the number of, and widths
between, rifling marks - which are manufactured in the barrel to spin ammunition for
accuracy; and whether the rifling twists to the left or right [244].
Individual weapons are distinguished by smaller marks - or stria - left on the surface of
a bullet as it is propelled out of the firearm. The ability to individualise one firearm from
another is formed from the manufacturing process where the tools made to manufacture
the barrel will always be slightly different due to wear and tear. This means that a different
combination of stria will be left by each weapon - and these can be seen on any discharged
bullet.
Heard describes the examination of these stria as being a manual process which can
only be performed by an experienced examiner. This is due to the need to not only note
matching stria patterns but also discount those that do not. [129, pg. 182]. The process
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is summarised: “A positive match between two sets of stria is one in which the extent of
agreement exceeds that of the best accepted non - match. ”
The earlier mentioned IBIS are, effectively, image comparison engines - comparing a
representation of the stria, such as a photograph, against a stored set. A number of best
matches are then presented to the examiner for expert review.
But disparate IBIS have been set up by a variety of companies leading to problems
in searching across records. To alleviate this, the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms operates the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) Program.
This has aggregated the various IBIS operated by government agencies to allow greater
comparison of ballistic records [243]. Any agency wishing to join the NIBIN has to sign a
Memorandum of Understanding with the ATF agreeing to maintain a base level of both
equipment and expert staff to input records and assimilate results.
The field has been further advanced by the development of NIST’s Ballistics Toolmark
Database [239]. This standardises the fields for meta-data about firearms images - such
as calibre - but also introduces the use of an open source format for describing any stria
[176].
The points to be taken from ballistics are that:
• like fingerprint examination, it is not a definitive topic - expert human judgement is
required to decide if stria match;
• a classification system assists in this task by narrowing down the possibilities upon
which an expert must opine - so assisting with the problem of selection; and
• centralised government efforts were required to form a common standard from the
solutions put forward by the proprietary, competing, vendors.
2.4.3 DNA
For brevity, this section will not focus on how DNA was discovered but instead its use in
criminal investigations - particularly relating to its initial challenges when used as evidence
and also how classification systems have allowed international comparison to take place.
The first observation on the use of DNA for profiling was in 1985 [145] and its ability
to differentiate humans for forensics purposes was recognised shortly after [113]. It was
soon used as evidence of human identity in Court rooms - a practice pioneered in the US
by private companies [13]. But by the late 1980s, its accuracy was sustaining successful
challenges from defence lawyers. These attacks centred not on the theory and technology
but the process by which the DNA extractions and analysis had been conducted.
It was argued that the private companies in their rush to have the DNA evidence
admitted, and so gain market share, had “shielded their protocols and probes from rigorous
scrutiny by claiming that they were proprietary” [13]. The FBI stepped in - providing
standards and also training in how their standards could be attained.
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But it was also recognised that standards were necessary for the recording of DNA - so
that data banks could be built for comparison. Butler [45] describes the classification as
Short Tandem Repeat (STR) Genotyping. This involves the calibration of the testing equip-
ment being used before measuring peaks shown on fluorescent gel and converting them
into a number. This number is then stored and compared with others. Final comparison is
always conducted by the forensic scientist due to the need for fine interpretation of results.
The manner in which these “numbers” are collected and stored has varied between
Europe and the US [220] but standardisation efforts have been driven by such bodies as
Interpol, the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes and, in the US, the FBI.
Whilst there are some variances, they are compatible.
The points to be taken from DNA are:
• whilst DNA has become a powerful tool for investigation, it was initially doubted
because of private companies offering “black box” solutions without any specified
standards; and
• standards for the classification of DNA results were not developed by the private
sector but by government and governmental bodies.
2.4.4 What has been learned?
The construction and use of standards to describe findings is a strong element of all the
reviewed disciplines. Also, these standards were not created organically but by a central
body - often part of or related to a government. Finally, it is the marriage of automated
systems applied to a classification system and human skill that has proved successful in
these areas. The systems reduce the volume of results that the expert has to review.
When the topic later moves on to digital evidence, key issues will be:
• An assessment of whether digital evidence has the same classification systems that
are present in the other areas reviewed?
• If it doesn’t, is there a reason for this?
• Would the introduction of these classification systems help to address the identified
challenges?
2.5 Factors influencing forensic examination
Aside from the lessons learned from current disciplines, there are other factors that influence
the effectiveness of forensic evidence. These will be discussed because of their impact on
digital evidence. First, the variety of evidence and then accuracy of interpretation will be
discussed.
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2.5.1 Variety is the spice of life
In describing forensic evidence earlier, three examples were deliberately chosen - due to
their continued use. But what about other areas of forensic evidence - principally concern-
ing the examination of trace evidence? Paint chips, gun shot residue, glass fragments, hairs
and fibres, to name a few, have been valid and useful forensic science disciplines for many
years but are now falling into disuse. The main culprit for this decline, Roux et al [213]
argue, is DNA.
The development of DNA was so seismic that the resources it required pushed the
others disciplines out of consideration. The traditional trace fields, though being described
as having “robust and well established” scientific underpinnings, require costly laboratory
equipment, well-trained staff and are time consuming. Further, they do not provide the
personal identification or “individualisation” that DNA supplies.
In a number of papers Roux, Ribaux et al use Locard’s exchange principle to argue
that this is a retrograde step [205, 213]. The first consideration is Locard’s intended
meaning: whilst commonly cited as “every contact leaves a trace” they argue that this is a
simplification of what was written and intended by the author. Instead they argue that the
principle means:
• The types of material exchanged are dependent on the type of criminal activity
• These materials are the remnant of this activity
• Interpretation is required to transform these materials into clues of what activity
occurred
They argue that trace evidence matters because, although it does not identify a person
in the way that DNA or fingerprints can, it goes towards the holistic view of the crime -
the building up of a picture showing what and how an activity could have occurred. This
provides corroboration but also makes life harder for the criminal. They quote one of
Locard’s less well-known comments:
“Fingerprints are wonderful. I would say (.. .) it is privileged evidence.
But, beyond, one can find prints of a variety of species: tooth print, nails,
traces from the entire body, hair, dusts. Dust analysis is an infinite, unlimited
resource. One can exactly know what the man did”.
The conclusion to be drawn is that variety of evidence is not something that should be
shied away from - indeed it is positively beneficial. And when the problems surrounding
digital evidence are examined, three things should be considered:
1. the approach to examining for potential evidence is to consider what traces are left
when an activity takes place;
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2. there should be caution on relying on any one particular trace or type of evidence.
The mutual corroboration from a number of sources provides Roux’s “holistic” view
of events and helps to avoid misinterpretation; and
3. if multiple sources are checked, it is much harder for a criminal to adapt their
behaviour to avoid leaving a trace. The more sources that are considered, the more
they are constrained in their actions.
2.5.2 Accuracy of interpretation
Provenance is a commonly used term when discussing evidence - particularly forensic
evidence. But the meaning of the word is somewhat ambiguous because it can cover at
least two areas:
First, the origin of the actual data presented to the court. This could be a blood stain,
a tyre pattern or a finger print from a murder weapon. This is the actual data and can be
explained by showing a chain of evidence from an original item being first discovered with
all the people who handled it explaining what they did and the processes that were applied.
But a second, key, use of the word covers the origin of the knowledge that is applied
when this data is interpreted and presented as a forensic science finding. Why, for example,
are the blood stains on the wall a blood spatter pattern? And why does it indicate that the
victim was hit from the front? This is the area that will now be discussed.
The most recognised reference concerning these matters is the US case Daubert v
Merril Dow Pharmaceuticals [247]. This gave guidelines on the admission of scientific or
technical expert evidence.
Whilst these rules are often cited it is, perhaps, more accurate to consider the version
captured later in 2000 by the US Federal Rules of Evidence [257]:
Excerpt from US Federal Rules of Evidence
1. the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
2. the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
3. the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.
Welch [257], concerned about the admission of “Junk Science” into the Court room,
notes that what is often called the Daubert “test” is not actually a test at all - it merely sets
the questions and does not give any guidance for the correct answers.
Schwartz, in a dissection of the firearms and toolmarks fields’ shortcomings [221]
notes that the Daubert test has had little impact. Despite “systemic scientific problems”
with these fields, as at 2005, no evidence of these types had been excluded. This is due to
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the difficulty for non-experts, including judges, in assessing it - essentially marking the
answers to Daubert’s questions.
Schwartz’s assertions on the firearms and toolmark fields may or may not be correct.
But it does call into question the assertion that a method or tool must be correct and
accurate because it has already been admitted at a Court hearing. It is not a particularly
reliable indicator of efficacy.
The problem is not confined to the US. Robertson notes that in Australia “less than 5
percent of all matters examined in the laboratory will result in a forensic scientist giving
evidence. An even smaller percentage of cases will see the forensic evidence being strongly
contested” [207]. In essence, but for a small percentage of cases, the evidence is just
accepted without test. This places an incredible burden on examiners to self-police the
tools and methods that they use to ensure their reliability and accuracy.
Having looked at forensic evidence generally, the topic will now narrow to digital
evidence specifically - what is it and how is it examined? But when the various digital
evidence tools are later considered, one key aspect is the assertions made by the tools about
the data they produce. On what basis are these assertions made? What precautions must a
Digital Evidence examiner take?
2.6 Digital Evidence - the beauty and the beast
Some things can be predicted with reasonable certainty and this includes
the continuing emergence of computer forensics as the new DNA for the
forensic world. As every incident at any level of crime today has potential
electronic evidence, it has been necessary to seriously rethink how best to use
available resources. Robertson [207]
This section introduces “Digital Evidence”. First will be a discussion on what this term
actually means followed by how the material is generated. The different fora in which
Digital Evidence is used will then be reviewed before looking at current and developing
challenges for the field.
Once these challenges have been articulated, the section moves on to look at approaches
and tools that have advanced the field of Digital Evidence examination. The focus will be
on how these respective approaches and tools can answer the research questions posed by
this thesis.
2.6.1 What is Digital Evidence?
There are numerous definitions for the term “Digital Evidence”. Carrier is general: “digital
data that supports or refutes a hypothesis about digital events or the state of digital data.”
[52]. And so is Whitcombe: “information of probative value stored or transmitted in digital
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form.” [258]. Other sources reference that the field has moved on and should now be
referenced as “Digital Investigation and Intelligence” [133].
But for the purposes of this discussion, Casey’s narrow and applied definition will be
used: “any data stored or transmitted using a computer that support or refute a theory of
how an offense occurred or that address critical elements of the offense such as intent or
alibi.” [54, p. 7]. This concentrates on the evidential aspect and also how digital evidence
is to be used in a criminal investigation leading to a criminal trial.
2.6.2 How is digital evidence used?
In considering how digital evidence is generated, a first view is that it primarily concerns
computer or cyber crime
The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime [73] broke down the field into
four distinct areas which Walden [255], more succinctly rolls into just three:
Walden’s Categorisation of “Cybercrime” [255]
Area Description
computer-related crime Traditional offences where the instrument for
commission is a computer
content-related crime The use of a computer to distribute illicit content -
for example, copyright material such as films and




The target of the offence is a computer - such as
viruses or hacking.
But the increased use of technology as a general tool for life, especially the mobile
phone, has led to a situation where evidence is generated out-with these arenas. As example,
a man goes to a house and murders the occupant. He is carrying a mobile phone. The
offence does not fall into the supplied cybercrime definitions: it is not used to commit a
traditional crime or deliver illicit content and it is not compromised. Yet its location could
be tracked using cell-site analysis - effectively placing that user at the scene of the crime.
So Digital Evidence can actually be generated as a “digital witness” to events. In
the same way that trace evidence was shown in Section 2.5.1 to make a circumstantial
connection between, for example, fibres on a suspect’s jacket to fibres found at a crime
scene, so digital evidence can link the user of a device to a location or an action.
And as its importance increases, following the commission of an offence, a role for
investigators will be a form of digital “house to house” enquiries. But instead of asking
the occupants if they saw or heard any of the events, the investigators will be checking
to see if the occupants have any digital devices installed which will have inadvertently
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collected digital artefacts. At present this may simply be the installation of a closed-circuit
TV system (CCTV) but as the prevalence of technology increases, such as WiFi networks
and the Internet of Things, more records will be generated.
2.7 Peripheral uses of Digital Evidence
Whilst the use of Digital Evidence in criminal investigations has already been introduced
at section 2.1, there are other areas worthy of consideration. These include “Incident
Response” and “E-Discovery”. From the definition at Section 2.6.1 they may not always
strictly make use of Digital Evidence - since they are not, necessarily, criminal investiga-
tions. But they are worth studying to understand the background to some of the tools that
are later discussed.
2.7.1 Incident response
The terminology surrounding the investigation of computer emergencies - or Incident
Response - has morphed over time. What Walden would call “computer-integrity offences”
[255] - has become a more prominent topic in recent years and may be referenced using
the term “cyber”. But it is, by no means, a recent development.
In 1986, Clifford Stoll investigated the breach of computer systems he was administer-
ing [235].
In 1993 the concepts of “netwar” and “cyberwar” were coined by Arquilla and Ronfeldt
[14]. Netwar relates to a high-level conflict where the target is a large group or population’s
opinion. It involves a multi-faceted attack involving interference with the media and
tampering with networks and databases. Cyberwar is “traditional” warfare applied to
information systems - both for enabling attack - such as smart weapons systems - and as
targets - interfering with an enemy’s information systems.
Since this earlier time, theory and practice have continued with public consciousness
raised by incidents such as the unauthorised access to Sony Corporation’s systems [22]
and the allegations that Russia hacked the Democratic party’s computer systems in the
2016 US elections [168].
The prevalence of these activities is documented but there should be caution if there is
a mixing of investigators who are aiming to secure digital evidence with the intention of
pursuing a criminal prosecution together with others looking solely at securing intelligence
to prevent further attacks. There may be different thresholds on effectiveness of the tools
and the degree to which they can be reliably interpreted.
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2.7.2 E-Discovery
The term “E-discovery” has no strict legal definition but a relatively settled explanation
would appear to be: a process by which “electronic data is sought, located, secured, and
searched with the intent of using it as evidence in a legal case.” [156] echoed in [117].
The driver behind E-Discovery is civil and regulatory litigation - in particular the
duty of a party in proceedings to make evidence available to another. When considering
its application instead to criminal cases, aside from Lawton et al [156], sources [42, 82,
115, 146] focused on E-Discovery’s ability to assist with criminal disclosure - logically
mirroring its current use in the civil sector.
But the arena of disclosure, certainly in the UK, has a different focus for evidence than
for investigation. The code covering this task [245], states the duty of the investigator is to
review and reveal to the defence any material which may undermine the prosecution case
or assist the version of events put forward by the defence. As such, the versions of events
put forward by all parties are known. This provides targets for the material to review and,
when dealing with selection, these targets can be used to reduce it. Most common is the
use of keyword search - as later described in section 2.9.4
But at the beginning of a criminal case, the scenario and the parties involved are
unknown - or only partially known. This means that the ability to focus reviews on any
targets are limited until the enquiry is more mature.
The ability of E-Discovery’s tools and techniques to provide a solution will be consid-
ered at section 2.9.7.
2.8 Current and developing challenges for Digital
Evidence
This section looks at the challenges facing the use of Digital Evidence. It then examines
what has been done to address them and, most importantly, whether these measures address
the four fundamental problem statements posed by this thesis. These statements, originally
defined at section 1.2, are repeated for easy reference. An examiner needs to:
• Understand the available artefacts on any particular data source (Availability);
• Be able to select which of these artefacts are relevant to a particular enquiry (Selec-
tion);
• Be able to to compare artefacts (Correlation); and
• Be able to document the provenance of an artefact - the reason why a particular piece
of data indicates a particular event (Reliability).
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The challenges being considered are the increasing volume and variety of evidence. As
previously argued, these two issues are not the core problems facing digital evidence but,
instead, factors that aggravate the situation when Availability, Selection, Correlation and
Reliability are not addressed successfully.
Concern about the effects of volume and variety is not novel - having been periodically
reviewed and visited by, for example, Carrier in 2003 [50], Hoss et al in 2009 [135],
Raghavan in 2012 [201] and Lilis et al in 2016 [159].
In essence the arguments mirror those captured by the concept of “Big Data” - used as
early as 1997 [164] and reiterated in 2015 [104].
Once the challenges posed by volume and variety have been defined, there will be a
review of the tools and methods that have been developed to address these issues. The idea
is to understand their approach and assess if they can answer the research questions.
The remaining gaps left by the tools will then be outlined. This will form the problem
that is to be tackled in the rest of this thesis.
2.8.1 Volume of data
From early references to Big Data in 1997 [164] to the present day, the increasing volume
of digital evidence has been a consistent theme. Quick and Choo, in their survey of papers
published in the digital evidence field from 1999 to 2014 [200] reported over half of the
ninety surveyed papers covered volume as a topic.
A recent report in March 2017 by the UK’s policing inspectorate noted, despite special
initiatives to clear digital evidence backlogs over the previous two years, there still remained
over 16,000 items awaiting examination in the UK Police evidence stores [132, p.56]. The
report noted understandable concern for this residue and that “sustainable” approaches
were required to make best use of the opportunities presented by Digital Evidence.
Whilst the increase in volume is well documented, the reason why volume presents
such a challenge is not so keenly articulated. Figure 2.3 lays out the effects.
First, volume is a phenomenon that is not all bad - greater amounts of data present
more chances to find probative material. Further, it is much harder for a suspect to destroy
it all.
But volume can have a negative effect on an investigation - both in the way it is
processed and on the ability to locate evidence.
First, if there is too much material to review, valuable resources are tied up processing
and reviewing it which could be otherwise employed. Further, as noted at Section 2.1,
investigation is an iterative task - lines of enquiry change over time and, with conse-
quently changing objectives, this means that increasing volume will adversely affect the
investigation as a whole.




































Fig. 2.3 The effect that increasing volume of Digital Evidence has on criminal investigations
- both positive and negative
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With existing resources but increasing volumes of data, each time the investigative
objectives change logic dictates that the investigator must either:
1. review all of the data again and risk delay to the investigation;
2. selectively review devices that are considered most likely to contain useful artefacts;
or
3. devise a method to reduce the volume of data requiring examination by distilling the
evidentially useful artefacts from all devices for analysis.
Unless all material is reviewed each time, there is always a compromise to the investi-
gation but practicality dictates that multiple complete reviews are not a viable approach. In
reducing volume to facilitate review, there must always be a compromise and it is the way
in which these compromises are made - and their effectiveness - that will be covered in
section 2.9 on tools and approaches.
Together with the investigative compromises is also the chance to miss probative
evidence: unless there is a carefully considered approach, merely trying to look at an
increasing volume of material means that it is harder to discern that which might be of
relevance from that which is not.
The investigative compromises and potentially missed evidence do have an effect on
the Justice system. Suspects may not be identified and can destroy evidence, interfere with
witnesses and commit further offences. On the other hand, suspects who have not been
convicted may have to wait a long time for the results of the investigation and any trial.
This is a considerable pressure - they may not be able to work and will suffer from the
stressful effects of the situation. And they may be innocent.
But there is also an impact on victims and witnesses. As the investigation is delayed
because of the Digital Evidence backlog, vital witnesses may not be identified and ques-
tioned. Memories may fade, records - particularly from mobile phones - may no longer be
available.
So in mitigating the problem of volume, the challenge is to devise a method which
makes the least investigative compromise and is sustainable.
2.8.2 Variety
Earlier, in section 2.6.2 the increasing number of sources for Digital Evidence was dis-
cussed. Casey [53] noted how the increasing use of digital devices for non-core computing
purposes was producing the “digital dust” as described earlier by Locard. The use of
processors in domestic appliance and home entertainment systems - as referenced by the
term “Internet of Things” is producing data that could be most useful as a digital witness.
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For example, if a two person game was played on a Sony PS4 console followed by an
increase in electrical power supply and the use of a washing machine on “hot” wash. This,
in a murder investigation, could provide circumstantial evidence of two people present
before an argument, the use of power tools to dismember the corpse and the washing of
bloodied clothes afterwards.
This is not an abstract concept: in December 2016 news sources reported how investi-
gators were making enquiries of Amazon’s “Alexa” personal assistant in case it recorded
words spoken during a suspected murder [256].
Casey notes the sheer pace of change in technology and how this is affecting digital
evidence [56]: “the lion’s share of digital evidence has migrated from wired computers
to other systems, creating multifaceted challenges for digital investigators.” This change
produces different artefacts in increasingly disparate locations.
As with volume, the increase in variety, managed correctly, is a positive. The issues
are shown at Figure 2.4. The diversity of sources means that suspects may not be able to
keep track of all the digital records that are created as they commit a crime. For instance, a
burglar may forget that his phone connects to a victim’s home WiFi network. With correct
identification and correlation, there are greater opportunities to make connections.
But there are drawbacks - chiefly centring on the diverse nature of these records. This
can be categorised as the “Specialist / Generalist Trade-off” - a term used in the areas of
evolutionary biology [152, 90] and personnel management [152] but not, specifically, in the
field of digital evidence. The issue has, however, been debated in the general forensics field
[213, 210] and, in some senses, mirrors the earlier debate on the gap between investigators
and forensic scientists at section 2.3.
In summing up the debate, the specialist will have an in-depth knowledge of the field -
knowing the artefacts that could be found. But, as noted by Harichandran [127], the way
in which any results are described or presented may not be readily comparable with those
from other specialist fields. Further, the specialist may not have case knowledge - raising a
doubt over whether the most relevant artefacts will be identified and, if they are, will their
significance to the investigation be noted. This can lead to missed evidential connections.
The generalist may be closer to the investigation but will not have such a detailed
knowledge of the available artefacts - meaning some may be overlooked. Further, the
lack of knowledge in a particular field may lead to the reliance on “black-box” tools as
discussed at section 2.11.2. If the findings are not carefully interpreted then this can
mislead an enquiry or, worse, lead to a miscarriage of justice.
Alink et al summarised the situation from a practical perspective: “it is difficult today
to obtain an integrated view on the output of different tools. And again, it is quite unlikely
that a forensic investigator has both the time and the knowledge to apply all appropriate
tools to the evidence at hand” [5].
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So, in dealing with the challenge of variety the problem is to devise a solution which:
• is able to keep track of artefacts on disparate sources;
• is able to select which ones are relevant to an investigation; and
• is able to correlate these artefacts no matter their original source.
2.9 Tools and approaches that have advanced the field
This section looks at solutions that have the potential to answer the research questions.
This is from two perspectives: general approaches and tools.
General approaches are not necessarily designed for Digital Evidence but may still
have the potential to assist. The tools are designed for Digital Evidence and are reviewed,
first, from a theoretical perspective and then a practical one.
2.9.1 Testing and recording provenance
“Recently CRC Press published a book called Forensic Science — An
Introduction to Scientific and Investigative Techniques... The reader is struck
immediately by the scientific rigor applied to every one of the forensic sciences
except digital forensics. Clearly, those of us using digital forensics need to be
concerned about this problem.” Stephenson [230]
Earlier in section 2.5.2, there was a discussion on provenance - not just on the origin of
a piece of evidence but what does this evidence represent? This will now be discussed in
the context of digital evidence. This is important because of the fourth research question:
reliability. A mechanism is required to document the provenance of an artefact - the reason
why a particular piece of data indicates a particular event.
To aid discussion, provenance will be discussed as a number of levels - as shown
at Table 2.1. There should be provision for each level for any item of digital evidence
produced in a criminal trial. These levels can be used as a shorthand where some provision
for testing and recording provenance is provided. If so, which level is it? And is there any
provision for the levels that are outstanding?
If any software tool used by an examiner is “Closed-Source”, more commonly known
as “Blackbox”, how do they satisfy the three levels? This will now be discussed.
When any forensic tool is used without the source code being available, this presents a
problem since there is a limit to the amount of checks that can be conducted on its operation.
The code cannot be inspected. To cater for this Wilsdon et al proposed a blackbox testing
regime involving the generation of test cases and reference sets [260].
This idea was taken further by Buchanan [43] with the actual generation of these tests
and data. The tests were simple - purely the recovery of files with no interpretation of their
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Table 2.1
The Provenance Levels for Digital Evidence
Level Question How Answered
1 What data can be
found in a certain
location or structure
and what is the
justification for
saying this?
Chain of evidence showing location of
physical item and subsequent processes used
to read / make a copy of data contained within
any storage device. Efficacy of any software
used to interpret at a higher level - such as
parsing master boot records and file systems.
Ability to repeat / reproduce by reference to
definitive location - such as physical sector or
file path




Justification that the data at a certain location
can be represented as, for example, an IP
address, MAC address or GPS coordinates




Justification for asserting that the identified
data item exemplifies an event or act - for
example, the presence of a device in a
physical location or the connection of the
device to a particular network.
content. As such only a small subset of the functions were tested. Flandrin et al [101]
in 2014 reviewed this and other previous efforts. They noted drawbacks in all previous
propositions due either to the impracticality of the suggestion or that the proposal was too
limited in scope to be effective.
The US government agency NIST has continued to test tools with its latest results
published in 2015 [173]. The tools tested for computers are limited to:
• Wiping of media
• Imaging of media
• Hardware and software write blocking
• Deleted file recovery
• File carving
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Whilst important, these are basic functions. Notable by their absence are tests on
functions upon which examiners routinely rely:
• The interpretation of file systems
• The presentation of artefacts
It is of note that in its specification for testing mobile devices [174] NIST goes much
further. The testing involves the successful extraction of user and device data in its tests
MDT-CA-06 to 07 and MDT-AO-04 to 05[175] including the phone book, call logs, text
messages, instant messages and third party application data.
This is only provision for level 1 and, possibly, level 2 provenance but not level 3. But
these tests are an advance because of the breadth of coverage. However, the issue of variety
has a direct impact on the usefulness of these tests:
1. Are the tests able to keep up with the rapid changes to mobile device hardware and
operating systems?
2. In testing application data, how will the tests keep track of the variances caused by
the interraction of different application versions, operating systems and devices?
It is understandable that NIST should seek to test only the core forensic software
functions on general types of device hardware and software. It regards these a “head start
on validating the tool” [173]. But the clear inference from this phrase is that NIST expects
examiners to validate at least part of the tool’s functions themselves.
Due to workload and, perhaps a lack of knowledge, Digital Evidence examiners have
come to rely on computer forensic tools to, for example, interpret data from hard disk
images or extract data from mobile phones. In using these comprehensive tools, sales
literature has often made claims leading to an “industry myth that certain tools have been
accepted by the courts” [166]. Whilst this comment was made in 2005, a review of these
tools in Section 2.11.2 shows some are still doing so.
This is not a defensible stance for two reasons:
• first, as seen in section 2.5.2, just because evidence has been used in Court, it does
not mean that it has been “tested”. In fact, very little of it is subjected to informed
challenge.
• second, the stance defies legal procedure in, at least, the US and the UK. Meyers
records a commonly cited US legal judgement [166] deciding that software packages
are not experts. Instead the material produced by the tool has to be presented by
an expert after informed interpretation. Similarly, in the UK, there is no legal
mechanism for the automatic acceptance of expert evidence from specialist forensic
tools.
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Even if the efficacy of closed source tools is accepted and they are properly operated,
Stephenson’s 2002 assertion [230] must be considered:
“Computer forensics comes fairly close, in process, to being rigorous, but,
even here, the rigor is in the process, not the interpretation of data.”
To summarise the issue of testing and recording provenance, there are limited efforts to
test the successful identification, extraction and presentation of artefacts. These efforts are
limited due to the changing nature of technology - testing cannot keep pace. The testing
that has been conducted provides assurance of Levels 1 and 2 Provenance.
But how is Level 3 provenance provided? Does, for example, an SMS text message
in a mobile phone “Inbox” mean that the user received this message? And what do any
associated dates and times mean - are they the time the message was sent, received or read?
And if this level 3 provenance is not provided, what meaning will be assumed when this
piece of data is used at a criminal trial?
2.9.2 Linked data
The concept of Linked Data was first discussed by Tim Berners-Lee in 2006 [28]. He cited
what were to become known as the “Linked Data Principles”[31]:
• Use Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) as names for things;
• Use HTTP URIs so that people can look up those names;
• When someone looks up a URI, provide useful information, using the standards
(RDF [40], SPARQL [242]); and
• Include links to other URIs, so that they can discover more things.
The purpose of these principals is to provide a foundation enabling the linking of
disparate data sources using the Internet. This resonates with the third research problem:
correlation - providing a classification scheme to compare artefacts.
Some applications of Linked Data have been found in the Digital Evidence field:
• Dosis [84] uses Linked Data principals to join events to times whilst Gayed et al
[110] propose their use for proving evidential chain of custody;
• Syed et al [236] propose a “Unified Cyber Ontology”(UCO) which, in its prototype
form, models software vulnerabilities. The benefit of using Linked Data principals is
that the model can link to other external data sets to perform compound queries; and
• Nimbalkar et al [179] build on the UCO work to show how log files can be broken
down into their component parts and links formed between them.
But whilst the concept of Linked Data shows promise, the development of the field for
digital evidence is still in its infancy.
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2.9.3 Triage
Triage is “the process of determining the most important people or things from amongst a
large number that require attention” [189]. Whilst it is used in the digital evidence field
there are differing approaches to triage with the process described by Shaw and Brown as
“poorly defined and poorly understood” [223].
One approach is to have an early, targeted, inspection of the evidence for any material
of apparent assistance [209]. This is a tactic employed by the UK’s Metropolitan Police to
look at mobile phone data [132].
The second approach is described by Parsonage as “a process for sorting enquiries into
groups based on the need for, or likely benefit from, examination” [193] and echoed by
Clarke [67].
Quick and Choo [200] propose a third approach where a subset of potentially relevant
files is extracted and analysed in place of a full image.
Concerns about triage have been expressed [144, 198, 212]. If triage is used by non-
experts in advance of a full inspection, are they able to accurately interpret any results. If
used by either experts or non-experts, to select devices for a full examination, what criteria
are used?
In summary, there may well be a case for the use of triage but its effectiveness depends
on the tools looking for the relevant data in the correct location. The surveyed papers gave
no indication of how this was to be achieved.
2.9.4 Keyword Searching
Whilst the concept of keyword searching is a basic one with little need for explanation, it
is still a fundamental tool to sift through data. The function has moved on to conceptual or
fuzzy matching of words [156] but these are variations on a theme.
Despite being one of the most commonly used forensic techniques, it is only of use
when the likely keywords are known. This is problematic at the start of a large complex
conspiracy investigation as those words may not be readily apparent.
For example, in the insider dealing investigation of Matthew Uberoi et al [155], the
son was working in an investment bank and sent his father coded instructions to buy shares
in the guise of an order for takeaway chinese food. At the early stages of an investigation,
these details were not known. Only after examining emails and noting that the messages
were suspicious - no one could eat that much chinese food - was the connection made and
the keyword search for “chinese” run.
This shows the limitations that can be encountered when using keywords for, example,
the triage of devices. The significance of the word “chinese” would not have been known
at the start of the case and its presence on any device would not have been important.
Keyword searching does not assist in assessing availability and selection since it is run
across all data - unless some culling has first been conducted using some other method.
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Similarly it does not assist with correlation since, without some form of classification
system, it is assessing whether any piece of data on a source matches the keyword and,
again, this depends on first knowing the correct keyword.
2.9.5 Time-lining
Time-lining is, effectively, getting a number of events or pieces of data and lining them up
in time order. It is cited as a valuable tool for digital evidence examination [60]. Indeed in
the Operation Saturn insider dealing trial [99], the time-line of evidence from disparate
sources provided compelling evidence of suspects looking at confidential documents before
transmitting them to accomplices.
But there are three problems with the approach.
• First, the volume of time stamps in modern digital devices can be a challenge. As
noted by Gudjonsson [122]: “A super time-line often contains too many events
for the investigator to fully analyze, making data reduction or an easier method of
examining the time-line essential.” But if the examiner is selecting only particular
records to put in the time-line, how is this selection made?
• Second, there may be variances in the time stamps due to inaccurate clocks, time
zones and the very manner by which they were created. As Schatz notes: “all but
the simplest of forensic investigations will involve multiple computer time sources
in various states of de-synchronisation” [217]. If the clocks are not aligned, or if
the times they represent not unified, then a time-line is not only of little use but
also hazardous as evidence will be missed. This affects any ability to answer both
the correlation and reliance questions. Methods have been proposed to check for
accuracy by, for example Willassen [259] and Schatz [219], but these will only be
effective if they keep pace with the increasing variety of data sources.
• Third, time-lines are only useful in certain scenarios - normally at an advanced
stage of the investigation when the facts are well established and there is a desire to
impose some order on them. Even some tool developers warn on this aspect: “By
limiting a search’s scope to only a particular date or time, or even a range of dates or
times, investigators may miss important and relevant information: an argument that
occurred several weeks before the homicide, for instance, or a pattern of harassing
behavior with more victims than just a single complainant” [59].
When considering the limitations outlined above, time-lines do not assist with avail-
ability or selection - some other method must be used. But time-lines do assist with
correlation as long as some method is found to first unify both the times and their semantic
representation before inclusion.
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2.9.6 Hash functions
The use of Hash functions such as MD5 [206] and SHA-1 [78] feature prominently in
many aspects of digital evidence. They are a way of generating a code for any piece of
data that is unlikely to be generated for any other different piece of data. Since files are
just a “piece” of data, this means that they provide the ability to recognise files - and the
differences - based on whether or not they generate a particular hash code value. Identical
files will generate the same value.
It is not the properties and operation of hash functions that are pertinent for this
discussion but, instead, their ability to address the four research questions.
In essence, hash functions can be used to filter out extraneous material or look for
potentially relevant material.
For example, NIST maintains the National Software Reference Library (NSRL) [172]
containing the hash values of files from common operating systems and applications. This
means that the files on a device can be hashed and compared against the NSRL library to
filter out files which are unlikely to contain relevant material. Alternatively, they can be
used to look for the presence of particular applications.
Garfinkel et al [105] use hash functions to search across large volumes of data . The
targets are known files and their fragments or, instead, fragments of known data structures
such as those found in JPEG files. Statistical sampling methods are used to reduce the
volume of data that must be checked. Roussev [211] shows how “data fingerprinting” can
take the characteristics of a file for comparison rather than having to search for all of it.
Whilst a valid technique, hash functions do not address the research questions. They
do not assist with knowledge of available artefacts or their selection. They do not ensure
that data values are in a consistent format to aid correlation. They do not provide any
assistance with reliability.
2.9.7 E-Discovery
Earlier, at section 2.7.2, E-Discovery was introduced. As a reminder, this is a process by
which “electronic data is sought, located, secured, and searched with the intent of using it
as evidence in a legal case” [156].
The process is largely concerned with civil and regulatory cases though is now making
in roads for disclosure exercises and the investigation itself [156]. For this reason it has
been reviewed.
A common reference point for E-Discovery is the Electronic Discovery Reference
Model (EDRM) [86] which is illustrated at Figure 2.5.
A review of this model shows the “Identification” phase could assist with the selection
problem because it aims to locate and understand potential sources of electronically stored
information. But the EDRM offers guidelines which, though informative, are high level
check lists of the activities to perform. And no material based on the EDRM was found

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 2.5 The E-Discovery Reference Model (EDRM) [87]
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that would further assist in identifying what digital material was available and how any
selection could be performed.
The EDRM’s Processing, Review and Analysis phases aim to:
• reduce the volume of data and convert it into a reviewable form;
• evaluate it for relevance; and
• evaluate it for content - such as topics and people.
If successful, this would address the questions of selection and correlation. But,
essentially, the tools being used to perform these functions are keyword searching and
categorisation by file type and time - a form of time-lining. The benefits and disadvantages
of these have already been covered.
Further, as noted by Lawton [156], E-Discovery is centred on user generated material
such as documents, spreadsheets and emails. This is not the breadth of data available
on devices. Finally, a key driver for digital investigations is to locate evidence but for
E-Discovery it is about managing costs.
Lawton’s review - the only paper found examining E-Discovery tools from a criminal
investigation perspective - noted that there were advantages to the contemporary tools:
• the ability to convert data from disparate sources into a common format such as
XML; and
• the presentation of a common interface for this data.
This could assist with correlation. But it did, however, note that the commercial tools
were “generally poor at helping the investigator to understand the links between their
data and spot new investigative leads”. An example of this is its XML coding [88]. This
contains a limited number of classifiers which all relate to either email header fields or file
meta-data such as size and creation date.
2.9.8 Digital Evidence artefact / information repositories
This section looks at attempts to record information about Digital Evidence artefacts. If
effective, any repository could answer the availability question and may assist in selection
and correlation. They will reviewed with these possibilities in mind.
The Forensic Wiki
The Forensic Wiki was first established in 2005 [238] and covers “information about digital
forensics”. This is not limited to artefacts but also covers “tools and techniques used by
investigators”.
The Wiki shows a healthy usage - currently consisting 856 pages with regular additions.
There is no data to understand how commonly these pages are referenced.
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The pages are organised in a tree-based category system - 13 main categories, discount-
ing three for administration, and further sub-categories. The “Tool” category, for example,
has a further 12 sub-categories covering such topics as “Disk imaging” and “Vaporware”.
Aside from these categories, there is no structured tagging system and so searching the
Wiki for topics pertinent to a particular digital evidence source would not be possible.
The Artifact Genome Project
The Artifact Genome Project (AGP) [15] is an an “online system for uploading and
viewing digital forensic artifacts”. Its initial development came from documenting “cyber
observables” as described by the CybOX project [77]. This concentrates on system-wide
attacks in the Incident Response field as documented in section 2.7.1.
In terms of classification, before submission of an artefact to the AGP, a user must first
select an artefact type - which includes File, Windows Registry, SMS Message and Email.
A unique name must be chosen and the type of entity that created this artefact must be
chosen - for example: User, System or Network.
In specifying the Device upon which this artefact was found, the description is not
broken down into its constituent parts - such as device, file system and operating system. It
is instead listed complete, for example “Computer, Windows 10, 64 bit, NTFS”.
Other data items are captured - such as date and time of the artefact’s discovery and
subsequent addition to AGP and the person discovering it.
AGP invites users to also submit the reference sources used for any submission.
To search AGP, the artefact type, device type and other entered criteria can be selected
together with the use of keywords.
Observations on AGP are as follows:
• The project has momentum - at the time of review it contained 439 artefacts and it is
being actively publicised to garner more entries [264];
• It is not clear if AGP stores information about artefacts or the actual artefact data
itself. For example, its SMS Message Artifact template invites completion of the
Sender and Recipients’ phone numbers but its “Email Windows 10 AOL Content”
artefact documents the folder where AOL email messages are stored.
• In addressing availability and selection, AGP’s artefact classification system limits
the assistance it can provide:
– Because devices are listed in a system format - ie combining the device type,
file system and operating system together - there may be a lack of flexibility.
For example, the NTFS file system has artefacts contained within it that are
irrespective of the operating system. There is no mechanism for recording
these artefacts.
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– There is the potential for ambiguity in the terms employed by AGP and this
is shown when conducting searches. For example, the network Media Access
Control (MAC) address is a common and useful identifier. But, in AGP how
does a user search for any artefacts that relate to the MAC? A search for ‘MAC’
on its keyword and Tags function both returned hits relating to “Macintosh”.
And further, even if there was a specific tag for “MAC” would this relate to the
Media Access Control or a Message Authentication Code?
• Some of the listed artefacts do not provide sufficient detail to provide great assistance
to an examiner or be readily searched. For example the “File iOS 10.3.1 Wifi
Connections” artefact states it contains data relating to WiFi connections. But it does
not document the positions in the referenced file that these discrete data items can
be found. Further, it does not explicitly list the - earlier referenced - MAC addresses
that can be found in this file.
The observations indicate that the AGP could be a valuable addition to the field but to
assist with the four research questions there needs to be clarity on the data that it is trying
to represent. It also needs a controlled vocabulary with structure so that users are able to
better understand the artefacts it contains and how it can be searched.
Magnet Forensics Artifact Exchange
In 2017, Magnet Forensics created the Artifact Exchange [161]. This is not an open-source
repository and it has not been possible to review it.
2.9.9 Repositories: summary of findings
The Forensic Wiki and AGP both aim to increase awareness in the digital evidence field.
Both of these repositories suffer from a lack of controlled vocabulary. Without this,
names and terms will lack clarity and there is a danger of capturing irrelevant information
as well as the pertinent artefacts. This makes them difficult to search for the available
artefacts on a particular device and there is no method for selection based on investigative
need.
2.10 Previous research on digital evidence tools
Before considering the tools that have been developed to examine digital evidence, it is
worthwhile examining the research has been conducted into these tools. Are the Research
Questions addressed by the tools - or do the tools seek to answer different questions?
The review stems from some of the earliest studies in 2003 to the present day.
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2.10.1 Comments on provenance
There is significant comment on provenance. Carrier [50] in 2003, and to a greater extent,
Wilsdon et al in 2006 [260], argued that tools, whilst providing access to evidence do
not allow verification of the evidence’s reliability - essential if digital forensics is to
approached from a “scientific point of view”. To improve the situation, abstraction layers
were proposed - this breaks a tool down into the functions it performs with the output from
one function feeding into the next. Each layer can be independently tested to understand if
it performs its intended function accurately and completely.
Beckett et al [23], in 2007, noted how examiners relied on vendors to validate the tools
they produce yet this validation is often undocumented and unproven. Whilst one method
of testing could be the use of two different tools to understand if they achieve the same
result, this takes no heed of the possibility that both tools could be wrong.
Instead it was argued that the development of individual forensic tool testing can be
avoided if a neutral stance is adopted. A predetermined function is contemplated with the
tool tested against its ability to perform this function using a defined reference set. This
carries on the earlier proposal of layers.
This means that, first, the choice of a tool is irrelevant so long as it can demonstrably
perform this function. Second, testing new iterations of a particular tool is simplified -
simply run its functionality against a reference set and verify the expected results. Guo et
al [125] in 2009 and Casey [55] in 2012 echo this view.
On the surface, this proposal may not seem particularly novel but, in fact, it is because
of the shift of focus from the tool to the function. As new forensic artefacts are discovered,
the consideration is selection of a tool that can accurately perform the required function -
ie extract this artefact. As Becket [23] notes, this is a new paradigm.
The 2015 publication of the NIST tool testing handbook [173] saw a comprehensive
review of a large number of digital forensic tools. In a sense, it begins the journey outlined
above because it conducted tests on only certain capabilities of a tool. They are intended
only as a baseline on top of which examiners can subsequently conduct their own tests.
The difference is that, instead of breaking down the tool into functional layers to test, it
tests certain functions of a whole tool.
2.10.2 Comments on availability, selection and correlation
Ayers [17], in 2009, argued that “tools are not keeping pace with increased complexity and
data volumes of modern investigations.” These “First Generation” tools concentrate on the
extraction of files but Ayers argues that the examiner’s purpose is not to locate relevant
files but, instead, relevant evidence.
The necessary attributes of second generation tools that address these problems are
defined by Ayers. These attributes are predictable: fast processing speed; accuracy and
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reliability; auditability and repeatability; and data abstraction. There are possibilities
outlined for how these attributes may be gained without any concrete proposals
The same year, this view was echoed by Beebe et al [24] noting that the goal of
tools should be to provide “information and knowledge, not merely data”. This includes
“automated link analysis” and “cross-correlation”. It asks why digital forensic tools did not
yet meet the needs of examiners?
In a prescient review in 2010, Garfinkel [107] argued that the tools developed in
preceding years would be unable to cope with future challenges including:
• increasing volume
• increasing variety creating difficulty in extracting artefacts and then correlating them
across sources




In a practical suggestion to address these problems Garfinkel argued that there is a
requirement for the creation of a “a wide range of abstractions - standardized ways for
thinking about, representing, and computing with information ranging from a few bytes to
a person’s lifetime data production.”
Raghavan’s 2013 survey [203] included an examination of a forensic tool’s ability to
“compose” evidence using meta-data from heterogeneous sources and identify correlations.
In some part, this was testing whether Garfinkel’s earlier suggestion had been implemented.
The eleven surveyed tools included four of the, then popular, commercial offerings. Only
one was found to provide such correlation and this was based on keywords.
Raghavan noted that the tools relied on the examiner supplying the appropriate keyword
or attribute for comparison but, of course, should the examiner not supply the correct
criteria, the pattern would be missed. Further, few of the available meta-data - aside from
IP addresses, user names and timestamps - were considered. This leaves a large amount of
them under-utilised.
In 2013 Salem et al [216] noted the increasing diversity of mobile devices and the
inherent difficulty in selecting the correct tool to perform an examination. They warned how
selection of an incorrect tool could lead to “compromised evidence, incorrect interpretations
and wrong conclusions”.
In 2015 Katie et al [149], in their taxonomy of digital forensic challenges, noted
increasing volume and also how forensic tools designed to cope with the various devices
are incompatible with each other. In essence, there is no system allowing the outputs from
these tools to be correlated.
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2.10.3 Summary
Over a long period of time, the research questions of availability, selection, correlation and
reliability have been continually cited by researchers. Yet contemporary reviews of tools
do not identify efforts to address these questions.
The following section looks at these tools to verify this point and, if proven, why this
is the case and how it could be addressed.
2.11 Digital evidence tools
This section reviews tools from two perspectives: modular and monolithic.
Modular tools are those which provide a framework to intentionally allow the incorpo-
ration of various other “plug-in” tools to perform a certain task. Of those surveyed, they
are largely open-source and require a greater level of technical knowledge to operate than
monolithic tools.
Monolithic tools are more restricted in their ability to integrate with other tools but
offer a more user-friendly interface. They are designed to offer a platform where all
required tasks can be performed on a particular source. Of those surveyed, they tended to
be commercial.
The review of monolithic tools is based solely on the information from the various
companies’ websites and material they make available such as “white papers”. On the face
of it, this is not comprehensive - a fair evaluation would involve trialling the products.
However, the point of this exercise is to understand how an examiner would select a
tool to use? If there is a limited budget to purchase a Digital Evidence examination tool




The Netherlands Forensic Institute first released a product called Xiraf [5] which was
further developed to produce Hansken [251]. The documentation describes more of an
approach than a tool. Further, although knowledge has been built up through considerable
practical application, the tool appears to be commercial: no open source download or trial
evaluation was found. As such, only a limited assessment can be conducted.
Essentially, Hansken states it uses a modular approach to process data from any source
so that it can be viewed through one web interface. Analysis can be conducted by keyword
search, time-line or selective review of evidence types - such as chat messages.
Whilst there are information security controls built into Hansken, it does appear similar
to an e-discovery system. There is insufficient documentation to understand if it goes
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further than the user created data such as documents, spreadsheets and emails that these
systems would handle.
Documentation states that it can handle data from many sources but there is no detail.
The sparse documentation means that it is not possible to assess its approach to the
Research Questions.
Google Rapid Response
Google Rapid Response (GRR) is principally an incident response framework - a tool
for collecting data from live systems suspected of being compromised or involved in
compromise [69].
It aims to provide a centralised source of artefacts that is free and compiled by the
general community. Castle, [58], reasons that during incident response, there is a need
to retrieve common pieces of information whose location and format may vary across
heterogeneous systems. These need to be collected and grouped automatically - without
respect to the source - ie they should be comparable.
This approach has benefits:
• first, this assists with availability as there is a list of artefacts to reference; and
• second, the ability to compare artefacts across a variety of sources addresses the
question of correlation.
However, when examining the store of GRR artefacts it is clear that there is some work
to be conducted before the goals are realised. The location of artefacts is not stated in
sufficiently granular detail to allow easy and effective extraction. For example a location
of Microsoft Office Most Recently Used (MRU) on Darwin (OS X) systems is listed as:
• %%users.homedir%%/Library/Preferences/com.microsoft.office.plist
But this is only the location of the file that contains this data - not the location of the
data within that file. This further detail can only be implied from reviewing the python code
specified in the supplied reference. As such, this is not platform agnostic or automatically
parsable. An improvement would be to have the explicit location of the actual data item
specified in the artefact entry.
GRR also has a stated aim of grouping artefacts and its style guide [165] sets out
definitions for these groups using “labels”. Examples are:
• Browser: Web Browser artifacts.
• Memory: Artefacts retrieved from memory.
• Rekall: Artefacts using the Rekall memory forensics framework
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These may be sufficient for incident response but offer little utility for criminal investi-
gations:
• first, they are too broad to allow proper comparison across heterogeneous sources
with no specification for reporting format; and
• second, they are drafted from a technical perspective which does not allow an
investigator to understand which artefacts could assist in a line of enquiry.
Bulk Extractor
Bulk Extractor [108] searches for patterns across any digital source. These patterns can be
in the simple form of, for example, IP addresses, email addresses or telephone numbers or
the more complex, such as patterns that identify a particular file type. This now extends to
“SQLite” databases [33] - currently a common storage point for mobile phone applications.
The idea behind Bulk Extractor is that it is source neutral - acting on any digital stream
- and is blind to the file system - looking only for patterns. Because of this, the approach
to availability and selection is not device specific. Instead, availability relates to those
patterns for which Bulk Extractor can search and selection relates to those patterns that are
chosen.
In terms of correlation, Bulk Extractor’s radical approach has both positives and
negatives. First, its media and file system insensitive approach means that an examiner can
handle data from any source. Further, its ability to search for a pattern and output this in a
consistent manner aids easy correlation - as noted by Garfinkel [106].
But this very approach of media blindness also has an impact: first, more data may be
processed than is necessary when compared to GRR’s approach of identifying a particular
artefact in a location and just extracting that data. Second, as noted by Bradley et al [33],
the scanners are limited when discussing false positives. Care is required when interpreting
them. The reason for this caution is that the position of an artefact within a file and the
location of that file within an operating system are key to any interpretation. Bulk Extractor,
on its own, does not provide this information.
Sleuthkit and Autopsy
“The Sleuthkit” and its front-end, “Autopsy” [240] are an open source framework for
processing any digital media.
Essentially, the file system is processed and the material made available for keyword
search, time lining or selective review of contents. Third-party modules are available to,
for example, ingest Windows Pre-fetch files [226].
There is a facility called “Interesting files” which aims to bring any predefined objects
of note to the immediate attention of the examiner. This was also noted with Bulk Extractor
using “watch lists”.
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In terms of availability and selection, no assistance is provided by Sleuthkit. In terms
of correlation, although Sleuthkit is adapting to various disparate media - it now parses
material from Android operating system devices - it does not use any form of uniform
data representation or categorisation. Further, its third-party module developer instructions
[226] has no specification in this regard.
If Sleuthkit could be married with a central source of artefacts then its effectiveness
could be improved.
2.11.2 Monolithic Tools
As earlier referenced, the term “monolithic tools” is used to describe comprehensive tools
that are designed to provide an all-in-one solution to processing and examining digital
evidence.
There are benefits to this approach: a consistent interface allows easier control of the
tool; and, properly implemented, the tool should be able to correlate disparate artefacts
across the sources on which it is used.
In the earlier review of research on digital evidence tools in section 2.10, criticism
was levelled at these tools but no definitive analysis of the digital evidence tool market
place has been identified. Certainly, whilst there may be some justification to the criticism,
there also needs to be consideration of the role that the developers are trying to perform.
They are driven by the demands of their clients to handle increasing volume and variety -
already discussed at sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.2. This leads the tools to focus on these issues.
But this thesis argues that volume and variety are aggravating factors for digital evidence
examination - not the underlying problems.
A number of tools will be briefly reviewed. Comments in this review are not intended
to downplay the significance and utility of these tools but to document how the tools could
answer the research questions in whole or part.
For brevity, it should be assumed that all of these tools provide facilities for keyword
and pattern searching, time lining and selective review of extracted contents. A deeper
look at certain specific tools takes place at section 6.5.1.
The available literature of the following tools was reviewed:
• ADF Triage [2, 3];
• Encase Forensic [124, 92];
• Forensic Toolkit (FTK) [1]; and
• Nuix [181, 182].
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Availability of artefacts
Of the documentation reviewed for these tools, there was no material which described
the artefacts that are available for a particular device and, of these, which ones could be
extracted by the respective tool.
As examples, Encase’s promotional literature states that it supports the “widest array
of computers, smartphones, and tablets of any forensics software solution” but there is no
listing of these devices or respective artefacts. And FTK states that it handles operating
systems such as iOS and databases such as SQLite but does not state what artefacts it
extracts from them.
Selection of artefacts
All the tools allowed selection based on keyword search and file system meta-data such as
creation date.
Where the surveyed tools allowed more sophisticated selection of artefacts, this was
on a technical process. For example ADF has categories such as “APPLICATIONS >
Application Usage”.
Nuix differs slightly in that it states that it can automatically retrieve and correlate:
“company names, sums of money, email addresses, IP addresses, and social security, phone,
and credit card numbers”. But it is not clear if this is also conducted on keyword and
pattern matching or if some internal categorisation is used. As such it was not possible to
assess.
Correlation of artefacts
The only one of the surveyed tools to explicitly discuss correlation was Nuix. As detailed
above, its selection process specifically details the extraction of such values as phone and
credit card numbers. The success of correlation will depend on whether some sort of
classification system is employed to ensure that, for example, the same phone number,
stored in different formats, is matched.
Also of note is that Nuix, certainly in 2014, was actively promoting the ability of its
product to operate with other tools. It has published an Application Program Interface (API)
but, again, there is no data classification or formats listed so this limits any assessment of
correlation.
Reliability of artefacts
Terms such as, “Forensically Sound”, “Court-cited” and “Court-acceptance” were used
in the surveyed literature. The possible hazards of using these terms has already been
explored at section 2.5.2.
Level 1 provenance was documented - where the artefact value was found - but there
was no mention of Levels 2 and 3.
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Summary of monolithic tools
The surveyed tools suffer from a lack of technical documentation. This presents difficulties
when reviewing their effectiveness in addressing the research questions.
There is no documentation of the artefacts that are and are not covered by a tool - so
how is an examiner able to assess their completeness? Selection of these artefacts is either
from a technical perspective or from a category named, for example, “Application” usage .
There is insufficient description for an examiner to assess what this category covers. There
is no documented facility to effectively correlate artefacts from different sources and no
documentation on the justification for a particular artefact.
How could monolithic tools be improved?
There are two improvements that would enhance the use of these monolithic tools.
First, if there was a uniform listing of artefacts, a tool could explicitly state which of
these it is able to extract. Essentially, this takes the onus of identifying this data away from
the developers and leaves them to produce fast extraction tools.
A further benefit is that these artefacts could then be organised from an investigative
perspective rather than a technical one.
Second, if artefacts could be extracted from these tools with a uniform type and format,
then this data could be readily compared with other tools and shared amongst investigators.
In a manner, this is an extension of the formats specified by the E-Discovery Reference
Model.
This second point appears to be gaining some traction with the recent announcement
of the Cyber-investigation Analysis Standard Expression (CASE) [20, 94]. Developers,
including all of the surveyed monolithic tools, have expressed interest in this project and it
could provide a core foundation for the expression of artefacts and their comparison across
sources and tools.
The project aims to address the shortcomings identified to date. In particular: allowing
the communication of artefacts in a standardised form; maintaining provenance; and
providing support for structured and linked data.
In terms of addressing the research questions, it does not assist in assessing the
availability and selection of artefacts. It is not a library of what may be available, it is a
method for documenting what has been found.
In terms of correlation, the design is still at an early stage but inspection shows it to
be principally concerned with documenting the technical details observed on a device -
such as “BrowserCookie”. It has already published mappings of how, in one example,
the results from a mobile phone examination tool can be mapped to a central set of terms
[241]. This aids correlation because the results of other tools, which are also mapped to
this central set of terms, can be compared.
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Where it has not yet been developed is to document which items of data within a
“BrowserCookie” would be of use to an examiner and providing a uniform format for them
to be reported.
In terms of reliability, it addresses Level One by documenting not just the source of
the artefact data but also the tool that was used to extract it. But not Levels Two or Three
which form part of what is referenced as “Evidence Analysis”.
2.12 Conclusions
The first research requirement, detailed at Section 1.1, called for a thorough examination
of the issues that need to be addressed to see an improvement in examination. These are
availability, selection, correlation and reliability.
The review of current non-digital evidence sources at section 2.4.4 found that the use
of classification systems to document findings has been a key factor in their success. This
has allowed selection and correlation of artefacts.
The review of both theory and practice of digital evidence tools at section 2.10 found
that no such a classification system has been developed so far.
The development of CASE, detailed at section 2.11.2, shows promise in documenting
the results of tools. But first, it does not assist an examiner to know what artefacts may be
available and which ones to select. And, second, its current manifestation is at technical
level and there is still a challenge in mapping these results to the investigative questions
that require answers.
Whilst some systems aim to document the location that data was found together with
the method and tools used to extract it, there is still a gap in establishing Level Two and
Three provenance - why a piece of data can be represented in a certain way and what does
its presence mean?
But the benefits of a suitable classification system that were seen in the three previously
reviewed forensic evidence fields could also alleviate the problems seen in digital evidence
for the following reasons:
1. artefacts could be compared, irrespective of source or the tool used to extract them;
2. artefacts could be selected based on the particular investigative questions that require
answers;
3. the burden of provenance would be alleviated if tools merely had to be proven to
extract a particular artefact rather than also attempting to interpret it; and
4. a tool could list which artefacts it covered - so allowing the examiner to select the
most appropriate one.
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The research questions posed by this thesis are documented at section 1.2 but are
repeated for convenience:
Principal Question
• RQ1: Can a classification system be devised that allows for the documentation of
digital evidence artefacts and facilitates their extraction and comparison?
Availability
• RQ2: How can this classification system allow for differing digital sources and
rapid changes in technology?
Selection
• RQ3: Is it possible for this classification system to reduce the volume of digital
evidence that requires examination?
• RQ4: Can this classification system allow for the selection of artefacts based on
investigative criteria as opposed to technical ones?
Correlation
• RQ5: Can the classification system allow for successful comparison of artefacts
irrespective of their source or originating format?
• RQ6: Can the classification system allow the use of any tools to process evidence?
Reliance
• RQ7: Can the classification system provide for the provenance of these artefacts to
be established?
The use of a form of model called an ontology is proposed for this classification system.
The next chapter continues the first research requirement’s thorough examination of
the issues. First it explains models and ontologies and then goes on to review the field to





The previous chapter provided background on investigation and its use of forensic evidence.
The focus then moved to the examination of digital evidence and the challenges it faces.
After examining approaches and tools used for this field, gaps were identified when
considering the research problems.
It was proposed that a classification system could answer these questions. This leads
on to the Hypothesis detailed at Section 1.1 - that an ontology can improve the effective
examination of digital evidence in large criminal cases.
This chapter introduces ontologies and allied models. In so doing it justifies the choice
of this format for classification.
First, the terminology will be examined. Included in this discussion of models and
ontologies will be an allied topic: digital evidence taxonomies. The reason for this
discussion of terms is to highlight their evident ambiguity. For this reason, when previous
research is then considered, it does not strictly stick to ontologies. The reason for this
consideration is that it is not just whether any of the previously specified ontologies are
suitable for re-use but if any of the models or taxonomies have ontological properties
which make them also suitable for such re-use?
The review of the various models that have been developed is then detailed. The
analysis takes in quite a lengthy period of time because, as will be seen, some of the
fundamental challenges of digital evidence were recognised from quite an early stage and it
is useful to understand the solutions that were proposed and why they were not successful?
Following this, ontologies will be covered - and in some depth since the rest of this
thesis looks at how their use may alleviate digital evidence’s outlined problems:
• Some general ontologies will be first covered because they may provide assistance.
Included in this section will be some ontologies relating to the Internet of Things
and Building Automation Systems as these arenas also have to contend with the
same problems as digital evidence. There may be some lessons that can be learned;
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• Specific digital evidence ontologies will then be considered to understand how the
field has been advanced and any shortcomings that have been identified; and
• Finally, there will be a summary of the material with a proposal for future work.
This leads to the Chapters 4 and 5 which detail “DESO”, the ontology designed to
act as a classification system. This ontology is then applied to some digital evidence
problems in Chapter 6 to understand how it answers the research questions and identify
any shortcomings that require further work.
3.2 Terminology
3.2.1 Models
Whilst the term “model” is liberally used in digital evidence research - examples [11, 21,
197] - the term is rarely defined. Since the authors surveyed do not define the term when
using it, the presumption is that reliance is placed on the common perception of the word.
Sampled dictionary definitions are in relative agreement:
• “something that represents another thing, either as a physical object that is usually
smaller than the real object, or as a simple description that can be used in calculations”
[48]; and
• “A thing used as an example to follow or imitate” [185].
Philosophically, Frigg and Hartman [102] note that models can perform two functions.
The first can represent a certain section of the world - either the phenomena or data they
contain. The second function of a model is its use to represent a theory - representing its
“laws and axioms”. They note that these functions are not mutually exclusive.
The word “axiom” is used frequently by the model and ontology field. and for clarity is
taken to mean, in this context, “ a statement or proposition on which an abstractly defined
structure is based” [187].
There is no intention to pursue a protracted debate on the issue. It appears that the












Fig. 3.1 An example taxonomy based on Noy and McGuiness’ Ontology 101 [180]
The word “taxonomy” also enjoys a wide use - examples [71, 18, 196] - but, similarly,
reliance is placed on the common meaning of the word rather than any explicit specification.
Again, sampled dictionary definitions are broadly in accord:
• “A scheme of classification” [186]; and
• “A system for naming and organizing things, especially plants and animals, into
groups that share similar qualities” [49].
An example taxonomy is shown at Figure 3.1. Here, the increasing definition of a
bottle of wine is shown in a tree structure.
This is useful to put some sort of order on a set of terms but there is a difficulty in
representing complexity. If a solution to the research problems involves looking at the
situation from more than one perspective, how is this modelled using a taxonomy?
So for example, if the concept to be modelled included not just the classification of
the wine itself but also its properties such as “flavour” and “body”, how would these be
represented?
It is anticipated that the digital evidence concept to be represented will require such a
multi-faceted view because the Research Questions cover not just the location of artefacts
but also how they can be compared.
This brings the discussion on to ontologies - which allows more sophisticated concepts
to be represented.
3.2.3 Ontologies
Whilst original uses of the word “ontology” relate to philosophic fields, it is becoming in-
creasingly exploited in the computing, knowledge representation and artificial intelligence
arenas. When using the word in this dissertation, it relates to knowledge representation.
Even within the field of knowledge representation, the word “ontology” has a variety
of meanings. For clarity, these will be briefly covered.
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Gruber’s, now classic, definition of Information System (or knowledge representation)
ontologies is that they are an “explicit specification of a conceptualization” [118]. But, in
the same paper, Gruber expands this a little further to describe how they are a “represen-
tational vocabulary for a shared domain of discourse — definitions of classes, relations,
functions, and other objects”. Gruber puts forwards a key purpose of ontologies - for the
sharing of knowledge.
In explaining “conceptualisation”, Gruber states that it is an “abstract, simplified view
of the world that we wish to represent for some purpose.” [119]
Handler [131] proposes a similarly simple description of ontologies “as a set of knowl-
edge terms, including the vocabulary, the semantic interconnections, and some simple
rules of inference and logic for some particular topic”.
Chandrasekaran et al [62] describe ontologies as one of two, seemingly interrelated,
concepts:
• The first is a representational vocabulary for a specific domain or subject matter.
What matters is not the actual terms that are used but the concept being captured. In
this way, the terms could be translated from, for example, French to English, and,
though the words may change, the concept would not. The authors note the care
required in analysing the kinds of objects in the domain and the relations that can
exist in the domain studied.
• The second use of the word is, instead of describing a domain conceptually, it is
captured as a body of knowledge. Facts take the place of conceptual terms.
Smith [227] puts forward a definition that, for information science, an ontology is “a
dictionary of terms formulated in a canonical syntax and with commonly accepted defini-
tions designed to yield a lexical or taxonomical framework for knowledge-representation
which can be shared by different information systems communities.”
But, crucially, Smith states that an ontology not only has these definitions but also “a
supporting framework of axioms”. This means that, for this definition, an ontology is more
than a taxonomy - it requires statements about the inclusion of entities in classes and the
relationships between them. This a view largely echoed by Uschold and Jasper [249].
All of the surveyed sources noted how the use of the word was indistinct - indeed
Hendler [131] believes the term has been abused with different meanings ascribed to it
by differing communities. There is an irony to this observation in that this ambiguity is
actually a key problem that an ontology is intended to solve.
However, there are similarities in definitions: the need for a consensual, community,
view; and the need to model a specific domain. But the conclusion from this review is that
further discussion of the meaning of the word “ontology” is moot. Instead, it is better to
understand how ontological properties can help to address the Research Questions - and
then use this understanding to form an ontology as a solution.
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The next sections provide a practical illustration of an ontology then consider its uses
and how these could assist in answering the Research Questions.
3.2.4 What do Ontologies look like?
Ontologies are a system of “Classes” and “Sub-classes”. “Instances” are placed into
this system in the same way that sets and subsets have members. The earlier referenced
“axioms” are statements governing the conditions that instances must fulfil to be a member
of a particular sub-class.
This, alone, might be taken for a taxonomy - as seen in the wine example at Figure
3.1. But an ontology may consist of a number of taxonomies, now renamed “classes”. All
represent a particular standpoint with “Object” and “Data” properties used to bring further
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Fig. 3.2 An example ontology based on Noy and McGuiness’ Ontology 101 [180]
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To illustrate, Figure 3.2 builds on the earlier wine taxonomy at Figure 3.1. It displays
two classes (yellow coloured circles): “Wine” and “Wine Properties”. Each have sub-
classes.
Instances (purple coloured diamonds) are placed in appropriate sub-classes.
Object Properties (coloured blue) join instances to build up a conceptual picture. They
describe relationships between the instances in different sub-classes.
The Data Properties (green coloured squares) are used to add extra description to the
instances within these classes.
So, in this example it can be seen that the wine ‘’Chateau Morgan Beaujolais” has a
“moderate” flavour and “medium” body. The wine was bottled in “1982”.
As can be seen, this is much more versatile method for describing a particular concept
or, in ontological terminology, a “World View”.
3.2.5 What are ontologies used for?
From the varying definitions of an ontology, it logically follows that there are various
views on their use. Indeed the self-referencing term “meta-ontology” has been introduced
to describe an ontology that describes ontologies.
Whilst helpful contributions are made by Gomez-Perez et al [116], Uschold and Jasper
[249] and Gasevic [109], the most accessible description is a guide by Noy and McGuinness
[180]: “Ontology Development 101 - A Guide to Creating Your First Ontology”. This
implicitly describes an ontology by listing some reasons for creating one:
• Sharing a common understanding of the structure of information amongst people or
software agents. This addresses a concern raised by Smith [227] who noted a key
problem in Information Science: disparate groups have their own idiosyncratic terms
used to represent information. Similarly, these groups may use the same terms but
ascribe different meanings to them. As more groups wish to share and translate this
information, the problems increase “geometrically”. Using the Wine example from
section 3.2.4, all vineyards could use the terms to describe their respective wines.
• Enabling reuse of domain knowledge. In the same way that functions in a computer
program can be reused, the modelling of a domain in a particular sphere can be
reused in another. For Digital Evidence, this could be the compilation of an ontology
detailing file systems. Originally this could have been used for modelling operating
systems but it also could be used for the location of evidential artefacts. Lopez
et al caution on re-usability [116, p.34]: the more generic an ontology is made to
allow subsequent reuse, the less usable it becomes for the domain in which it was
originally intended.
• Making explicit domain assumptions. These are, essentially, top-level assumptions
about the environment in which a system operates. If all entities in the system
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individually use their own assumptions, it can be difficult to effect a change in any
environment being modelled. By having a common, upper, reference point used by
all entities, any change is easier to facilitate as it can be made at this one level rather
than for all of those below it.
• Separating the domain knowledge from the operational knowledge. The relates
to using functional separations and assigning ontologies to each. As example, an
operation could be to turn a water tap on. But the functional separations could
include the physical theory on how the movement of the hand can turn a tap on and
what causes the water to then flow out of the tap.
• Analysing domain knowledge. If an ontology is accurately specified then the domain
it covers can be analysed accurately - what it will and will not cover. This allows the
effective selection of an ontology for knowledge reuse.
Whilst all of these could be of use in addressing the stated challenges of this thesis, the
most relevant are the ability to share a common understanding of an information structure
and knowledge reuse.
The first allows the correlation of disparate pieces of information to make links. The
second, as earlier alluded, allows for knowledge about, for example, a FAT file system
installed on a USB memory stick to be also employed when it is used to assess the same
file system on a different device.
3.2.6 Ontological Commitment
An ontological commitment is the shared agreement amongst all users on what that
ontology represents. The ontology need not represent everything in each individual sphere
but, for all those who subscribe to it, the outlined terms, objects and relations should be
consistent amongst them all. This is how a shared understanding for the exchange and
reuse of knowledge is reached.
Each party will know different things - the ontology creates a shared vocabulary for
the exchange and use of this knowledge.
3.2.7 Design principles for ontologies
Whilst the benefits of an ontology are readily apparent, creating one can be difficult due to
the required ontological commitment.
Smith [227, p.159] notes the difficulties of compiling a single shared ontology: the
framework must be sufficiently neutral to make it widely accepted by a variety of com-
munities. But to ensure maximum use, there is also a desire for an ontology to be as
wide-ranging and detailed as possible. This creates a tension.
To alleviate these problems, ontologies can be composed as a series of layers - a top,
“upper”, level to serve as a “common neutral backbone” with more specialised ontologies
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below it. In essence, keep the upper ontology simple and high level to allow a maximum
number parties to commit. There may be factions of these parties under this level who
wish to create and commit to their own ontologies but they will reference the high level
ontology that has already been agreed. The lower levels will be subsets of the upper one,
not contradictory.
Gruber [119] defined five principles for the design of formal knowledge representation
ontologies. These will be covered because they provide a useful check for any Digital
Evidence ontology that is developed. These are shown in Table 3.2.7 below.
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Gruber’s five principles for formal knowledge representation using an ontol-
ogy [119]
Area Description
Clarity Terms used in the ontology should unambiguously
communicate their meaning. Definitions should be
objective - not tied down to any particulate topic area
or use of technology. Where possible, logical axioms
(statements) should be used to define the ontology.
What is it based on?
Coherence As a minimum, the defining axioms should be
consistent with each other. Also, the conceptual
definitions should fit any examples. This means that
the best way of testing the ontology is by using it - do
the example instances fit into the structure?
Extendibility The use - and future uses - made of the ontology
should be considered. In doing so, it should be kept to
a minimum, essential, foundation that allows
additional uses to be made of any terms without
change to the original structure.
Minimal encoding
bias
The ontology should be specified using knowledge,
not the technical terms of any particular arena. The
reason for this is that the use of these technical terms
inhibits reuse by any committed party that does not




Only define the minimum required to allow the
required knowledge sharing activities - this is tied in
to the facilitation of extendibility
Gruber does, however, note the compromises required when compiling an ontology.
The principals are check points to use in the design not hard and fast rules.
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3.2.8 Assessment of terms
The definitions of the terms“Model”, “Taxonomy” and “Ontology” are vague. However,
the properties of ontologies offer clear benefits in addressing the problems identified in
section 1.2. These are:
• The ability to reuse domain knowledge adds an essential extensibility which can be
used to cater for an increasing variety of digital devices. For example, if a file system
such as “NTFS” is specified in the ontology, any device using this file system can
reuse this knowledge instead of it having to be restated for each device in which it is
used. Further, if artefacts of a certain type are found to offer assistance in answering
a particular investigative question, the ontology can be queried to understand where
else these artefacts may also occur? This assists availability and selection and goes
some way to answering Research Questions 1 and 2;
• The ability to make domain assumptions assists in building up knowledge. For
example, any devices connected to a network using “Ethernet” will have a “Media
Access Control” (MAC) address.
• Separating domain knowledge from operating knowledge directly addresses the
problems seen with the surveyed forensic tools discussed in Chapter 2. The tools
were seen to address the technical aspects of digital evidence - such as extracting
internet browsing history - but not the investigative ones - such as did a suspect ever
visit a particular location? Instead, the debate has to be abstracted to a different level:
first, the prospective 5WH investigative questions have to be considered. But when
these questions are decided, they are then overlaid on to the available digital evidence
artefacts. In this way only data relevant to the investigation is considered. This
approach aids selection and goes to answering Research Questions 3 and 4. Further,
properly structured, an ontology will identify all artefacts that can assist in answering
a particular question without a deep knowledge of any individual technology.
• Ontologies can assist in analysing domain knowledge: for example, a device is
known to be mobile yet there are no listed artefacts concerned with location. This
may focus research attention to consider the question: is this because there are no
generated artefacts concerning location or have they not yet been identified?
Taxonomies may be too simple a representation to solve the research problems but,
in reviewing material, models and taxonomies will be considered as well as ontologies.
The reason for this approach is the ambiguity of the terms: there may be models and
taxonomies that have ontological properties and can be re-used in any ontology that is
subsequently developed.
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3.2.9 Basis for review
The basis for the review of models, taxonomies and ontologies is to understand the
following questions:
• What is the proposal - what does it purport to do?
• How does it implement this proposal?
• Does it achieve its objective?
• Can it assist in a solution to represent Digital Evidence artefacts in such a way that
they can be:
– recorded;
– selected based on suitability to a particular investigation;
– compared; and
– assessed for their reliability.
3.3 The contribution of models
There are few arenas where every source of potential data can be exhaustively collected
and reviewed – this is particularly the case when it comes to the collection of evidence and
its examination. For example, at a scene of crime, not every surface can be examined for
fingerprints, traces of body fluids or other contact evidence. Instead, there are practical
constraints applied relating to the likelihood of evidence being found and, in conjunction
with the severity of the crime, the resources to actually conduct this examination.
As previously outlined, this is also true of the Digital Evidence field where the volume
of material gathered has dramatically increased. So what should be examined and when?
This is the reason for having a digital evidence model – something which can inform the
examiner of where to look and in what order so that the most useful evidence is found.
The key models will now be surveyed.
3.3.1 DFRWS 2001
The genesis for a number of early digital evidence models came from research presented
at the first Digital Forensic Research Workshop in 2001. It set out to provide a research
base for the field of Digital Evidence.
Its conclusions [190] stated that the digital sources analysed to obtain suitable evidence
had three things in common:
• “First, they are increasingly complex and less understood overall.
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• Second, they are constantly morphing in form and function.
• Third, at the root of all their increasing functionality and detail are fundamental
technologies that can be explained scientifically”.
This conclusion has stood the test of time however, with regard to the third point,
although it remains true, the systems now examined are of such complexity that the
scientific explanation of the underlying technologies could well be impractical.
A pertinent paper given at this conference by Eugene Spafford laid the ground work
for much of what later models should have been addressing. He commented: “We need to
know how much information and what type, exactly, we must collect to afford the most
accurate analysis under particular circumstances”. This is the selection problem - Research
Questions 3 and 4.
This conference also established a Digital Forensic Road Map to: “Define a generic
investigative process that can be applied to all (or the majority of) investigations involving
digital systems and networks. The Digital Investigative Process (DIP) must be defined
from highest level categories to the individual steps necessary for complete analysis of all
potential digital evidence.”
Whilst this covered a number of issues it did not, in fact, address the comments made
by Spafford – essentially, how do you see the digital wood from the trees? Nevertheless, it
was the beginning of a digital evidence model.
3.3.2 Stephenson 2002 - 2003
Stephenson, in a number of articles spanning from 2002 to 2003 [230, 232, 231, 233],
built on the DFRWS framework - applying it to a methodology named “End to End Digital
Investigation” (EEDI).
Even though Stephenson’s main thrust is computer network attacks - Incident Response
- he still notes that key to this process is the continual cycle of interaction between the
digital and traditional investigators - feeding investigation leads back and forth as they are
found. A key observation is that “there is no magic program that we can plug our evidence
into that automatically extracts just what we need for our case” [230].
For its time, the work is novel but there are no concrete measures in it that could
usefully be applied to answer the Research Questions.
3.3.3 Carrier and Spafford 2003
In 2003, Carrier and Spafford attempted to move digital evidence models to a more
practical basis [51]. The paper’s most pertinent comments are made when discussing
the generic model of physical crime scene investigation – as gleaned from a number of
published works. The authors comment that “this model allows the crime scene to be
thoroughly documented and uses the investigator’s experience to find useful pieces of
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evidence. Not all physical objects can be taken from the crime scene, so the Search Phase
must be thorough enough to gather the needed evidence but not overload the laboratory
with unrelated objects.”
This recognises the availability and selection research problems but there no proposals
to provide any answers to them.
3.3.4 Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model and Mocas
Review 2004
In 2004 the “Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model” (EDIP) was proposed [21].
The model aimed to "include the physical and digital crime investigations”.
The model is a little short on detail - particularly what it calls the “dynamite phases” -
the actual analysis of the examined data. This might be considered the most time consuming
and difficult aspect of the case. Nevertheless, its suggestion of an iterative approach is
useful.
Also in 2004, a paper was produced which recognised the “Investigative Context”
[167]. Its desired outcome is “to produce reliable evidence that is useful to an investigation
and admissible in a proceeding”.
But the paper also discussed “Minimalization” which it defines as collecting and
examining the minimum amount of data. This is Research Question 3 but there are no
suggestions that would assist in answering it.
That year also saw the publication of a survey on computer forensics [208]. The survey
found that there was “disproportional focus on the applied aspects of computer forensics,
at the expense of the development of fundamental theories”.
As this survey of digital evidence models progresses, it is apparent that very few of the,
often most erudite, proposals have come into main-stream use in the digital evidence fields.
The reason for this is considered at the end of this section.
3.3.5 Ruibin 2005
Ruibin et al [214], puts forward the term “case-relevance” - defined as a measure of any
piece of information’s ability to answer the investigative "who, what, where, when, why
and how" questions in a criminal investigation”.
In this way, the technical data is used most appropriately to answer the investigative
questions. The proposed model, is an early suggestion of “Predictive Coding” - see
[204] - used for E-Discovery. Essentially, fundamental or “seed” keywords are chosen by
investigators then fed into data. Results are then assessed using machine learning against
stipulated objectives.
Though the model is no more than a sophisticated implementation of keyword searching
- with attendant drawbacks previously discussed - the suggestion of applying the 5WH
concepts to technical investigation is useful.
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3.3.6 Beebe and Clark 2005
Instead of a model, Beebe and Clark in 2005 [25] proposed a “framework” incorporating
phases, sub-phases, principles and objectives.
They argue that “a digital investigation framework must be based on objectives, rather
than tasks”. It is the first paper noted that discussed a matrix of tasks and objectives. The
reason for this format is that the relationship between the two is not linear – ie one task
can accomplish a number of objectives and in attempting to achieve an objective, there
may be a choice of a number of tasks.
In illustrating this approach, they suggest how it is easier for an examiner to decide if
an enquiry is relevant by referencing it as “Determine whether unauthorized software has
been installed” as opposed to “Examine the Registry”. This is the same topic as addressed
by Research Question 4.
Their “Data Analysis” phase aims to answer the 5WH questions. To perform this role,
the task / objectives matrices are employed to marry to allow ”the digital forensic examiner
to quickly determine which objectives and in turn which specific tasks are applicable to
the incident and approach strategy at hand.”
This is an interesting concept but it still does not assist with availability or selection
- it just allows easy recall once the mapping of tasks and objectives has been decided.
Further, the use of a matrix may not easily allow for change - either in the complexity
of investigative objectives or technology. Rows and columns would require frequent
modification.
3.3.7 Politt 2008
Pollitt’s 2008 research [196] contends that previously developed models contribute to the
notion that all evidence must first be acquired and then the generated material handled in
two ways: devising ways to reduce it - for example by removing operating system files -
and finding ways to select it, for example, by keyword searching. Both have drawbacks:
the first may not sufficiently reduce the volume. The second relies on the examiner being
sufficiently well informed on the material sought. Instead he applies four processes to
digital evidence examination to improve this approach.
The first, “Identification”, aims to cover the gap between the investigative and digital
demands of a case - the translation from one to the other. He proposes that the process is
best approached by first considering the desired information before its possible forms and
where it might be stored. Only then is the selection of the tool and query to extract this
data in the desired locations. In a sense this echoes Beebe and Clark’s [25] idea of setting
questions based on the required information rather than the specific technical task.
Pollitt justifiably contends that this approach reduces the burden on the examiner and
produces relevant evidence. This is key to Research Question 3.
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The second, “Classification and Individualisation”, aims to mimic the processes in
other forensic disciplines such as ballistics - covered earlier at Section 2.4.2. The disparate
artefacts can be composed to form a picture of characteristics - which can then show that
that an object or certain data is either representative of a certain class or of a unique identity.
This is the correlation research problem.
The third, “Association”, relates to the traces left when an event happens - such as the
insertion of a USB memory stick into a computer. For digital evidence, Pollitt emphasises
the necessity of noting what artefacts can be compared and where they are located. This
contributes to the selection of evidentially “Rich” data from “Identification”. This is the
Principal Research Question 1.
The fourth, “Reconstruction”, looks to put any identified events in some sort of order
to gain a clear picture of what happened.
Pollitt makes a case that legal and investigative questions must be defined before
defining any digital forensic questions.
From these proposals, there are no suggestions of how they could be implemented.
However, the principal is carried through to the design of DESO and how it is used to
select artefacts based on the needs of the investigation.
3.3.8 Hunton 2010
In a series of papers Hunton develops the “Cybercrime Execution Stack” and a model for
Cybercrime investigation [137–140].
Hunton’s definition of cybercrime is wider than criminal activity - also encompassing
the generic “harmful behaviour” - but restricted to actions assisted or enabled by technology.
This does not encompass events where technology acts as a “witness” to events such as a
suspect being placed at the scene of the crime by their mobile phone’s location.
The proposals act as useful model for how the defined “cyber crime” can be committed
and then investigated. However, it is purposefully designed as being high-level and,
from this perspective, the model and investigative framework offer no assistance when
addressing the research questions. Where they may be of use is in providing an overall
guide - perhaps being applied onto any solution that is found for these challenges.
3.3.9 Contemporary models
Smith and Petreski [228] propose an index to determine the best method for investigating
the technological elements of a case. This is based on such metrics as “effectiveness”,
“Level of effort” and “Compatibility of toolsets”.
Whilst this is applied to sample cases, the difficulty with these metrics is that they
assume criminal investigations to be constant or predictable. As discussed in section 2.1,
they are not. Nevertheless, if such metrics could be kept and applied, it may be possible to
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see if the same techniques are effective regardless of the investigation. This is beyond the
scope of this dissertation but may prove useful further work.
Raghavan et al’s model [202] proposes time lining as a way of addressing volume and
variety. The drawbacks of time lining have been covered earlier at Section 2.9.5. Without
a method of locating and selecting the correct time artefacts, this approach is unlikely to
succeed as, first, some vital points of data may be missed and, conversely, there may be too
many irrelevant time instances to discern any pattern or illuminating sequence of events.
Bulbul et al [44] offer a comprehensive view on the digital evidence crime scene - noting
how the recovered digital evidence must be tied into any physical evidence. However, they
do not focus on identifying, extracting and comparing artefacts so this research is not able
to offer assistance.
Most recently, in 2017, Amato et al [8] outlined the problems addressed by this thesis
and propose the use of ontologies which are then queried. But aside from these suggestions,
there is insufficient detail to assess their approach. No ontology is specified.
3.3.10 Summary
Two general types of models were found: those that guide the digital evidence examination
process and try to solve the case and those that model data and allow other tools / humans
to draw conclusions.
But in terms of addressing the problems addressed by this thesis and resulting Research
Questions, there were few found to be anything other than meta-solutions - those advising
on what a good solution should look like without a practical proposition.
The study will now move on to ontologies and taxonomies to understand what can be
learned from this particular area.
3.4 Selected ontologies indirectly related to Digital
Evidence
3.4.1 The Gene Ontology
The Gene Ontology proposed by Ashburner et al [16] was developed as the fields and
genetics and bio-chemistry realised that there was a finite universe of genes and proteins.
The knowledge of the biological role of one protein in an organism can allow conclusions
to be drawn about the role of other organisms when the protein is also present in it.
But the way in which these shared biological elements were being described and
organised was not sufficient to keep pace with the rapid discoveries emanating from
genomic sequencing. Different fields of study had varying methods of describing a protein
and its function. This meant that the transfer of knowledge — such as the role of a protein
- was not taking place. This required a shared vocabulary so that a protein recognised in
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one field of study was linked to its presence in another. And with this, the observation of
the protein’s role in one field could be used in the other.
A key requirement of this vocabulary was to cater for the need to “organise, describe,
query and visualise biological knowledge at vastly different stages of completeness. Any
system must be flexible and tolerant of this constantly changing level of knowledge and
allow updates on a continuing basis.”[16]
Four years after this initial description, in 2004, Harris et al [111] reported on a, now
viable, and active ontology that was used by the community. The three goals were to:
• Develop a set of controlled vocabularies (the Gene Ontology) to describe key do-
mains of molecular biology
• Use the terms in this ontology to annotate genetic material and behaviours in biolog-
ical databases
• Provide a central public resource allowing universal access to the ontologies and
annotation data sets in addition to the tools for use with this data.
Each Gene Ontology term has a name and a unique alphanumeric identifier. Consortium
members of the Gene Ontology submit annotations about various gene products by citing:
• The reference used to make the annotation - such as a journal article;
• An evidence code indicating the type of evidence upon which the notation is based;
and
• The date and creator of the annotation.
The principles of the Gene Ontology are directly applicable to the Research Questions
addressed by this thesis for the following reasons:
• it provides a method for documenting genetic data. This could help to answer the
principal Research Question 1 and Research Question 2 relating to availability;
• its method for documenting characteristics to allow comparison could be used for
Digital Evidence - if properly considered. This helps to answer Research Questions
4 and 5 relating to selection and correlation; and
• the quality of evidence supporting assertions about these artefacts can vary - from a
blog with no supporting data to a paper in an authoritative journal with supporting
data and details of experimental data. The Gene Ontology - using its evidence codes
can cater for this variety. This assists in answering Research Question 7 relating to
reliability.
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3.4.2 Recording of provenance
Bibliographic ontology
The Bibliographic Ontology [80]is a conceptual representation of the reference sources
typically found in academic material such as this thesis. It can be used as an ontology
for citations, document classification or to describe any kind of document in Resource
Description Framework (RDF) [40].
Amongst its terms, data and object properties its only contribution to an online presence
are the classes for “website” and “webpage”. This does not cover delineations such as
“blog”. Since this is a relatively current version of the ontology - produced May 2016 -
it is not clear if this is an omission or, simply, that it was felt any lower level of detail is
unnecessary. This latter point is a viable argument since terms such as “blog” are indistinct.
The base requirement is for a user is to know the URL where this source can be found and
the date of access.
Further detail is required on the type of material published - not its location. For
instance, is the published material the lone musings of a researcher or a detailed description
showing full workings and test data? The Bibliographic Ontology does not assist with this
but the Evidence and Conclusion Ontology can. This will now be detailed.
Evidence and Conclusion Ontology
The Evidence and Conclusion Ontology (ECO), as described by Chibucos et al [64],
documents evidence found during research and the assertions that can be drawn from it.
The ECO was primarily formed to support the Gene Ontology. As with the digital
evidence field, the study of life sciences uses a wide variety of techniques and tools to
generate data. From this evidential data, assertions are made and conclusions drawn.
As noted when discussing the Gene Ontology, the conclusions from a certain genomic
sequence may have relevance where the same protein is found in a different organism.
Conclusions can be published, for example, in a journal, conference paper or online.
The ECO’s purpose is to document the type of evidence generated and the assertion
method:
• The type of evidence can be documentation of the experiment type. For example,
“competitive growth assay evidence” which is described as “A type of biological
assay evidence in which a mutated strain of a microorganism, such as a yeast or
bacterium, is grown competitively with wild-type cells and the relative fitness of the
strains is assessed.”
• The assertion method documents how the Gene Ontology entry was devised. How
does the evidence support it? This can be “manual” - where the material was
generated or reviewed by a human. But it can also be “automatic” where it has not
been reviewed by a human but is automatically inferred - possibly by some sort of
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algorithm. For the Digital Evidence field this latter assertion type could be applying
an assertion about a Windows 7 operating system artefact to Windows 10 if the
program code has not changed.
Though there is now consideration being given to widening the scope of the ECO
beyond life sciences and the Gene Ontology [95], most of its current manifestation is quite
specific to that field.
However, there are parts that are immediately applicable to any proposed solution - for
example:
• the class “traceable author statement used in manual assertion” references statements
that are attributed to a cited source; and
• the class “inference from background scientific knowledge used in manual assertion”
is defined by the ECO as a “curator inference that links the current annotation to
a different evidence-based annotation via background knowledge of the curator.”
Again, this could allow for a particular property seen in an operating system to be
also linked to a subsequent Service Pack
A key point to note about the ECO is that it is not looking to filter out “good” and “bad”
annotations. Instead it is looking to accurately document the provenance of them. How
much reliance can be placed on them?
The PROV ontology
In a similar vein to the ECO is the PROV ontology [157] - explained by Moreau et al [169]
- which provides a set of terms to describe how data or “things” were produced. This can
encompass entities, activities or people and allows an assessment to be made on the data /
thing’s “quality, reliability or trustworthiness”.
There are six components including:
• entities and activities - including the time that they were created or used - this could
include a forensic tool or a reference source used for the interpretation of data;
• derivations of entities - this could allow for the extraction of, for example, a file from
the the image of a hard disk - which itself is a derrivation of the data on the physical
computer hard disk; and
• a method for aggregating provenance records together to provide information on a
particular item of data.
Object properties, such as “prov:wasGeneratedBy” allow the link to be established
between data and the entity or activity that created it.
The PROV ontology is a comprehensive W3C standard that could be used to document
the chain of evidence from an item’s initial seizure to the presentation of some arcane
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derived data. Further, it documents how the cited source supports the creation of the data -
for example “prov:qualifiedAttribution” and “prov:wasInfluencedBy”. But where it does
not assist is in documenting any perceived quality of the sources themselves.
Both the ECO and PROV ontology could provide useful methods for describing the
process by which digital data is transformed from the initial collection to its subsequent
derivations and interpretation. PROV is more aligned with the chain of evidence whereas
the ECO is more useful for interpretation. And it seems sensible to use one or more of
these to document provenance rather than a novel solution. Ontological reuse is, first, more
efficient and, second, allows the use and sharing of knowledge with other fields.
3.4.3 The Recording of Time
The Time Ontology [74] has been developed to provide a uniform understanding and rep-
resentation of temporal references in web pages or, indeed, anything that can be referenced
using a Uniform Resource Indicator (URI). This includes the various components of an
ontology.
This is a relatively mature standard with the first draft put out for comment in 2004
[134] and it now falls under the stewardship of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).
The Time Ontology provides little obvious assistance in answering the Research
Questions but, should any time references be required, then there seems no reason not to
use the terms specified in it. This leads to reuse with other ontologies and interoperability.
Of particular use is “https://www.w3.org/TR/owl-time/#time:Instant” which can be used
for the describing and correlating the various time stamps that are encountered.
3.4.4 The Internet of Things
The Internet of Things (IoT) also has to address the same challenges as the Digital Evidence
problems now being studied: the scalability and heterogeneity of IoT components [126].
Two ontological approaches to these challenges will be covered.
Hachem et al [126] describes the devices of the IoT and their function. Three ontologies
are used to represent:
• actual physical devices;
• abstract functionality; and
• an estimator - mapping the physical devices on to these functionalities.
From a digital evidence perspective, this could be mapped on to: the digital data itself;
the artefacts that are useful to an investigation; and a mapping of these artefacts on to
available data. But from this 2011 proposition, it was not possible to find any further
development.
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But the second ontological approach, the Federated Interoperable Semantic IoT Testbeds
and Applications (FIESTA) project [98], is advanced. This is an EU project providing
real-life generated IoT test data to researchers from various geographic locations in the
EU.
To enable this, an ontology is required so that there is a common consensus on how
to describe and represent the measurements from the various sensors attached to the IoT
devices. There have been previous instantiations including the Semantic Sensor Network
(SSN) ontology [252] but a version for this project is the Unified IoT ontology [4] and
its “lite” version submitted to the W3C [30]. Inspection of the ontology shows it to be a
comprehensive functional description including classes such as:
• “Device” - with subclasses such as “ActuatingDevice” and “TagDevice”;
• Domains of interest - such as “Health” and “Tourism”;
• “Sensor” with subclasses such as “CholesterolSensor” (which is also in the Health
domain) and “FuelLevel”; and
• “QuantityKind” with subclasses such as “Cholesterol”.
Object properties, such as “hasQuantityKind”, link “CholesterolSensor” with “Choles-
terol” to allow reporting of measurements.
There is a development and organisational commitment for IoT ontologies which is
not seen when those for Digital Evidence are later reviewed in section 3.5.
Further, as the field of Digital Evidence expands to include data from IoT devices, it
would be sensible to ensure that any Digital Evidence ontology that is developed has the
capability to link with the IoT ontologies. This will allow the ready dissemination and
inclusion of data between the fields.
3.4.5 Building Automation Systems
Allied to the IoT are Building Automation Systems (BAS) - the various sensors and
controllers installed in large buildings to control such facilities as fire alarms, access
control, heating and ventilation. Though not necessarily connected to the Internet, these
are similarly large systems involving the assimilation and interpretation of data from
disparate heterogeneous sources.
Charpenay et al [63] reported on “Project Haystack” in 2015. A series of ontologies
were introduced for tagging various BAS components and creating domains such as air,
water, humidity and temperature. Reasoning can then take place using these ontologies to
control the BAS functions.
A check of the current project website [199] shows Haystack to be a trade association
comprising at least 24 members with open source specifications available for download.
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Making use of Project Haystack’s tags is “Brick” [19] - which attempts to advance
the field of BAS. It does this by defining a core ontology of fundamental concepts and
their relationships which is allied to domain specific ontologies covering specific building
concepts.
Brick is reported as having been implemented on six buildings and found to work well
using the “notion of synonyms to equate sensors and subsystems similar in function” [19].
3.4.6 Observations from non-Digital Evidence related ontologies
The examples of non-digital evidence ontologies show well-developed concepts that could
be of use in any solution.
In particular, IoT and BAS ontologies that have already been implemented show that it
is possible to unify measurements from disparate systems. If forensic tools are equated to
these measuring systems, then an appropriately framed functional ontology could provide
the same role.
Further, the BAS and IoT fields show that it is possible to obtain ontological commit-
ment that allows the sharing and reuse of knowledge.
Finally, when other forensic fields were surveyed in section 2.4.4, the role of govern-
ment or non-commercial bodies was necessary to form standards for inter-operability. But
the Project Haystack project in the field of BAS has shown that the private sector is quite
capable of solving these problems. And this field is not alone: the USB Implementers
Forum [248] and GSM Association [121] are two examples of industry bodies setting
standards that are in world-wide use.
3.5 Digital Evidence ontologies - summary of findings
A total 24 ontologies and taxonomies covering the digital evidence field have been surveyed.
These were published between 2006 and 2017. For readability and brevity, the full listing
of those surveyed and a summary of their capabilities is included at Appendix B.
The sample of 24 were assessed on:
• the problem they were looking to address;
• their stage of development;
• their effectiveness in addressing the stated purpose; and
• their ability to assist with the Research Questions.
Findings are as follows.
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3.5.1 General immaturity
As noted at section 3.2.3, the definition of the word “ontology” is broad and unspecific.
However, only ten of the surveyed 23 ontologies went beyond description of a concept to
describe even a light ontology such as, for example, a class system. Fewer still provided
further detail such as object and data properties or broader axioms.
3.5.2 Lack of reuse or commitment
Material introducing the ontologies, such as published journal papers, made reference to
previously outlined ontologies - for instance Harrill and Mislan’s “Small Scale Digital
Device Forensics Ontology” [128] was commonly cited. But, aside from Schatz [217] there
were few examples of ontologies making use of pre-existing work - or indeed, ontologies
from other fields. This does not take advantage of one of the key benefits of ontologies as
stated by Noy [180]: reuse of domain knowledge.
Related to this is the isolation of these ontologies. There was no evidence of the
multi-party efforts earlier outlined for other fields such as genetics, the IoT and building
automation. Instead, the ontologies were developed by a small group without reference to
others.
This risk of this approach is that there is a lack of ontological commitment - as outlined
at Section 3.2.6. This has an impact on another of Noy’s outlined benefits: sharing a
common understanding of the structure of information amongst people or software agents.
If the ontology is only developed by a small group without reference to others, this
shared understanding is jeopardised and the lack of commitment makes ontological success
less probable.
3.5.3 Assistance with the Research Questions
Of the 24 surveyed, only four ontology proposals were able to offer substantive assistance
with the Research Questions. The remainder either did not have a suitable capability or
provided insufficient detail on which to make an assessment.
Alzaabi et al’s [6] ontology for smart phones is of use if the common terms outlined
for this environment are applied to other devices and environments.
Dosis’s series of lightweight ontologies [83] could assist with availability if they could
be used to target specific elements within a source instead of all the data. However, no
assistance is provided in the selection of these elements.
Chabot’s work on time-lines [60] could assist by specifying a common format for
reporting data from disparate heterogeneous sources.
Nimbalkar’s work proposed how log files can be interpreted [179]. This is an interesting
approach to correlation but one which concentrates on low level data interpretation in a file
not any higher level semantic meaning.
3.6 Summary 72
3.6 Summary
In chapter 1 the problems facing digital evidence were set out and a series of research
questions were posed. In chapter 2 a model or ontology was proposed as a solution.
In this chapter, existing digital evidence models and ontologies have not been found to
provide assistance in this regard.
Some of them have sought to view the Digital Evidence field from a “real-life” view
rather than conceptually. As example Harrill’s Small Scale Digital Device Forensics
ontology [128]; Craiger’s Digital Evidence Markup Language [75] and Cosic et al’s
Ontological Approach to Study and Manage Digital Chain of Custody of Digital Evidence
[72]. These approaches model the evidence from the perspective of the device upon which
it is contained.
This is a valid ontological approach and may be the most appropriate for the purpose
intended by the authors. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the approach has
limited value. In attempting to model technology rather than evidence, as the amount and
complexity of these increase, any ontology would have to linearly scale in line with the
these increases. This is irrespective of the evidential artefacts that they contain.
A different approach would be instead to solely model the artefacts that are required
for an investigation and only document the locations where these artefacts can be found.
Kahvedzic [147] touched on this point when defining “Evidence Location” in the Dialog
ontology.
Whilst existing Digital Evidence models and ontologies do not offer substantial assis-
tance, other fields covering Genetics, the Internet of Things and Building Automation have
shown how it is possible to:
• Functionally describe a domain concentrating only on the elements that are required;
• Map these functional descriptions on to individual lower-level domains to create
synonyms between disparate systems; and
• Obtain ontological commitment in a community to allow the success of these on-
tologies.
If a similar system could be developed for digital evidence then the tasks could be
addressed as shown in Table 3.6.
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Assistance Provided by an Ontology to Solve the Research Problems
Research Questions -
as set out in Section 1.2
How an ontology addresses this problem
Allow for differing
digital sources and the
rapid changes in
technology
An upper level functional ontology could provide a
framework linking new instances of existing and
emerging technologies together. The various domains
could reference this ontology.
Reduce the volume of
digital evidence that
requires examination
A functional ontology could include only artefacts -
data of use to an investigation - not attempt to map the
whole system. This reduces the volume that must be
addressed. If this ontology was aligned with
investigative objectives, then relevant selections could
be made.










The ontology creates the “synonyms” that allow
artefacts from disparate sources - but which the mean
the same thing - to be identified and compared.
Allow the use of any
tools to process evidence
Any digital evidence tool could make use of this
functional ontology to understand where artefacts may
be located. It can also provide a reference for the
correct format to describe and report an artefact.
Ontological commitment creates this shared
understanding and allows interaction of the various
tools. Developers can specify the functions that their
tool can perform.




Ontology reuse allows one or more of the provenance
ontologies to be used to describe the origin of the
information behind any artefact and document its
relevance and accuracy.
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To address the outlined gaps, this thesis documents research compiling the Digital
Evidence Semantic Ontology (DESO). This is documented in Chapters 4 and 5 and then
tested in Chapter 6.
Chapter 4 provides a general overview of DESO before looking at the documentation
of Digital Evidence artefacts. This is Research Question 2 relating to availability. It will be
shown how the proposed ontology allows for differing digital sources and rapid changes in
technology.
Chapter 5 documents a classification system for these artefacts that addresses Selection
and Correlation - Research Questions 3 to 6. It also shows how the reliability of each
artefact can be assessed by documenting provenance - Research Question 7.
Chapter 6 applies DESO to a hypothetical investigation to understand how it assists the
process and where there are gaps that require further research.
Chapter 4
The Development of DESO - Structural
Overview and Addressing Availability
4.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the Digital Evidence Semantic Ontology (DESO). First, the
research methodology is outlined followed by a brief review of approaches that were not
successful with lessons learned. These findings were carried through to the development
of DESO, which is then detailed.
The description of DESO first, covers the conceptual background of the ontology’s
three classes. As appropriate, other aspects are introduced. These include the use of data
properties at Section 4.5.3 and the placing of instances, at Section 4.5.8.
4.2 Research methodology
4.2.1 General Approach
DESO was developed organically. It started from the research problems - that an artefact
would need to be identified, selected, compared and assessed for reliability. This led to
the hypothesis that three classes could be created which would, respectively, describe the
location of an artefact, its type and its provenance.
This was applied to test data and DESO was adjusted as shortcomings were identified.
The Research Questions from Section 1.2 were used to assess these solutions. These are
repeated for easy reference:
• RQ1: Can a classification system be devised that allows for the documentation of
digital evidence artefacts and facilitates their extraction and comparison?
• RQ2: How can this classification system allow for differing digital sources and
rapid changes in technology?
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• RQ3: Is it possible for this classification system to reduce the volume of digital
evidence that requires examination?
• RQ4: Can this classification system allow for the selection of artefacts based on
investigative criteria as opposed to technical ones?
• RQ5: Can the classification system allow for successful comparison of artefacts
irrespective of their source or originating format?
• RQ6: Can the classification system allow the use of any tools to process evidence?
• RQ7: Can the classification system provide for the provenance of these artefacts to
be established?
4.2.2 Test Data
A sample scenario was chosen: the connection between two different computers when the
same USB memory stick is inserted into both. To provide richness to the data, one of these
used the Windows operating system whilst the other used Apple’s OS X operating system.
This is not a particularly complicated scenario - involving neither great volume or
variety of Digital Evidence. However, as stated in Chapter 1, this thesis contends that
volume and variety are not the key problems for Digital Evidence but, instead, aggravating
factors.
The chosen scenario generates a controlled set of well known artefacts for initial testing.
If the Research Questions are answered, more complexity can be added to stress test it.
The method for creating the test data is detailed at Appendix A. A literature review
was then conducted with the aim of identifying possible artefacts that would be created by
the respective operating systems when a USB device is inserted.
The literature review and the test data complemented each other. The artefacts identified
in the review could then immediately be observed in the actual data for confirmation. Often,
the location of an artefact was found to be poorly specified in the reference material.
The test data also allowed the use of various forensic tools to understand how they
represented the artefacts. This will be detailed in Chapter 6.
As development of DESO progressed, a device running Apple’s iOS operating system
was introduced to further test the ability of DESO to answer the Research Questions.
4.3 Alternative approaches that were not successful
Before DESO’s current manifestation, others approaches were attempted. These will now
be briefly covered for the benefit of others addressing this topic.
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4.3.1 Linear listing of artefacts
In considering how to list the location of artefacts, the initial approach was to use the
ontology class system to mimic the relevant file system. So, for example, an artefact
located in the file path \Windows\Documents and Settings\User would be represented by
the ontology class structure shown in Figure 4.1.
But this approach does not scale: as file structures become increasingly complex, so
the structure of classes and subclasses becomes increasingly verbose - making any class
structure unwieldy and hard to read.
The questions to be considered are: how much information does the examiner need to
know when choosing a source of artefacts; and is the file path relevant to this choice?
The proposition is that the level of detail only needs to be that required to delineate
one source of artefacts from another. This does not have to be, for example, the complete




Fig. 4.1 File path represented as a class structure
4.3.2 Artefacts as classes
Another early idea for DESO was to capture the location of all artefacts as a class structure.
This was an attempt to apply the principles of the “Photography Ontology” [85] to the
world of Digital Evidence. This is represented in Figure 4.2.
The approach moves away from representing the file path as the class structure - as
described in Section 4.3.1 and, instead, into categorisations such as “Operating System
Artefacts”. But, again, this raised a number of problems:
• The Class structure becomes complex because there are many artefacts. This com-
plexity will increase as further artefacts are documented.
• The classification of artefacts is represented from a verbose technical standpoint.
Note the entry in Figure 4.2 for “Registry” to the left-hand side of “Windows XP”.
This may be of little relevance to the examiner whose only questions to be answered
are: “What artefacts may exist on the device being examined, which ones do I need
and how do I compare them?” As such, the classes are over specified.
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• The class system relies on one to one explicit connections between artefacts in
different locations. As example, note the connections to “Volume Serial Number” to
the right-hand side of Figure 4.2. When a new artefact is added, all existing entries
have to be considered to understand whether a connection from them to the new
artefact can be made. This will have to be manually calculated and added. A time
consuming process that is prone to error. There needs to be a simpler way of making
connections across large number of artefacts from disparate sources. The aim is to,
effectively, normalise the structure.
4.3.3 Lessons learned
From the previous attempts at a solution it became clear that:
• Attempting to organise artefacts from a specifically technical standpoint makes for
complicated class systems. This makes the representation of available artefacts com-
plex and there is no means of selection. Any ontology must be carefully considered
for the concepts that are to be captured not the technology that is encountered.
• A single class system representing all artefacts and explicitly listing the connections
between them causes complexity and is difficult to sustain effectively. Any ontology
must use a process where connections between artefacts can be made without them
having to be explicitly defined.
4.4 Introduction to the Digital Evidence Semantic
Ontology (DESO)
4.4.1 DESO’s basic structure - the concept it captures
The concept represented by DESO is a representation of available artefacts on a given
evidence source in such a way that they can be selected for investigative purposes, compared
and assessed for reliability.
It is not a view of all the technical data on a device but only those that could have a
demonstrable impact on an investigation.
So instead of having a model to represent data on a system, it is a forensic investigation
model on to which system data is placed. In this way the collected data is controlled and
organised so that it is all potentially useful to an investigation.
To do this, the criteria necessary to capture the “complete” artefact are considered: how
can a piece of data be located on a source, what does the data represent and what is the
justification for making these assertions?
The three classes of DESO are shown at Figure 4.3:












































Fig. 4.2 A representation of artefacts as classes. Note the complexity as the various
subclasses start linking to each other.
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Artefact Location Artefact Type Identifier
Artefact Reference
3 4 C F 9 2 B 7
5 A E 6 8 F E 1
C 5 4 B 8 7 D 5
E 6 D 3 E 5 A 9
An artefact can be found here
This is what the artefact 
represents - viewed from the 
5WH investigative perspective
This is the reason
Fig. 4.3 The three classes of DESO
• Artefact “Location” represents the places in digital material at which evidentially
useful data can be found.
• Artefact “Type Identifier” represents the meaning of the data at this location -
examples of this are a device serial number, a mobile phone IMEI or a GPS location.
• Artefact “Reference” is the reason why it can be said that the data in the stated
artefact Location can be classified as a particular artefact “Type Identifier” - this
could be an article in a scientific journal, a description in a blog or a technical
manual.
A key concept for the artefact “Type Identifier” class is its fundamental structure: the
entries are organised using the investigative What, Where, Who, When, Why and How
concepts. In doing so, the identification and comparison of suitable artefacts is driven by
the needs of the investigation - not the technology.
4.4.2 The necessity for the three classes
Location
First, all data on digital devices are, by their very nature, just strings of ones and zeros. It
is the interpretation of these ones and zeros that make these data useful. The location of
data within a particular file and, sometimes, the location of the file itself are one of the key
descriptors that differentiate one set of digits from another.
Second, unless the location can be adequately described, then it will not be possible
for a different examiner to find these data.
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But if the location of the data is effectively described then this directly goes to solving:
• the availability problem, covered by Research Question 2 because the artefacts on a
particular evidence source are readily identifiable; and
• part of the selection problem relating to Research Question 3 - the ability to reduce
the volume of data that requires examination. Only the data at a specific location
requires examination, not all of it.
A suitable class structure should allow an examiner to understand what artefacts may be
available on the various data sources - either those items already submitted for examination
or sources from which data can be subsequently collected - such as a system log file or
WiFi hotspot.
Type Identifier
As earlier discussed, a digital device stores and manipulates binary digits. To create any
use from them, a meaning has to be assigned to the data at a certain location. Otherwise,
the data is just that and of little use to an investigation.
Unless there is a consistency to these meanings, then comparison becomes impossible -
the artefacts at different locations remain, simply, disparate pieces of data.
But if this meaning is assigned a Type Identifier and it is consistently applied across all
data where it is found, then it goes to solving:
• the remaining part of the selection problem, Research Question 4 relating to the
selection of artefacts based on investigative rather than technical criteria. Instead of
having to examine all data, the examiner can now be judicious in choosing only the
artefacts of a particular Type Identifier that are relevant for a line of enquiry; and
• the correlation problem, Research Question 5, because artefacts of the same type
can be compared irrelevant of where they are located.
Reference
To create evidential credibility, there must be a stated reason why it is being asserted that
the data at a defined location has a defined meaning. If no reason is provided then other
examiners, and any judicial hearing, cannot assess the evidence’s reliability. This risks the
weight that is assigned to it or, even, its non-admission. This is the reliability problem -
Research Question 7.
4.4.3 Overview of how the classes interact
To demonstrate the operation of DESO, two simplified artefacts will be considered:
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• A journal paper has documented how a laptop Network Interface Card has a MAC
address
• A blog has documented how a wireless access point captures MAC addresses of
computers in its vicinity
With reference to Figure 4.4, the addition of artefacts to DESO will be described. For
each artefact:
1. The artefact location is considered and an instance created in the appropriate Location
sub-class.
2. The Type Identifier is considered and a link made to the appropriate instance in the
relevant artefact Type Identifier sub-class.
3. A link is made to the appropriate instance in the relevant Artefact Reference sub-
class.
Note how the two artefacts have their own respective Locations and References but
share a common Type Identifier. This means that:
• Both artefacts can be located
• The reason for asserting both the Location and Type Identifier is known
• Data extracted from these two locations can be compared because they are of the
same type.
• If an examiner is looking for a certain type of artefact, then the locations of that
type can be found by tracking back from the relevant Type Identifier instance to the
locations that point to it.
Having outlined the basic structure of DESO, the three classes will be detailed and the
associated data and object properties will be outlined.
4.5 The Artefact Location class
4.5.1 Structure
As earlier stated at Section 4.4, a design principal of DESO is not to represent all technical
data on digital devices but only those that are useful for investigations. This is particularly
relevant when documenting the location of files.
At Section 4.3.1 it was shown how merely replicating the file structure as an ontological
class caused problems due to the complexity of modern file systems. This caused a complex


























































































































































































































































Fig. 4.4 The three DESO classes with two sample artefacts to show population. Note how
the “What” sub-class for “Type Identifier” is listed.
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Table 4.1
Location - top level class structure
Container Definition Comment
Device Artefacts contained on devices
such as serial numbers on USB
devices or Media Access Codes
on Network Interface Cards
These tend to be hard
coded in device firmware
and not easily altered.
They are present
irrelevant of the data
stored upon the device.
File System Artefacts contained within file
systems such as Volume Serial
Numbers and Volume Label
These are created at the
inception of the volume.
They can be changed
and vary according to








Artefacts contained within files
that are not dependent on any
other class - such as Operating
System. As example, the meta
data stored within a PDF or
JPEG file.
This is not intended to
capture every piece of
meta-data in these files -
it must be capable of
being assigned a Type
Identifier.
Operating System Artefacts contained within
operating system files - typically
gathered as part of system
operation. This could include
Volume Serial Numbers in
Windows Link files, the serial
number gathered when a USB
device is inserted or the names of
wireless networks to which a
device has been connected.
The location and nature
of the artefacts will






Files generated by the execution
of applications within a
particular operating system. A
contemporary example of this is
the messaging application
WhatsApp, described by Shortall
et al [224], which operates on
many platforms but using code
specifically designed for that
platform - ie platform dependent.
The location and nature
of files will vary
according to the version
of the operating system.
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class structure with a comparative lack of value to the investigator in having this complexity
specified.
Instead, DESO looks to list only what an examiner requires. To implement this idea,
the Location class is simplified with the focus on the class system representing “containers”












Fig. 4.5 Top-level structure of the Location class
Each “container” within this structure has instances that represent the locations at
which artefact data can be extracted by the examiner. The structure only requires sufficient
detail to allow the examiner to differentiate one container from another. It does not, for
example, require the full path to a file - as will be shown later at Section 4.5.3, this can,
instead, be included as a Data Property.
The first four classes are disjoint from each other - so for example, an instance in the
“File System” class cannot also be a member of the “Operating System” class. The artefacts
found on, for example, a hard disk - such as the serial number in its firmware - are not also
found on a file system or operating system. These artefact locations are not connected so
the classes are disjoint.
Whilst it is accepted that a device may actually contain a file system and a file system
may contain an operating system, this is not the concept being captured by DESO. Each
sub-class and descendants is seen as a metaphorical “container” where artefacts could be
available. By doing this, the artefacts are normalised so that those found on, for example, a
particular File System are identified irrelevant to whether that File System is installed on a
USB storage device or a helicopter’s satellite navigation system.
The final class, “Operating System Dependent Application Files”, has a dependency in
that all of its instances must also be a member of at least one of the “Operating System”
sub-classes:
OperatingSystemDependentApplicationFiles⊆ OperatingSystem
This will be detailed later in Section 4.5.7.
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To illustrate the “container” concept, each of the top level containers will be detailed
and populated with example instances. In so doing, it will be shown how:
• Instances are named to allow later modification. This will be explained in section
4.5.2 relating to Devices;
• The Location class can be extended and modified to take account of changes in
technology and the knowledge of available artefacts. This will also be explained in
4.5.2, Devices; and
• The presence of an instance in a class means that it is available for all its sub-classes.
This will be illustrated at Section 4.5.8 when the placement of instances is explained.
These all assist in answering Research Question 2 - adjusting to changes in technology
The Device sub-class will first be detailed and used to introduce some of the key
concepts. Next Data Properties will be introduced followed by the other Location sub-
classes.
4.5.2 Location sub-class: Device
As the name suggests, the Device sub-class is a structure of containers for the artefacts that
can be located on devices. An instance in this class represents such an artefact location.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.6. The sub-classes are listed only to a level of detail necessary
for an examiner to identify a device and so assess what artefacts are available.
So, for example, current Hard Disks contain at least three items of interest: Manu-
facturer, Model and Serial Number. All Hard Disks should have this data. As such, it is
unnecessary to subdivide this class into, for example, disks containing spinning platters
and solid state disks. This further delineation does not change anything in terms of the
artefacts that are available.
But for Network Interface Cards it is worth delineating further as there are differences.
For example, a wireless Network Interface Card will also have a Service Set Identifier
(SSID)
The instances, shown in purple (with diamonds), are the actual artefact locations. Each
instance has properties giving further data about this location. These data properties are
explained later at Section 4.5.3.
At this stage, two further aspects of DESO will be detailed: the naming of Instances
and the extension of classes.
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Naming of Instances
If instances are named meaningfully, as shown in Figure 4.6, there is room for confusion.
Many of them may have the same - or similar sounding - names. Whilst the instance names
could be made longer to delineate them, this is inefficient. It could lead to a situation where
instances are given artificially long and obscure names just to differentiate one from the
other. Further, a record must be kept of names that have been already used and this must
be searched before naming any new instances.
Instead, the “Linked Data Principles”[31] are used - which were previously described
in section 2.9.2. All instances are named using a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI).
In DESO, the ontology name is unique, www.semanticweb.org/owenbrady/ontologies/
2015/version15# and then either “Artfct”, “Type” or “Ref” followed by a sequence number.
To illustrate, in Figure 4.6 the entity “SSID” is actually named:
www.semanticweb.org/owenbrady/ontologies/2015/version15#Artfct000009
The name “SSID” is instead included as a “Label” - one of the instance’s Data Proper-
ties. This has a number of benefits:
• first, it removes any ambiguity - if two researchers call an artefact the same name but
they are actually referencing different locations it could cause confusion. Using a
URI, the two researchers could create different instances for each of their Locations
but their Data Property Labels for the name could be the same;
• second, following on, it allows researchers in different fields to keep names that
have a meaning to them. This is useful as it allows reference to a name that they
commonly use for communication; and
• third, it helps with extensibility - as will be detailed later in the next section, 4.5.2.
Extension of Classes
A key criterion for DESO’s design is that it should be able to extend in order to deal with
developments in technology - Research Question 2. To give an example, in Figure 4.6
the class “Hard Disk” contains three instances common to all hard disks. But as research
progresses, extra artefacts may be found in Solid State Devices which are not found in
other Hard Disks.
This can be captured by the creation of a new sub-class “Solid State Hard Disk” as
shown in Figure 4.7. This shows the three original artefacts that can still be found in all
Hard Disk types but also one which can only be found in Solid State hard disks.













































































































































































































































































































Fig. 4.6 Location Class: Device Subclass. Note that Instance labels rather than URIs are
shown for clarity
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Device Hard Disk
Solid State Hard Disk
Hard Disk Manufacturer
Hard Disk Model
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Symbols
Fig. 4.7 Location Class: the addition of a sub-class for Solid State Devices
Device Hard Disk
Spinning Platter Hard Disk
Hard Disk Serial Number







Key to Ontology Symbols
Fig. 4.8 Location Class: the addition of a sub-class for “Cloud Disk” and rearrangement of
instances
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An alternate scenario is the development of a new type of hard disk, purely for example,
called a “Cloud” disk. This no longer identifies itself by Manufacturer and Model but by
MAC address. It does, however, still have a serial number. The structure can be adjusted
as shown at Figure 4.8. Here, “Serial Number” can still be located in all classes of Hard
Disk but this class has been split. The instances Manufacturer and Model are moved into
the newly delineated “Spinning Platter Hard Disk” and “Solid State Hard Disks” but they
are not contained on “Cloud” disks.
The modification and addition to the class structure is made possible due to the use of
URIs - explained at Section 4.5.2. This means the instance names are irrelevant to the class
containing them. It allows instances to be freely moved around as the class structures are
changed - references to them from other properties will still be valid because they point to
the URI itself.
4.5.3 Data Properties
Data properties are the extra information that the user of the ontology needs when assessing
an instance. Since the three classes represent different concepts then these properties will
vary across them.
For the Location class, typical questions requiring an answer are:
• How can the artefact data be located?
• Can the artefact be refined to a particular user?
• Is the data machine parsable?
• How is the data encoded - e.g. hexadecimal or ascii?
To answer these questions, the data properties for the class are shown at Figures 4.9
and 4.10 but, for context, the full set is also shown at Figure 4.11.
How these data properties answer the posed questions
The location of data will vary according to its container and so the addressing systems
must be flexible to take this into account. In some instances, there will be a direct way to
obtain the data. In others, there must be a direction to a block of data - such as a file - and
then further direction on how to locate the pertinent data within that block. As example:
• devices have artefacts that are typically hard-coded into firmware running a propri-
etary operating system. Their data may be obtained by issuing a command over the
device’s data bus. As example, for hard disks, the ATA specification [9] states the
“Identify Device” command can be used to obtain a hard disk serial number; and
















Fig. 4.9 Example Data Properties used in the Location class to show location of a data
block
• file systems will have a path to locate the file containing the data. As shown in Figure
4.9 this can be split into those files that are user or non-user identifiable in case the
examiner is trying to find artefacts for a single user in a multi-user environment.
And once the file has been located, the position of the artefact data within that file
must be specified. This is shown at Figure 4.10 with a subset of properties under
“hasPosition”.
There are still questions concerning data encoding and machine parsability. To answer
these the properties shown in Figure 4.11 are used.
The property “hasEntryFormat” supplies information on how the data is encoded. This
is important because some conversion may be necessary dependent on the format that
will later be required for comparison with other data of the same Type Identifier. For
example, the comparison of one FAT 32 Volume Serial Number in decimal with another in
hexadecimal will not be effective.
The property “hasParsableStructure’ is a boolean value which a forensic tool can
interpret: “true” means that there is a set of instructions to allow the data to be extracted.
But “false” means the examiner will need to manually interpret the data for this DESO
entry.
The question of parsability is one that will be considered further as, despite some
solutions being found, this is an area where DESO is still only partially effective.
































Fig. 4.10 The Data properties used in the Location Class to show position within a block
4.5 The Artefact Location class 93
Some extensible structures could be specified as, effectively, a file path or XML - as
demonstrated by Nelson [178]. Examples include the “Plists” found in Apple’s OS X or
the “Registry” and “Link” files found in Windows operating systems, Solutions were also
found for “SQLite” databases by specifying “Table” and “Field” names as shown in Figure
4.11.
But the position of data within a block may be more complex - requiring a number of,
interdependent, steps. One approach is to use the Yet Another Markup Language (YAML)
[27] as used in the Google Rapid Research Framework (GRR) [58] but this is an area of
research that requires further work.
4.5.4 Location sub-class: File System
The File System sub-class is shown at Figure 4.12. Note that, although there are multiple
instances with the label “Volume Serial Number” these are not the same. They have
different URIs as their location in the respective file systems is different. Also note that
“EXT’ is not sub-divided into, for example “EXT3” and “EXT4”. This is, simply, because
at this stage of DESO’s development, there are no instances and so further granularity
is not required. As shown at Section 4.5.2 the classes can be extended and modified as
technology and Digital Evidence research progresses.
4.5.5 Location sub-class: Operating System Independent Files
As the name suggests, this class lists artefact locations in files that exist regardless of the
operating system upon which they are contained. A ready example of this is the EXIF
data stored in image files such as JPEG and TIFF. Whilst this is commonly known to
contain GPS coordinates of where an image was recorded, the standard also has space to
record the make, model and serial number of the camera lens used [237, p.68] - a valuable
opportunity to link an electronic file back to a physical object. A benefit of DESO is that
the potential for this data can be documented and not overlooked.
Because of their independence, it is not possible to use the location of a file as a means
of identification. Only the position of artefact data within a file can be specified. This
creates a problem in assessing availability and, following on from this, selection to reduce
the volume of evidence - Research Question 3.
There is investigative value in these files but caution may need to be used when
considering their use. This will be explored later at Chapter 7.































































Fig. 4.11 The hierarchy of DESO’s data properties
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Class
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Fig. 4.12 Location Class: File System sub-class. Note that Instance labels rather than URIs
are shown for clarity
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4.5.6 Location sub-class: Operating System
The Operating System sub-classes again demonstrate the extensibility of DESO. A repre-
sentative sample is shown at Figure 4.13. As with Devices at Section 4.5.2 the classes are
expanded as and when required: “Windows 10” is not expanded as any and all instances
are present in all versions of this operating system. But “Windows 7” has been further
divided into Service Packs 1 and 2 as there are some instances that are not common to
all versions. Representative instances have been shown in Figure 4.13 together with one,
“Windows 7 Software Registry EMDMgmt USB Serial Number”, that is common to all
versions of this particular operating system.
As new operating systems are developed, they can be added appropriately - for example,
an operating system has been developed by Samsung for Internet of Things devices [68].
This can be added under Operating System as a sibling class to Windows and Apple.
4.5.7 Location sub-class: Operating System Dependent Application
Files
The reason for considering this sub-class is the increasing use of applications (“apps”) on
mobile phones. This was noted by Anglano [12] in his deconstruction of the “Whatsapp”
message database on phones running the Android operating system.
The sub-class is different from the others under Location because it is not disjoint from
them all. Instead it is dependent on one other sub-class: all instances in Operating System
Dependent Application Files must also be a member of an Operating System sub-class.
To explain this step, the Whatsapp application may store its artefacts in a database with
a consistent format. The position of artefacts is the same whatever version of operating
system the App is running under. But this database file may be located differently according
to the operating system upon which the App is installed.
As illustration, Figure 4.14 shows how the application Whatsapp is a sub-class in
Operating System Dependent Application Files. It has a GPS artefact contained in the
SQLite database that it generates on the device upon which it is installed.
But the location of this SQLite database file will vary according to the operating system
- the instances will have differing data properties for this location. As such there are two
separate instances - both in the Whatsapp sub-class but also members of respectively
different operating systems.
4.5.8 The placement of Instances - what does it represent?
Having explained the Location sub-classes, it is now worth further considering what the
sub-classes and respective instances actually represent to the examiner? Figure 4.15 will
be used to assist explanation.





























































































































































































































Fig. 4.13 Location Class: Operating System Sub-class. A selection of the Operating
System Subclass with example instances
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Fig. 4.14 Location sub-class: Operating System Dependent Application files showing
two instances produced by the same application but hosted under two different Operating
System sub-classes
DESO is set up as a sort-hierarchy in order-sorted logic - as described by Kaneiwa et
al [148]. The presence of an instance in a particular sub-class means that a specific artefact
is present at the same location for that sub-class and all descendent sub-classes.
So, in Figure 4.15 “Artfct 1” is a an artefact that can be found in the same location
on all versions of Windows operating systems. “Artfct 2” can be found on all versions of
Windows 7 operating systems but not Windows 10 or Windows Vista. “Artfct 3” can be
found at the same location on all versions of Windows 7, Service Pack 1 but not Service
Pack 2.
To evaluate the available artefacts, the examiner first assesses which of the top level
Location sub-classes, as at Figure 4.5, are present on the item to be examined - eg Device,
File System and so on. For each of these sub-classes, the examiner then parses the
descendent sub-classes working down through their levels until, either a match is found,
or there are no more sub-classes to examine. The conclusion of this process leaves the
examiner at the optimal sub-class.
As a worked example, with reference to Figure 4.15, the examiner has found that the
item has an Operating System. Further examination has revealed that it is the Windows
Operating System. Next, the examiner assesses if there are descendants to this sub-class.
There are and so the examiner assesses if the item matches any of these sub-classes - eg
Windows 7 or Windows 10. If the examined Operating System matches one, for example
Windows 7, the examiner then looks to see if there are sub-classes. Again, there are, and
so the process continues.
The process stops when, either there are no more descendant sub-classes, or the
Operating System being examined does not match any of them. So, for example, the
examiner may reach Windows 7 but is unable to discern if it is Service Pack 1 or 2. In
which case, the process would stop at Windows 7.
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When this process is complete, the examiner is left at the optimal sub-class and can
have confidence that all of the artefacts in that sub-class and its ascendants contain instances
that are locations of available artefacts.
This process is complete when the process is reversed and the examiner works back up
the sub-classes to the top of the Location Class gathering all these instances.
At conclusion, the examiner has all the available artefacts for a given digital evidence
source.
4.5.9 Summary
A class system for Location has been outlined and it has been shown how this structure
can be modified and extended to cope, not only with developments in technology but also
the continual discovery of digital artefacts. In this way, a repository is created that allows
an examiner to understand what artefacts may be available.
But this class system does not assist with selection and correlation since it is capturing
all the available artefacts.
Finally, the artefacts have no provenance - if, for example, something is described as
a USB Device Serial Number and it is accessed using a certain command, what is the
justification for this assertion?
For the answers to these questions, two further Classes are needed: the first is Type
Identifier and the second, Reference. The next chapter will explain these concepts.

























































































































































































































Fig. 4.15 Location sub-class: Illustration of Operating System with contrived instances to
illustrate how placement affects the availability of artefacts.
Chapter 5
DESO - Addressing Selection,
Correlation and Reliability
The Location class demonstrates that the artefacts available from a particular source can be
documented. But this documentation does not assist in assessing which of those artefacts
will be of use for an investigation, comparing them and assessing their reliability. The aim
of the Type Identifier and Reference classes is to address these problems.
5.1 The Type Identifier class
5.1.1 The Aim of this class
To provide a mechanism for selection and correlation, the available artefacts in the Location
class need to be linked to a suitable, definitive, Type Identifier. This represents the meaning
of the data and allows only the available artefacts of a particular Type Identifier to be
extracted rather than them all. This saves processing time and storage space. Those
artefacts with the same Type Identifier can be compared - wherever they are located.
In assessing how the Type Identifier Class should be structured, the primary focus is
that all artefacts should be linked to the lines of enquiry in an investigation. As shown at
Section 2.1, these are always centred on answering What, Who, When, Where, How and
Why (5WH) questions. So it seems logical to group the artefact identifiers under these
headings as shown at Figure 5.1. In this way all Type Identifiers will have a relevance to
the investigation.
First, it is worth exploring the 5WH categories to understand their meaning in a Digital
Evidence context. This is shown at Table 5.1.









Fig. 5.1 Top level structure of the Identifier sub-class
5.1.2 The 5WH principle
A brief inspection of Table 5.1 shows that representation of some these terms may be more
practicable than others. This is due to the degree of interpretation required of the data
before it can be assigned a meaning. As examples:
• the definitive GPS coordinates in “Where” - which require no further interpretation;
• a recorded time in “When” - which can be affected by the clock of the machine
recording it and the various times zones in use around the World; and
• the more nebulous “How” and “Why” - can there be any single artefact that can
answer these questions?
This will now be explored in more detail.
5.1.3 What
As earlier shown in Table 1.1, common forensic science techniques rely on comparison of
one piece of data to another. This can be the mark left by a suspect’s finger or their deposited
DNA or a tool found in their possession when compared against the various marks and
traces left at a crime scene. The “What” category is important because its components
provide material for the digital equivalent of this trace evidence - the identifying traces left
when one piece of equipment or software interacts with another.
The consideration of issues that should be included in this category are those - and
only those - identifiers which would provide some positive benefit to an investigation. The
structure of sub-classes is shown at Figure 5.2.
Note that, at the top of the structure, there is a split between “Device” identifiers and
“Logical” identifiers. The reason for this division is that Device identifiers are intended to
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Table 5.1
Exploring the application of 5WH to Digital Evidence





Data identifying a piece of equipment
or software - such as a serial number
Who What or which
person or people?
Data associated with a person - such
as a name or user name. This could
also include an organisation
When At what time? Data identifying when a specific
event took place - such as the
interaction of one piece of equipment
with another
Where In or at what place? Data connected with a geographic
location - such as the GPS
coordinates that can be embedded
into an image file when it is created.
How In what way or
manner? By what
means?
Data that defines the process before
an event took place - such as how a
device was being used before a
telephone call was being made.
Why For what reason or
purpose?
Data that defines a motive before an
event took place such as internet
searches before visiting a particular
location.
be such data as the serial numbers embedded in firmware. Examples are the MAC address
in a Network Interface Card (NIC) or a mobile phone handset IMEI. Logical Identifiers
are those which are recorded by software and more easily changed - such as a file system
Volume Label.
Whilst there are reports of Device Identifiers being modified [97] or spoofed [263] this
change relies on a deliberate act in contrast to the Logical Identifiers which are likely to
change as a system is in normal use. As such, there may be a case for choosing the Device
Type Identifier category first - when there is a choice - as they are less prone to change.
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In defining sub-classes and instances, the focus has not been on the different types of
technologies but, instead, the identifiers they could contain. These identifiers translate data
into information that could be used in an investigation.
In following through this principal, when evaluating potential “Location” artefacts, if
data - in the form of a device, file etc, cannot be linked to a recognised Type Identifier,
it should not be included. This is because the data is of no use to the investigation. All
Location entries must be linked to a Type Identifier entry.
The instances contained in the Type Identifier class are linked from instances in the
Location Class by an object property: “isArtefactType”.
The naming of instances using URIs was previously covered at Section 4.5.2 and also
applies to this category.
Data properties
For type Identifiers, the data properties are less complex than Location. There is no need
to specify how data might be found - only how it should be displayed. This is important
to ensure that data from disparate sources is comparable. As such the only properties are
“entryFormat” and “entryLength”.
Extensibility
As discussed at Section 4.5.2 it is important that the Location class structure is able to
modify and expand as technology and research progress. The same principles apply for
Type Identifier as they do for Location: as new technologies are introduced and researched,
they can be added as a sub-class under Device or Logical identifier. If an extra Type
Identifier is found, it can be added as an instance under the appropriate sub-class.
Whilst the class structure is presently quite simple, this may change as DESO develops.
Because URIs are used, the sub-classes and instances can be rearranged with no impact on
other instances referenced to or from them. This is because the reference is to the URI and
not the class structure or name.
5.1.4 Who
Introduction to Friend of a Friend
As explored at Table 5.1, the “Who” category aims to identify data associated with a person
or organisation. This could be, for example, a name, a user name or correspondent.
Whilst no existing classification was found for the “What” category, a long standing
candidate does exist for “Who”: Friend Of A Friend (FOAF) - “ a computer language
defining a dictionary of people-related terms that can be used in structured data” [39].
FOAF has become recognised for articulating this type of data. Its use has been
examined in early studies: 2005, [158], and 2008 [114]. But there is less contemporary
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EUI-64 Network MAC Address
SIM Card ICCID
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USB Device Vendor Type ID
USB Device Product Type ID
USB Device Serial Number String
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Fig. 5.2 Identifier Class: the What sub-class. A sample of instances are shown for
illustration. Note that, again, labels are displayed instead of URIs for ease of reading.
5.1 The Type Identifier class 106
evidence of its wide-spread employment - only the anecdotal Linked Open Vocabulary
survey [37] by one of FOAF’s original developers. Nevertheless, as previously noted in
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Fig. 5.3 A section of the Friend of a Friend Class structure (coloured yellow) and data
properties (coloured green) from the “Paddington” version [38]. Note the limited options
for online account identifiers in the data properties.
As shown at Figure 5.3, FOAF has a simple Class structure. The data properties are
of interest because they could become the instances used in DESO for the Who Type
Identifiers.
The version of FOAF used in DESO was published in 2014. But despite its currency,
it can be seen that the selection of data properties is limited - not including many of the
common social media applications - such as “Snapchat”, “Twitter” or “Whatsapp” - in use
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at the time that this thesis is being written. Indeed, the noted transience and short life of
these applications [143] will pose problems when contrasted against the considered and
time-consuming development life-cycle of specifications such as FOAF.
Application of FOAF to DESO
In considering whether FOAF is suitable, consideration must first be given to DESO’s
requirements. In essence, these are minimal - purely the ability to assign a Type Identifier
to artefacts concerned with persons, organisations or user names.
But consideration should also be given to the granularity of this identification. For
example, if the details of a Facebook [96] account are stored in a Windows operating
system Registry, is it enough to assign it a type Identifier such as a “FOAF:accountName”
as shown in Figure 5.3 or does it have to be particularised to Facebook - for example
“FOAF:accountNameFacebook”?
The answer is not certain so it is prudent to cater for more detailed requirements. The
solution is to use FOAF classes to delineate the types of artefacts that will be identified
and use FOAF data properties as instances to form the type Identifiers. But new instances
can be created as required.
This is illustrated at Figure 5.4. The displayed classes are from FOAF and so are the
instances for the “Person” and “Organization” sub-classes - as can be referenced in Figure
5.3. The instances for the ‘Online Account” sub-class have been added as they do not
occur in FOAF.
The referencing to FOAF is useful because it allows any extracted data to be readily
compared to other Linked Open Data that has been typified using these same terms. Further,
FOAF specifies a format for the various data. This makes it more likely that data will be
matched. But the new Type Identifiers, such as “Twitter ID” could still be identified if the
examiner searched for all instances in the the “Online Account” sub-class.
5.1.5 Where
In describing the “Where” category a number of points are covered:
• the reuse of existing ontologies, as discussed at section 3.2.5, is continued;
• the concept of multiple instances for the same artefact data is introduced; and
• it is shown how DESO could alert an examiner to available evidence which had not
been previously considered.
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Fig. 5.4 Identifier Class: the Who sub-class. All classes are from Friend Of A Friend
(FOAF). All instances with the exception of those in “Online Account” also from FOAF.
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Fig. 5.5 Identifier Class: the Where sub-class
In the same way that a distinction was made between Device and Logical identifiers
for the “What” category at Section 5.2, the concept has been carried through to “Where”.
Instances in the “Address Identifier” sub-class are naming concepts that could change
over time in contrast to “Physical Location” where change is less likely. In specifying the
instances a number of existing ontologies / standards have been used. These are:
• The Postcode ontology [183] produced by the UK-based Ordnance Survey
• The RDF vocabulary for WGS84 latitude/longitude/altitude markup [253] produced
by W3C
• The The International Public Telecommunication Numbering Plan [142] produced
by the International Telecommunications Union
In so doing, DESO identifiers will link in to other sources of data used by investigators.
Same data - multiple instances
The concept being discussed in this section is how the same data can have different
meanings to an investigation - and how DESO copes with this situation.
Figure 5.6 illustrates a SIM card which contains an ICCID. This is a nineteen digit
serial number with a defined format [120, pg7]. The first two digits, “89” reference that
this SIM card is for telecommunications purposes. But the second two or three digits are a
country code: in Figure 5.6 this is “852” for Hong Kong.
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So this data actually contains two pieces of data of interest to the investigator:
1. the whole ICCID is a serial number which can be matched to a serial number
elsewhere - with a “What” type identifier; and
2. a section of the ICCID is a county code indicating the country in which the SIM is
to be used - with a “Where” type identifier.
The question is whether this data should be represented as one Location instance with
an Object property to two different Type identifiers or two Location instances which each
point to their own Type identifier?
There are hazards with the former solution: first, the locations aren’t exactly the same.
The ICCID is the whole nineteen digits but the country code is just two or three of them.
Second, the reference source justifying the link to the Type identifier may not be the same
for both pieces of data.
As such, if a single instance is being created in the Location Class which has multiple
Type Identifiers there must be careful checks. This is to ensure that, first, the data properties
for the Location instance remain the same no matter which of the Type Identifiers is
used. And second, the Reference Class entry is also the same for these Type Identifiers.
Otherwise, multiple instances should be created in the Location class.
Display of hidden evidential uses
With further consideration of Figure 5.6 it can be seen how the Type identifier can alert an
examiner to uses of evidence that may not have been considered.
Suppose an investigation concerns the discovery of a corpse pulled from the sea - the
first task is to identify this body. If a SIM card is found on the corpse then DESO can be
queried for the evidence that may be contained on it.
Both the ICCID in the “What” category and the ICCID Country Code in the “Where”
category will be highlighted - so alerting the examiner that this person may have a connec-
tion to a particular country and providing a useful line of enquiry. Unless the examiner was
regularly examining telecommunications data, this is an aspect that might be overlooked.
This illustrates the importance of concentrating on the semantic representation of the
data rather than the technical one.














































































































































































































































Fig. 5.6 An Illustration of how one section of data - SIM ICCID illustrated - can be multiple
Locations and Types
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5.1.6 When
Defining Type Identifiers relating to time is more problematic than for the preceding 5WH
categories due to the ubiquity of timestamps in a modern digital device. Willassen [259]
cites a number of examples:
• File systems have multiple time stamps per file - indeed each file contained within
NTFS has at least eight [36, p.228].
• Systems usually record events from their processes in logs. Each event has a
timestamp.
• Network equipment such as http, pop, imap and dhcp servers typically log each user
transaction in a system log. Each transaction may have a timestamp.
• For email, the SMTP protocol mandates each server to add its identity and a times-
tamp to a transmitted email. Email messages therefore contain many timestamps.
• Messaging protocols, such as SMS in GSM, also add server generated timestamps
to each transmitted message.
• Many mainstream applications such as word processors, spreadsheets and web
browsers generate timestamps and store them as part of their specific file format.
If DESO merely listed the locations of these time stamps without assigning any meaning
to them then this would not assist with the problem of selection. How would an examiner
assess which of these were required - Research Questions 3 and 4.
But there could be problems when assigning a Type Identifier due to the degree of
interpretation required for the data [65] [32]. This falls into two areas: technical and
semantic.
Technical interpretation of time stamps
There are a number of issues that can impact on the correct interpretation of a time stamp:
• The acccuracy of any clock used will have a direct effect on the accuracy on any
time stamp using that clock;
• The resolution of the time stamp - for example, in FAT file systems, the “Last
Accessed” time stamp is only a date with no time [259, p.8]. This leaves a large
window for an event to have taken place; and
• The time zone setting on a computer may have an impact on the interpretation of the
data. This is demonstrated by NTFS time stamps - which are stored with respect to
Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) [36, p.259]. If a Windows computer has its time
zone set incorrectly and then it is later corrected, the file time stamps set before the
correction will be inaccurate when displayed to the user after the correction.
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Semantic interpretation of time stamps
At section 2.9.5, the use of time-lines was discussed and, also, their drawbacks. The
semantic interpretation of time stamps is a key factor in these limitations. Figure 5.7
illustrates this problem.
PC A
Creation Date of Link Files 
and file saved on desktop:
7 March 2015
PC B
Creation Date of Link Files 
and file saved on desktop:
10 May 2015
Server7 March 2015 10 May 2015




Fig. 5.7 Illustrating the problems of time stamp interpretation using roaming profiles -
what does the Creation date represent?
If a user logs on to PC “A” where roaming profiles are enabled and then accesses a file
on a memory stick, a Link file is created. If this is the first time that a file of this name has
been accessed, the creation date of this Link file is the time of this access [194].
When the user logs out of the PC, the profile is uploaded to a central server. When the
user later logs on to PC “B”, the link file is downloaded to the PC. But the Creation time
stamp is not that of the access to the file but of when the user logged on to PC B and the
Link file was downloaded as part of the roaming profile.
So in summary, the same file appears on two different computers but the Creation date
represents two different concepts: one is the time that a file with a particular name was
accessed, the other is the time that a user logged on to a particular computer.
And delineating between these - and other - concepts is only possible by reference to
other data sources. It is hazardous to make assumptions based just on one source of data
[32].
How to represent When?
A viable solution for a Type Identifier has to avoid the highlighted problems of technical
and semantic interpretation. Instead it has to focus on considering what time stamps
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an investigator would want to know and then supplying as many reliable artefacts as
practicable.
In this respect, considering a time stamp on its own may be meaningless - it is just a
time. The utility of time stamps is when they are the meta-data for an event.
As previously discussed at section 2.9.5, there has been previous work on the rep-
resentation of a time by Hobbs [134] and Pan et al [191] leading to the W3C working
draft “Time Ontology in OWL” [74]. But these do not offer assistance on the meaning
of time from an investigative context. Indeed Pan et al assume that “another ontology
provides for the description of events, either a general ontology of event structure abstractly
conceived, or specific, domain-dependent ontologies for specific domains” [134]. DESO
has to provide this assistance.
The approach in DESO is to use the When category to act as meta-data for the type
Identifiers in the What, Where and Who categories. For example:
• When did a person go to a location?
• When was the device connected to a particular wireless access point?
• When did a user add a person’s contact details to a device?







When at a place
Class Instance
Key to Ontology Symbols
Fig. 5.8 Type Identifier: the When category
To illustrate this further, the process from artefact to DESO record will be followed
step by step.
Figure 5.9 shows an extract from a presentation on iOS artefacts [89]. These artefacts
document when a device encounters a WiFi hotspot. A file “cache_encryptedB.db” can be
parsed and records selected from a database table named “WifiLocation”.
Instances can be recorded in the iOS 9.0.2 Location sub-class to represent these
artefacts.
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Fig. 5.9 The use of the When Type identifier Stage 1: Extract from presentation on iOS
artefacts by Edwards [89] with relevant artefact locations shown. Note there are two
instances for the time stamp.
When assigning suitable Type Identifiers, note that there are What records - the MAC
address - and Where records - the displayed GPS coordinates “Latitude” and “Longitude”.
But the time stamps for these records are semantically different. For the MAC address it is
the time that this equipment was encountered. For the GPS coordinates, it is the time that
the device was in this location.
It is important to make these distinctions because of how DESO will later be used by
investigators. If a geographic Type Identifier is used, then a question such as “Where was
the device being used on 15 January 2017?” can be answered by reference to geographic
identifiers in the “Where” sub-class. Conversely, an investigator may ask a question such as
“Was this device used in the Peckham Internet Cafe on 15 January 2017?” With knowledge
of the internet cafe’s WiFi network name, this question can be answered by reference to an
SSID type entry in the “What” category.
Figure 5.10 shows how these Type Identifiers are assigned. Note, it is important that a
time stamp is not recorded in DESO unless the precise meaning of the data is understood -
otherwise the hazards outlined in the section 2.9.5 regarding time-lining are not overcome.

































































































































































































































































Fig. 5.10 The use of the When Type identifier Stage 2: The artefact Locations displayed
in Figure 5.9 are assigned a Type Identifier. Note that “Timestamp 1” and “Timestamp
2” have different identifiers - from, respectively, the “What Dates and ‘Where Dates”
sub-classes.










































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 5.11 The use of the When Type identifier Stage 3: a new Object Property, “hasTimes-
tamp” is used to link the What or Where Location to the time stamp location. The When
Type Identifiers are used to convey what this time stamp represents.
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Figure 5.11 shows how the When Type Identifiers are brought into use by means of
a new Object Property ”hasTimestamp”. This is from the artefacts with What, Who and
Where Type Identifiers to those with a When Type Identifier. Again, for clarity, the time
stamp is seen as subservient to the other artefacts and the process for recording should be:
1. Identify Location and type Identifier of What, Who or Where artefact
2. Identify if there is any associated time stamp
3. Assess whether there is clarity on the meaning of this time stamp - can it be as-
signed a Type Identifier from the When sub-class? If so record and link with the
“hasTimestamp” Object Property.
5.1.7 How and Why
The classes of “How” and “Why” are more complex than the others. As discussed at
Section 5.1.2:
• “How” can mean in what way or manner or by what means and includes data that
defines the process before an event took place - such as how a device was being used
before a telephone call was being made.
• “Why” describes the reason or purpose for something and includes data that, for
example, defines a motive before an event took place. An example would be internet
searches before visiting a particular place.
These are compound queries not easily satisfied by one particular artefact but, more
likely, a combination of them leading to a conclusion for an action or series of events. This
chimes with the Level 3 provenance described earlier at Table 2.1 - which described the
inferences that could be drawn from any given artefact - what does it actually “mean”?
This topic will be discussed further when DESO is evaluated at Section 7.3
5.2 The Reference class
In order to assess the reliability of any artefact and its Type Identifier, it is important to
know the basis behind this assertion. The technological world develops rapidly so, given
the time delay caused by the process, it would be unrealistic to expect all artefacts to have
appeared in a peer-reviewed journal. As already documented, there is a wealth of useful
information on available artefacts being published by researchers using transient media
with no formal peer review process - such as web blogs.
DESO aims not only to include this information but also to capture the nature of the
source. In this way an examiner can decide whether further research or experimentation is
required - particularly if the recovered artefact data is of importance to a case.
5.2 The Reference class 119
To allow for the representation of provenance, DESO has a system for documenting
the source and weight of the information behind the artefact and its Type Identifier. As
introduced in section 4.4.2, the third and final class is artefact “Reference”. This is how an
examiner can understand the reason why data at a particular location means a particular
thing.
There are two aspects to answering this question: the first is recording the source of
the information for the assertion; and the second is documenting the type of provenance
this information provides - is it just a pronouncement on a blog or a detailed laboratory
study with test data and results for others to replicate?
These two aspects will be covered in turn.
5.2.1 Recording of reference source information
The Bibliographic Ontology [79] (BIBO) was chosen to record the reference sources due
to its wide use - a section of BIBO is shown at Figure 5.12. Other ontologies such as the
FRBR-aligned Bibliographic Ontology (FaBiO) and Citation Typing Ontology (CiTO)
were reviewed [195] but found to be more complex than required in terms of concepts and
classes.
Only a section of BIBO’s classes are required but one extra, “Developer Pages” was
added - as shown in the example at Figure 5.13. This is to distinguish that these pages
contain technical data from an authoritative source. As covered previously, due to the use
of URIs when identifying the instances in DESO, new sub-classes and structures can be
added and the instances rearranged.
5.2.2 Expression of provenance type
An examiner may not want to be restricted on a choice of artefacts when making an initial
assessment of evidential sources. Mention of useful data locations from such sources as
internet blogs may be of great utility. But once useful data is found, then consideration
needs to given to the source of any information about artefact locations and their meaning.
Otherwise, there is the risk of misleading an investigation or - worse - a court.
Each individual in the artefact Location class has an object property from the hasProve-
nanceReference set. This is a hierarchy of properties which describe the information
source used to assert that the observed data is a particular artefact Type Identifier. The
classification is an adaptation of the Evidence and Conclusion Ontology [112] which was
developed for the Gene Ontology [16] and is shown at Figure 5.14
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Fig. 5.12 A selection of the Bibliographic Ontology version 1.3 [79] classes and data
properties
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Fig. 5.13 The Reference class structure. Note the sub-class “Developer Pages” has been
added. Also shown is a sample instance, “Ref 000001” with related data properties.




























































Fig. 5.14 The set of object properties between the Location and Reference classes.
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The hierarchy has the following tiers:
• Author Statement - an assertion made in a published text of some nature - for
example this could be in a book or journal or on a blog. This hierarchy is further
divided to distinguish between author statements that are peer reviewed and also
whether there are supporting details of experimentation or availability of data used
for testing.
• Manufacturer Statement - technical specification on the function of system by a
manufacturer or standards body such as Apple, Microsoft, USB Association or IEEE.
• Observation - the artefact has been observed by the examiner on previous cases
either of the same or similar type of data.
• Experimentation - the examiner has conducted testing to understand how the artefact
data is created.
• No Evidence Available - There is no evidence to support the assertion that the
represented data is the artefact type.
5.3 Summary of DESO
This chapter has introduced DESO. In so doing it has shown how:
• the locations of useful evidential artefacts can be recorded in a class structure. This
structure can be modified and extended to cater for new technology - such as the
Internet of Things - and the discovery of new artefacts;
• the identified artefact Locations are assigned a Type Identifier which allows the
comparison of data from diverse sources in a consistent format. The identifiers are
arranged in a class structure matching investigative questions; and
• each artefact Location / Type Identifier pair are linked to a reference source to show
where this assertion originated and an object property describes the nature of this
reference in relation to the assertion.
The next chapter will examine an investigative scenario. This is used to test how
monolithic tools would be used to approach a particular investigative question and how
DESO can be used to overcome any identified shortcomings.
Chapter 6
Comparative test application and
evaluation of DESO
6.1 Introduction
Chapters 4 and 5 introduced DESO. This chapter details its application. Following this,
Chapter 7 critically evaluates the effectiveness of DESO’s application to understand if it
successfully addresses the research problems and where further work is required.
The scenario chosen for testing DESO is its assistance when using monolithic tools.
The reason for this choice is the widespread use of these tools. It follows that, if DESO is
to provide assistance, its impact would be greatest in this area.
The generation of test data was detailed earlier, in Section 4.2.2. This same data will
be used again as follows: The method employed when testing DESO was as follows:
• A hypothetical investigation scenario involving the test data was devised;
• A selection of monolithic tools was assembled;
• The tools were first applied to this data to understand how they could assist; and
• DESO was then applied to the various tasks to understand if the effectiveness of the
monolithic tools could be improved.
6.2 Investigation scenario
The scenario to be considered is that a suspicious death has occurred in a house containing
two computers. A person was seen running away from the premises and a suspect matching
this person’s description was arrested some distance away. When searched, he was found
in possession of a USB memory stick.
When interviewed, the arrested person denied ever having visited the dead person’s
house and he is now detained pending enquiries.
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There are non-digital enquiries that need to be performed which include assessing if
this person has left any physical traces at the scene - such as fingerprints or DNA.
But the job of the digital evidence examiner is to quickly discover if there is anything
regarding the USB memory stick that will link the suspect to the scene.
6.3 Selection of monolithic tools
Three tools were assessed:
• Magnet Forensics Axiom - Examine and Process v1.0.5.1994 [162];
• Encase Version 7 [123]; and
• Belkasoft Evidence Center Version 8.4 [26].
The selection of tools was based solely on availability of software. Findings were
common to all three tools but Axiom is principally described - purely as an exemplar, not
because it performed better or worse than the other two. The findings should be viewed as
suggestions for improving the use of these tools - not as a reason for discontinuing their
use. This point is referenced again in the findings at Section 6.9.
6.4 Consideration of tool use
The test scenario is a relatively simple problem: are there any links between the USB
memory stick and the two computers found on the premises. The question to be asked
when considering the use of monolithic tools is: how should they be used? Where does an
examiner begin?
A prudent approach may include an assessment of how any connections between the
USB stick and the deceased’s computers could be formed. The examiner would then have
to discover how artefacts evidencing these connections could be identified, extract the data
and then examine them to understand if there are any matches.
The effectiveness of this approach is subject to the examiner’s latent knowledge of
the artefacts and reference sources documenting others that are previously unknown. The
examiner would also require skill in using any tool to ensure that data for the the identified
artefacts is correctly extracted from any source.
Alternatively, the monolithic tools may have some sort of module or process that would
automatically perform these tasks - and then it would be for the examiner to assess the
tool’s effectiveness. But the problem with this approach has been detailed at Section 2.11.2:
the tools are not explicit when stating the artefacts they can and cannot extract. So how can
an examiner have confidence that all possibly available artefacts have been considered?
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Fig. 6.1 The selection of artefacts to be extracted. Note how the presented artefacts are
representative of those categories that Axiom can extract, not those that are available on
the item to be examined. This was presented for an OS X operating system
6.5 Test - availability of artefacts
6.5.1 The approach of monolithic tools
Axiom specifies its ability to handle “Operating System” artefacts for Windows-based
and iOS systems. What became clear is that the version being tested does not handle
OS X operating system artefacts. This demonstrates the difficulty for an examiner in
understanding the availability of artefacts on a particular Digital Evidence source based
solely on one monolithic tool.
The lack of support for OS X operating system artefacts places importance on the
ability to correlate any output from Axiom with tools that do handle this operating system..
Axiom’s data extraction module “Axiom Process” version 1.0.5.1994 was tested. It
allows the user to “Select artifacts to include in a case” but this is a generic screen which
only delineates between “mobile” and “computer” artefacts. All options are displayed
whether or not the actual device being examined actually may contain any of these artefacts.
As example, when the test OS X image was loaded, it offered the option to extract
Windows Prefetch files - illustrated at 6.1. But this data did not contain a Windows
operating system.
Instead of informing the examiner of the artefacts that may be present on the loaded
device, the interface is instead displaying Axiom’s capabilities. This means that the user
6.6 Test - selection of artefacts 127
may select superfluous processes on data that are not present. Further, the categories are
relatively high-level - they do not actually state which artefacts are extracted by these
modules and which are not. As a consequence the examiner may miss available artefacts
because Axiom does not have the capability to process them.
In summary, the use of a single monolithic tool to assess availability is only effective if
that tool displays all artefacts currently known to the field - irrespective of whether or not
the tool can extract them.
6.5.2 Improving assessment of availability using DESO
DESO moves any assessment of available artefacts away from the tools used by examiners.
As described at section 4.5.8, instead, the examiner uses DESO to work through the
functional categories from “Device” to “Application” gathering together a set of artefacts
that could be present on the item being examined. These artefacts are listed by their unique
DESO number. Tools are then selected on the basis of their ability to extract these DESO
artefacts.
To facilitate DESO, the way in which tools document their capabilities will have to
change. Instead of the rather generic categoric descriptions now presented to examiners,
they will instead have to specifically list the DESO artefacts they can extract.
But there are considerable benefits to this change:
• The examiner has an overall view on available artefacts - not just those presented by
any discrete tool. The tools, including open-source ones, can be mixed and matched
dependent on requirement;
• DESO provides a ready reference source for tool developers when they are looking
to add new capabilities;
• Tool developers can use DESO artefacts with test data to readily verify any changes
to tools; and
• The non-tool specific listing of artefacts means that any person wishing to check any
findings produced by an examiner can do so without the need to have any tool.
It is accepted that the effectiveness of DESO relies on its population.
6.6 Test - selection of artefacts
Previously, in section 6.2, the described test scenario involved a suspicious death and a
fleeing suspect. The task was to check whether there was any connection between the USB
memory stick and the two computers found at the deceased’s house.
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One approach is to conduct a full examination of all the artefacts present on the three
devices and then consider any apparent connections - but this is not time efficient and,
most certainly, does not scale well as the amount of devices increases.
Instead, a more strategic approach may be more effective. Discounting physical
traces on the devices - such as finger prints or DNA, there are at least two avenues for
investigation:
• there may be file content on the USB stick which matches files found on the computer;
and
• system records on the computers may indicate that the USB device was inserted and,
possibly, accessed. There may also be an indication of when these events happened.
Both are viable lines of enquiry but the second is likely to have more chance of success
for the following reasons:
• The first approach may not provide opportunities to link the suspect to the scene
unless the content of the files on the USB memory stick gives rise to some form
of identification - such as a contract or agreement between the deceased and the
suspect; but
• the second approach could be the quickest line of enquiry because it may highlight
individualising data - such as a serial number linking the USB memory stick to the
computers.
This second line of enquiry will now be considered.
6.6.1 The approach of monolithic tools
With regard to assessing which artefacts are required for a case, Axiom does provide
assistance in that it assigns potential artefacts to categories such as “Chat”, “Cloud” and
“Web Related”. But these are categories of the artefacts’ technical sources not how they can
assist an investigation. For example, “Web Related” is a generic term and could encompass
the URL of a visited site and also the volume name containing a viewed file. This broad,
technical-based, categorisation still relies on an examiner knowing which artefacts may be
present and how they may be compared.
Because there is no accurate description of the artefacts the examiner, to play safe, may
select them all - this is not a scalable solution to the increasing volume of data.
6.6.2 Improving selection of artefacts using DESO
DESO is required to assess what system records on the computers may evidence the
insertion of a USB device. To understand a method to exploit DESO, a short introduction
to SPARQL [242] is required.




<http :// example.org/book/book1 >
<http :// purl.org/dc/elements /1.1/ title >
?title .
}
Listing 6.1 SPARQL query to display any identified book titles
Introduction to SPARQL
DESO is an ontology specified as Resource Description Framework (RDF) [40]. This
means it consists “subject, predicate, object” triples which are interpreted and linked
together to form a conceptual model.
To query an RDF ontology, the most common method is to use the W3C standard:
SPARQL Protocol And RDF Query Language (SPARQL) [242].
SPARQL queries operate by searching through the various triples for any that match a
specified pattern. A simple query cited by W3C in its SPARQL specification is quoted as
example.




In other words, a book has the title “SPARQL Tutorial”.
A sample of SPARQL code is shown at Listing 6.1. This reviews the available triples
in the ontology for any matching this pattern. As follows:
• Variables are identified by a preceding “?” before the term;
• The “Select” clause directs which variable is to appear in any results; and
• The “Where” clause specifies the pattern that is to be used.
This pattern is run against the available triples and the corresponding variables are
returned as results. In the stated example, the ontology’s triples are reviewed for any that
match the pattern where the subject is a book and the predicate is title. Where these occur,
the object is returned. With the example, the result would be “SPARQL Tutorial”.
This is a simple query but more complex ones can be formed. Results can be presented
in a variety of formats. Further, queries on multiple ontologies can be performed at the
same time - making SPARQL a powerful and efficient way of examining data held in an
RDF format.






{? artefact rdf:type deso:OS_X_10 .6.8}
UNION
{? artefact rdf:type deso:Windows_7 }.
}
Listing 6.2 SPARQL query for any artefacts generated by OS X 10.6.8 or Windows 7
operating systems that are USB Device Type identifiers
To service these queries, local systems, such as Stardog [229], can be used to ingest
the triple store and search them. Alternatively, SPARQL end points are available using
HTTP to conduct queries over the internet.
Using SPARQL to query DESO for the selection of artefacts
Effectively, the examiner has to look for the potential links between either of the two
computers and the USB stick - and focus in on these links, excluding the material which
would not assist.
This requires the examiner to know what artefacts exist on the respective devices and,
of those, which ones are potentially comparable. A commonly shared artefact, such as
a serial number, allows this comparison. But there are others, and if the examiner is not
aware of them, there is the possibility for missed opportunities to make connections in the
data.
DESO has three strands: Location, Type Identifier and Reference. To use DESO for
this enquiry, the Location strand has to be searched for any artefacts of the same Type
Identifier present in both the USB stick and either the Windows PC or OS X machine
Locations.
The first task is to catalogue the sources to understand their type of device, file system,
operating system and any installed applications. Having completed this task, availability
of artefacts is assessed - as discussed at Section 6.5.2. The available artefacts are then
evaluated for any that share a common type between the USB device and either the
Windows or OS X devices. Any artefacts of the same type can be compared.
An early approach to this scenario was detailed by Brady [35] as shown in the SPARQL
code at Listing 6.2. However, there are limitations to this suggestion - illustrated at Figure
6.2.





USB Device Windows 7 OS X 10.6.8
What USB Device Type 






USB Device Windows 7 OS X 10.6.8
Which of the artefacts at 
these locations have the 
same Type identifiers?
For the artefacts at this 
location, what are the 
Type Identifiers?
1 2
Fig. 6.2 Two approaches to searching for artefact Type Identifiers - the upper diagram
illustrates an assumption that all USB Device Type Identifiers will be present on every
USB Device. The lower diagram illustrates selection of suitable Type Identifiers on the
Target only after those on the source have been identified.
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Table 6.1
SPARQL Results: Artefacts found on a USB memory stick formatted with
FAT32 that are also found on either Windows 7 or OS X 10.6.8





































The upper diagram shows the original concept - the two computer locations were
searched for the same Type Identifiers as should be found on a USB Device. The drawback
to this approach is it assumes that all the artefacts located on any USB device have a Type
Identifier from the USB Device sub-class. This may not always be the case. For example,
in the future a USB Device may be developed with wireless networking capability. This
would mean that it could generate artefacts with a Type Identifier from the “Network
Address” sub-class.
To rectify this, the adopted approach is one illustrated by the lower diagram of Figure
6.2. The USB Device is first checked to establish what artefacts are available on it together
with their Type Identifiers. The two computers are then checked for any artefacts with the
same Type Identifiers.
A remedied SPARQL listing is shown at Listing 6.3. Also included in this code is an
accommodation for any artefacts from the USB Device’s file system, “FAT 32”. Results
from this query are shown at Table 6.1.
Displayed in this table are the pairs of artefacts from, respectively, the USB Device
and either the Windows or OS X computers that match. Also shown is the common Type
Identifier they share.
Note how one artefact from the USB Device, “deso:Artfct000014” can be compared to
an artefact on each of the operating systems.
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SELECT ?art1 ?label1 ?art2 ?label2 ?type
WHERE {
{?art1 rdf:type/rdfs:subClassOf* version15:USB_Device}
#Supplies all instances of selected class and sub -classes
UNION
{?art1 rdf:type/rdfs:subClassOf* version15:FAT32}.
#Supplies all instances of selected class and sub -classes
?art1 rdfs:label ?label1.
# Obtains label of selected instance
?art1 version15:isArtefactType ?type.
#Obtains DESO type of instance
{?art2 rdf:type/rdfs:subClassOf* version15:OS_X_10_6_8}
#Supplies all instances of selected class and sub -classes
UNION
{?art2 rdf:type/rdfs:subClassOf* version15:Windows_7 }.
#Supplies all instances of selected class and sub -classes
?art2 version15:isArtefactType ?type.
# Compares Type of art1 against Type of art2
?art2 rdfs:label ?label2.
# Obtains label of selected instance
}
Listing 6.3 SPARQL query for any artefacts generated by USB Devices or FAT32 that
shares a Type identifier with artefacts located on OS X 10.6.8 or Windows 7 operating
systems.
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Once DESO has been used to make this selection, tools - monolithic or open source -
can be used to extract these artefact values and correlate them.
6.7 Testing the correlation of artefacts
It is assumed that the correct selection of artefacts has occurred and that the data values
from these locations have been extracted. The task now is to compare these extracted
values to understand if any found from the USB Device are also found on the computers.
6.7.1 The approach of monolithic tools
As a demonstration of the identified issues, the Axiom forensic tool (“Axiom Examine”
version 1.0.5.1994”) is again used as an example.
OS X operating system artefacts are not supported by Axiom so assessment concen-
trated on intra-Windows and USB device capability and the format Axiom used to export
this data. This is so that the data could be compared to the output of other tools.
Axiom does aggregate various data sources - for example its “USB Devices” tab draws
together data from various areas such as the Windows device installation log file and
registry to provide examiners with a single view of a device’s serial number, name and
volume serial number.
However as with all the three tools tested, Axiom demonstrated a lack of internal con-
sistency. As example, its “USB Device” and “Jump List” views are shown at, respectively,
Figures 6.3 and 6.4.
Note the USB Device view shows the volume serial number represented in two formats
- “VSN Decimal” and “VSN Hex”. Yet in its “Jump Lists” view this same field is called
“Volume Serial Number”. Further, whether this field is displayed in decimal or hexadecimal
is not specified.
If these Figures are inspected, it can be seen that the value “557180D” is displayed in
the USB Device view. A similar value, “0557180D” is displayed in the Jump List view. It
can surmised that this second notation is specified in hexadecimal but even this is shown
with an additional “0” prefixed.
This creates problems when these values are exported and combined: what does a
“VSN” or “Volume Serial Number” represent and in what format is it presented?
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Fig. 6.3 Axiom’s USB Device view describing the Volume Serial Number as “VSN” in
both hexadecimal and decimal formats. Note the value “557180D” for reference when
viewing Figure 6.4
Fig. 6.4 How Axiom displays the parsed Volume Serial Number data from a Windows 7
Jump List. Note how it is not now described as “VSN” and the format is unspecified. Also
note how the value “557180D” from Figure 6.3 is now listed as “0557180D”
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As earlier reported, since Axiom does not parse OS X operating system artefacts,
for effective use its output must be compared with that produced by tools that can parse
this data. Figure 6.5 illustrates the issues when this occurs. The output from Axiom is
combined with that from Encase version 7.10. Of note:
• Both tools use a field descriptor such as “Serial Number” without specifying to what
this “Serial Number” relates? Without this clarification two, completely unrelated
serial numbers could be compared.
• Field descriptors are not consistent within the tool - see Encase’s “Serial #” and
“Serial Number”
• Field descriptors are not consistent between tools - see Encase’s “Volume Serial”
and Axiom’s “VSN Decimal”
• Data is reported differently by the tools - both data that each tool has extracted
from the same apparent source - such as the “Last Connected” time - and data from
disparate sources that are capable of comparison - such as “Serial Number”.
In summarising the approach that Axiom and the other reviewed tools take, they rely
on the examiner’s historical knowledge or ability to research in order to understand how
the various formats can be compared. In a simple USB stick scenario, this is entirely
plausible but it may be less likely as more complex and obscure examination scenarios are
encountered. The potential for errors and missed evidential opportunities exists.
6.7.2 Using DESO to aid correlation of heterogeneous sources
Instead of using proprietary descriptions, the various tools could report data using the
DESO Artefact (Artfct) Number, Type Identifier and the data format dictated by the
respective Type Identifier. Correlation within and between tools becomes possible. Figure
6.6 illustrates how this facility assists.
There are a number of points to draw out from this illustration:
• Those findings with the same Artfct number are from the same location - for example
Artfct “0001”. This means that different tools can be readily compared to understand
if they are producing the same results.
• Those findings with the same Type Identifier number can be compared - eg Type
“0002”
• The reported value is in a format dictated by the Type - this means that all tools
report the data in the same way, no matter the source.
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Fig. 6.5 An illustration of how artefact data, and they way this data is described, is reported
differently both between tools and within the tool itself. This causes difficulties when
comparison is made.
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Fig. 6.6 Illustrates how DESO tags can be added to the output of monolithic tools. (Sample
Artfct and Type Identifiers numbers used for illustration)
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DESO is technology neutral - it is designed as a framework for capturing information
about artefacts and providing for their accurate and consistent reporting. As such, no
particular method for comparing artefacts is proposed. Possibilities include the use of
spreadsheets and databases - or feeding the results into other ontologies. This may make
for an interesting area of further research - discussed in Further Work at Chapter 8.
6.8 Assessing the reliability of artefacts
There are a number of occasions when the findings of an examiner need to be reported.
These include:
• the preparation of a report detailing evidence for a judicial hearing - such as a
criminal trial;
• the preparation of material for import into another analytical tool; and
• the preparation of material for transfer to another agency.
This can be time consuming - particularly where a large amount of artefacts require
documentation.
6.8.1 The approach of monolithic tools
With regard to provenance, Axiom and the other tools tested do show the source of any
reported artefact data. Examples are by reference to the location of the data in a file or,
sometimes further, to a row number in the column of a database table. This is Level 1
Provenance as discussed earlier in Chapter 2 - see Table 2.1. This states how data can be
located by others.
But there is no justification for any interpretation of these values. For example, the
tool may assert that a particular value is a “Volume Serial Number” but does not state the
reason for this assertion. This leaves the examiner having to trust that the developer of this
product has made a correct judgement in its interpretation of the data at this location.
From an evidential standpoint, the examiner is left in a weak position without conduct-
ing further testing. But as the volume of artefacts in a case increases, this further testing
may not be a practical expectation.
The examiner would, instead, be better served by the presentation of artefacts with
greater evidence of provenance: at least Level 2, justifying the representation of this data
as, for example, an IP address; but ideally Level 3 provenance would also be included
which details what this data means - for example, the IP assigned to the device when
connected to an internal network.
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6.8.2 Using DESO to aid reporting of provenance
If the reporting format shown at Figure 6.7 is used, then the workload for the examiner is
eased because evidence is produced as an automatic consequence of using DESO. Further,
the provenance of the evidence is automatically documented.
If DESO is to have maximum utility, it cannot only document artefacts that have been
tested and reported in peer reviewed journals. The field of digital evidence is advancing
too quickly to be only captured by these information sources. Instead, sources such as
blogs documenting artefacts must also be included.
But there is a difference in the reliability of the respective sources. An examiner has
to assess this reliability when considering which artefacts to use and, further, what extra
testing is required.
Using DESO, the examiner can review the information source for any artefact and
easily note the provenance behind each one. This is performed using a combination of the
source type and hasProvenanceReference object property.
For example, consider a DESO entry with only a blog entry for justification and the
object property indicating that it is not peer reviewed and has no supporting material1. This
may require further attention.
This ability to document and assess provenance may lend itself to analysis of evidential
strength using probability measures. This is discussed in Chapter 8, Further Work.
With regard to the transfer of data to other agencies, particular those overseas, the
reporting of DESO Artfct numbers and values may have particular utility. First, if other
agencies also reference DESO, then there is no ambiguity surrounding the data being
supplied. But second, it allows the transmission of disparate items of data without the need
for surrounding context.
For example, network MAC addresses can be supplied for use in an overseas trial
without the need to transfer a complete image of a computer. This may assist where there
are data protection concerns for other data also contained on an evidence source.
6.9 Summary of assistance provided by DESO
In the previous sections, a number of problems were noted with monolithic tools:
1. The artefacts presented for the examiner’s selection are based on the tool’s capability
- not the availability of artefacts. This means that potential artefacts are presented
which, in fact, are not capable of being contained on the device. This also means
that the examiner could miss potential artefacts if the tool does not support them.
2. The reporting and description of artefacts lacks precision and uniformity. This causes
problems when comparing the outputs of disparate tools.
1hasProvCodeAuthStatNonPeerReviewedNotSupported
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These problems can be addressed by buttressing them with DESO:
• instead of the tools being used to display and select artefacts, DESO is used and then
the tools’ capabilities are harnessed to perform this extraction;
• the tools use DESO to report their results - bringing benefits on comparability,
reporting and provenance.
Figure 6.7 illustrates how DESO fits into the investigative workflow. Note how DESO
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Fig. 6.7 DESO as part of the investigative process
To provide the greatest assistance to investigators, monolithic tools aim to cover as
many data sources as possible. But there are deficiencies when the research problems of
availability, selection, correlation and reliability are considered.
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However, any issue taken with the tools is not the skill and effort that has been expended
to produce them but the uses to which they are put. To expect one tool to perform every
possible function is unrealistic - the use of these tools in this manner does them a disservice.
The situation is akin to using a large number of specially crafted scalpels to drill a
specific hole from one side of a wall to the other. Each scalpel cuts material in a differing
way to the others and may not even excavate in the required direction. If they are all used at
the same time then, eventually, the hole will be cut but it may take longer than is required
and the hole could be larger than is necessary.
But use of the correct scalpel at the correct time in the correct order completes the job
faster and more efficiently. DESO performs this coordinating function.
Chapter 7
Evaluation of DESO against objectives
7.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate whether DESO addresses the thesis’ Problem
Statements.
The Problem Statements are set out in the Introduction at Section 1.2 but are repeated
for ease of reference. The issue being addressed is development of a classification system
to:
• Understand the available artefacts on any particular data source (Availability);
• Be able to select which of these artefacts are relevant to a particular enquiry (Selec-
tion);
• Provide a classification scheme to compare artefacts (Correlation); and
• Provide a mechanism for documenting the provenance of an artefact - the reason
why a particular piece of data indicates a particular event (Reliability).
So DESO will be evaluated for Availability, Selection, Correlation and Reliability. In
doing so, the Research Questions set out in Section 1.2 will be considered. These will be
highlighted as they are encountered.
The evaluation addresses not just how DESO solves these issues but also how it does
not. Recommendations for further work are made in Chapter 8.
In summing up, the principal Research Question will be considered: Does DESO allow




Research Question 2: Does DESO allow for differing digital sources and rapid changes in
technology?
This question primarily relates to the Location class. Chapter 6 demonstrated that
DESO is capable of being populated with artefacts.
The Location class is extensible and the use of Uniform Resource Identifiers (“URI”)
[29] means that artefacts can be reorganised as required. This answers the Research
Question.
For example, a global class for “IoT” devices may first be established but, as the field
advances, this may require sub-division. As there is further maturity, there may no longer
be a need for this “IoT” class at all.
But this organisation will require careful thought and consensus from the Digital
Evidence community. This is essential to gain the support of those who could benefit from
it - the ontological commitment described by Gruber [119].
Whilst fields such as fingerprints or ballistics show there are bodies that can reach
such a consensus, as yet, no such international body in the digital evidence field has been
identified that carries the authority to perform this task.
Aside from the Research Question, two other areas for consideration are DESO’s remit
and the way in which artefacts are placed within it. These will now be discussed.
7.2.1 The limited remit of DESO
Purposely, the scope of the artefacts captured in DESO is limited - it does not capture user
data, general operating system data or digital evidence techniques - yet these could be of
great benefit to an examiner.
The reason for this approach came from prior research. Technical information on
various digital devices and systems was specified but the way in which this information
could assist an investigation was often lacking.
DESO aims to address this point by linking all specified artefact Locations to a cor-
responding Type Identifier. If an artefact cannot be linked to a Type Identifier, it is not
included. In this way an examiner is able to assess the availability of actual evidential
artefacts, not just technical details.
At present, DESO’s development has concentrated on documenting digital trace evi-
dence between devices. This topic is again discussed in Further Work at Chapter 8.
7.2.2 The placement of artefacts in DESO
If DESO is to be effective, recording any artefact requires an instance to be placed in the
correct Location sub-class. Otherwise, it will not be correctly identified as being available.
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As an example of how this can go wrong, consider an artefact that is found in the
Windows 7 Operating system. This needs to be represented in the DESO Location class.
The relevant class structure is under “Operating Systems” where “Windows 7” could have
two sub-classes underneath it representing “Service Pack 1” (SP1) and “Service Pack 2”
(SP2).
The examiner wishing to find the correct Location sub-class in which to place the
artefact works down through “Operating System” - as discussed at section 4.5.8. The
“Windows” sub-class will be parsed followed by the one for “Windows 7”. Using the
method currently defined, if the person creating this instance is unable to further identify
whether the artefact is SP1 or SP2, the artefact is created in this, higher, Windows 7 Class.
But by creating the instance in this way, the examiner is implying that the artefact is
present in all versions of Windows 7 - including both SP1 and SP2. This may not actually
be the case, it is just the fact that the examiner has not been able to specifically identify the
correct location for the artefact. There are two approaches to alleviate this problem.
The first is to create another ontology which details how the various classes such as
Devices, File Systems and Operating Systems can be identified. This will include, for
example, how to identify between Windows 7’s various Service Packs. This is discussed in
Further Work, at Section 8.7. The purpose of this extra ontology is to assist any person to
accurately identify the environment in which they have discovered an artefact.
A second approach is to carefully consider how the provenance of this artefact is
recorded so that its reliability can be assessed. If the testing environment for this artefact
has been adequately recorded then this should accurately state the equipment and operating
systems used. From this, the “Service Pack” of the operating system should be apparent.
If not then, when documenting the relationship between an instance in the Location class
to its corresponding instance in the Reference class, the appropriate object property should
be used. This can include:
• “hasProvCodeNoEvidenceAvailable” meaning that there is no evidence available to
support this artefact; or
• “hasProvCodeAuthStatNonPeerReviewedNotSupported’ meaning that, although the,
artefact has been documented, it is not supported by test data.
The conclusion to this debate is that great attention must be paid to the correct listing of
classes and placement of artefacts. Whilst this may appear burdensome, any field involving
classification has the same responsibility.
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7.3 Selection
Research Question 3: Can DESO reduce the volume of digital evidence that requires
examination?
Research Question 4: Will DESO allow for the selection of artefacts based on investigative
criteria as opposed to technical ones?
The ability of DESO to answer these questions rests on the effectiveness of its “Type
Identifier” class:
• DESO’s largest class, “What”, captures elements of trace evidence - showing how
devices make records as they link together.
• The “Who” class documents where elements relating to identity are recorded and,
by using the Friend Of A Friend ontology, uses a categorisation which can be readily
interpreted by others.
• The “Where” class uses a number of other ontologies to categorise artefacts relating
to geographical location.
• The “When” class has a measured application due to the the ambiguity of time when
recorded by digital devices. It is a subservient class to the others instead of existing
in its own right.
But conspicuous by their absence are the “How” and “Why’ classes. By way of
explanation, no one artefact in isolation was found to assist as an answer to these questions.
Instead, multiple artefacts - by their presence or absence - may be required. This is
an obvious deficiency when addressing Research Question 4. The topic will again be
discussed later in Section 7.5 relating to Reliability and the requirement to define Level 3
Provenance - the meaning of an artefact.
Research Question 3 asked if DESO could reduce the volume of digital evidence that
requires investigation. The answer to this question is a qualified yes.
DESO reduces the volume of digital evidence that requires examination because it can
be used to select the required artefacts before data extraction takes place. This ensures that
all the extracted data is relevant.
But one area where DESO may not be effective in reducing the volume of digital
evidence is the examination of Operating System Independent files. This will be covered
next.
7.3.1 The complication of Operating System Independent files
In assessing the utility of Type Identifier, further consideration is required when it is
considered in conjunction with the Location Class for Operating System Independent Files
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as detailed in section 4.5.5. This is due to the ubiquity and volume of these files on a
device.
For instance, most devices will have large numbers of PDF or JPEG files contained
at some position within their respective file systems. These can be system files of little
immediate use to the investigation - such as icons and licensing agreements.
If, in the first instance, a device is parsed for these files, then there could be a large
number of results. This does not assist with Research Question 3 dealing with volume.
An alternative approach would be to identify artefacts in the other Location sub-classes
first and only consider Operating System Independent Files as a secondary approach if the
first is unsuccessful.
7.4 Correlation
Research Question 5: Can DESO allow for the successful comparison of artefacts
irrespective of their source or originating format?
Research Question 6: Will DESO allow the use of any tools to process evidence?
The use of a Type Identifier allows the identification of artefacts that can be compared
with each other. Figure 6.6 demonstrated how the use of this Type Identifier provides a
uniform format for reporting data values. This addresses Research Question 5. But there
are situations where this approach will not be effective.
The first concerns data which is not adequately formatted. To illustrate this point,
an example of data with a defined format is produced by the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE). This body specifies the format of an Ethernet addresses
used for computer networking. This is typically in the form of numbers in hexadecimal
interspersed by colons.
There may be variations to this format - for example some addresses may be stored
without colons. But it should always be possible to transform the varieties into a uniform
notation to allow comparison.
In contrast, examples of problem areas are user names and addresses. Although there
are other external ontologies used by DESO, such as Friend Of A Friend [38], these allow
the specification of a Type Identifier only. They are less stringent in specifying the format
of data - for example, in an address, is “Road” always spelled this way or is it sometimes
spelled as “Rd”?
The second concerns related but dissimilar data values. An example would be the
correlation between GPS coordinates and, as used by the UK mail system, “Postcodes”.
The reporting formats for these data can be specified in their respective Type Identifiers.
But this does not assist in understanding that some of the reported GPS coordinates are
contained within a particular Postcode area. So comparison could be made by translating
these GPS coordinates into the relevant Postcode - or vice versa.
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Both of these issues may be beyond the functional remit of DESO but there is contem-
porary discussion of them. The W3C has issued guidelines relating to best practice for
publishing on the web generally [261] and, in particular, the use of spatial data [262]. One
use of DESO may be as a component linking into the semantic referencing specified in
these documents.
Research Question 6 asked if DESO could allow the use of any tools to process
evidence. DESO does allow the use of any tools to process evidence because the reported
artefacts are tool agnostic.
Indeed, if forensic tools listed the DESO artefacts they could extract it would provide
for a more effective representation of a tool’s capabilities. Further, this leads to a more
accurate selection of a tool for a particular purpose.
7.5 Reliance
Research Question 7: can DESO provide for the provenance of artefacts to be established?
DESO is only partially successful in answering this question and further work is
required.
To explain, when provenance was originally discussed, see Table 2.1, three levels
were specified. DESO provides for Level 1 and Level 2 provenance. Level 1 is the actual
Location of any data and, Level 2 is principally conveyed by its Type Identifier - what this
data represents. And the reliability of the association between Location and Type Identifier
is represented by the corresponding instance in the Reference class. The Object Property
specifies the quality of this reference in supporting the association between Location and
Type Identifier.
But the Type Identifier class does not necessarily provide assistance with Level 3
provenance: what does this artefact mean? For example, if the artefact is an IP address,
what action or event does it represent? Is it the IP address of an external server or an
address assigned to the computer on an internal network?
This debate is similar to earlier discussion of the How and Why Type Identifiers at
Section 7.3. A possible explanation is there are few artefacts that, on their own, can justify
a Level 3 interpretation. One artefact needs to be combined with others to form an evidence
base before any such conclusion on meaning can be drawn.
There are two questions to ask in this respect: firstly, is it possible to specify a notation
covering a number of artefacts that, by their presence and, possibly, absence, indicate
a particular event? And, secondly, is DESO the correct mechanism to implement this
notation?
With regard to the first question, it must be possible to draw conclusions about the
meaning of one or more artefacts since this act is routinely performed for criminal proceed-
ings involving digital evidence. An examiner would be reckless in presenting, for example,
an IP address and then inviting the Court to speculate on what it means. Yet to guide any
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Court on this meaning, the examiner must have conducted some sort of logical thought
process. Indeed, during any trial, the examiner may be called upon to justify this process.
With regard to the second question, in its present form, DESO is not the right tool to
provide Level 3 provenance. Instead, some sort of rule-based system could be developed
which references both the presence and absence of particular DESO artefacts to suggest
conclusions. This is addressed in Chapter 8, Further Work.
7.6 Summary
Research Question 1: Does DESO allow for the documentation of digital evidence artefacts
and facilitate their extraction and comparison?
The evaluation of DESO has shown that the ontology is a good foundation for work
in this field but not a complete one. Issues still to be resolved principally concern the
complexity of situations - as seen in the “Why” and “How” categories and also the
specification of Level 3 Provenance.
These, and other issues, are discussed in the next chapter, Further Work.
Chapter 8
Further work
The critical assessment of DESO in Chapter 7 identified that the class structure is a good
foundation for the representation of Digital Evidence artefacts. However, this foundation
has to be built up with further work. This is now detailed.
8.1 Type Identification classes - How and Why
Whilst Type Identification classes for What, Where, Who and When have been specified,
How and Why remain. To cover these two, an idea is to join a number of artefacts together
with extra property constraints.
In this sense they might form a series of lower level ontologies, perhaps using Expert
Systems. These would use DESO as an upper level ontology for artefacts and their repre-
sentation. The lower level ontologies could be environment specific because motivations
and explanations may differ between the particular contexts they represent. Purely as an
example, the use of encryption by a person with no other interest in technology might be
more significant than when it is used by someone who routinely works in an IT-related
environment.
8.2 Specification of artefact Location - a universal
language
In section 4.5.3 the difficulty in specifying an artefact Location using a machine parsable
format was noted. Suggestions included using Google’s GRR language [58]. Further
research into this field would be valuable because a notation system for artefacts would
bring precision and, with increasing automation, an ability to code these locations for
automatic extraction.
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8.3 Modification of IoT and BAS systems for Digital
Evidence
As discussed at section 3.4.4, the development of ontologies and classification systems for
the Internet of Things (IoT) and Building Automation Systems (BAS) is more advanced
and consensual than noted for the Digital Evidence field. And now the potential for forensic
evidence from these devices is being discussed [93, pg 9], [184] [222].
This is fertile area for further research because of the changing use of technology.
Desktop and laptop computers may no longer be the primary source of evidence - instead,
as well as mobile devices, it is the circumstantial evidence created by IoT devices and
BAS that may come to the fore. And, as shown, such ontologies are already developed and
could be integrated into DESO.
8.4 Provenance ratings to assess weight of evidence
Section 5.2.2 discussed how the provenance of an artefact could be assessed by under-
standing the source of the information behind any assertion - its origin and relevance to the
artefact being described. For instance, there is a difference between an artefact detailed
in a web blog with no evidence of testing and one from a referenced and peer-reviewed
journal with published test data.
An interesting area for further research would be to consider how these provenance
ratings could be combined into a knowledge based system informing a collection strategy -
as suggested by Keppens et al [153].
An implementation could look at the available artefacts but its selection of those
to extract is guided not just by investigative objectives but, also, the reference source
behind each artefact. For example, if there was a choice between an artefact that was well
documented and tested and one which was not, it would be prudent to choose the former.
This saves the examiner’s time as less work would have to be performed testing any results.
8.5 DESO reporting to aid tool testing
A benefit of defined artefacts and uniform reporting is in the testing of tools. This is
because the tool is used to extract data from a specific DESO Location and report it in the
format specified by the Type Identifier.
As such, testing can be largely automated by running sample data with known results
through the software and checking that the pre-determined DESO artefacts have been
correctly located and displayed.
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Benefits arising from this are:
• software developers will find it easier to test new versions of software because, after
each iteration of development, it can be checked to ensure that it still performs the
DESO artefact extractions accurately; and
• examiners can perform “calibration” testing on new tools to ensure that the artefact
is extracted as claimed.
This may lend itself to some sort of certification scheme and so assist the presentation
and acceptance of Digital Evidence in criminal trials.
8.6 Fragments of data
Examiners may find fragments of data that are not directly attributable to a particular file.
This is particularly the case when conducting keyword searches across areas that are not
allocated to any extant file: “unallocated”. In this space there may be pieces of files that
have been previously deleted.
The problem is to understand the file to which the data relates and its significance to
enquiries.
But if certain data structures within the file can be identified - such as a particular file
header or a prefix - then DESO’s Data Properties, detailed in Section 4.5.3, can be used.
The data structures can be compared to the Data Properties listed in DESO for any that
match. The artefacts that have these particular properties could then be further investigated
to understand if they are the source of the fragment.
Interestingly, if DESO is sufficiently well populated, then it could be used to show only
a particular artefact has the identified data property. It acts as an evidence base to rule out
other possibilities.
8.7 Expanding DESO’s coverage
In Section 7.2.1 it was noted how DESO was limited to actual evidential artefacts and
did not cover, for example, Digital Evidence techniques. This is an area that could be
expanded. The benefit of using an ontology for DESO is that the terminology in it can also
be used in other ontologies - linking the two.
For example, if an ontology of techniques was developed, this could be cross-referenced
to DESO artefacts so that an examiner could readily understand not just the artefacts that
existed but also how to extract them.
Similarly, an ontology of tools could be developed and cross-referenced to the DESO
artefacts that each tool could successfully extract.
As noted at Section 7.2.2, a useful addition would be an ontology specifying the
identifying markers for various devices, operating systems and files. This could then feed
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into DESO’s Location class and aid more accurate identification and placement of artefacts
within this structure.
8.8 Use of the dateAddedToDESO data property
In a conventional investigation, the envisaged enquiries would take place soon after the
suspected offence. But this is not always the case. Other enquiries may take place some
time later - particularly for “Cold Case Reviews” - the fresh examination of a previously
unsolved case.
A key aspect of these enquiries is the use of analytical techniques - such as DNA
examination - that were not available, or unknown, to the original investigation team. This
could also occur with Digital Evidence.
For example, a mobile phone handset may have security features that make examination
impossible at the time of the original investigation. But by the time of the Cold Case
Review, flaws subsequently found in this mobile phone’s implementation of security could
allow access to the artefacts it contains.
In such circumstances, DESO can be searched for any artefacts with a “dateAdded-
ToDESO” that is subsequent to the original investigation. This checks whether there are
potentially useful artefacts available for examination that have subsequently come to light.
Chapter 9
Summary and conclusions
9.1 Summary of work
In Chapter 2 the basic concepts of criminal investigation are introduced. These included
the Who, What, When, Where, How and Why questions that are framed to according to
the various Lines of Enquiry. These “5WH” questions are later used in the Type Identifier
class in DESO.
Contemporary areas of forensic evidence examination involving fingerprints, ballistics
and DNA are discussed at section 2.4. The conclusion reached is that the construction and
use of standards is a strong element of these disciplines. But also, that the construction of
these standards relied on central bodies - often part of or related to a government - for their
formation. DESO’s evaluation in Chapter 7 also noted that a similar body may be required
for Digital Evidence.
After a general introduction to Digital Evidence, its use in criminal investigations is
introduced at section 2.8. The four Problem Statements are set out. That is to: understand
the available artefacts on a particular digital evidence source; be able to select those which
are relevant to an enquiry, be able to compare artefacts; and be able to document the
provenance of an artefact.
Two challenges facing the field are then discussed: volume and variety. The challenge
of volume is to devise an examination method which makes the least investigative com-
promise and is sustainable. The challenge of variety exacerbates any inability to handle
availability, selection and correlation.
A discussion of tools and approaches that may be able to assist with the Problem
Statements is at Section 2.9. This is followed by a review of previous research on Digital
Evidence and tools. The issues of availability, selection, correlation and reliance were
continually discussed in this research. There were, however, few solutions proposed.
A review of modular and monolithic Digital Evidence tools concludes a lack of
technical documentation hinders their assessment. The tools do not state which artefacts
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they do and, equally importantly, do not cover so an examiner is not able to gauge their
effectiveness.
To rectify this, a listing of artefacts is recommended so that a tool could explicitly state
which of these it could extract. It also recommended that artefacts should be assigned a
uniform type and format to aid correlation. Current efforts, such as the Cyber-investigation
Analysis Standard Expression are noted as being a step in the right direction.
Chapter 3 introduces the concept of models - and, in particular, a specific subset called
“ontologies”.
A review of models addressing Digital Evidence found there were few that were
anything other than meta-solutions. They advise on what a good solution should look like
without actually proposing one.
In reviewing previous Digital Evidence ontologies, few attempts to model from the
conceptual standpoint of an investigation were noted. Instead they chose to replicate
technical data in an ontological structure.
Chapters 4 and 5 introduce the Digital Evidence Semantic Ontology (DESO). The
ontology consists three classes covering, respectively: the locations that artefacts can be
found, the type of data at these locations and the reference sources behind these assertions.
The Location class is structured in such a way that it can be modified to take into
account the constantly morphing technological fields. It was demonstrated how DESO’s
class structure can take changes into account whilst still retaining backwards compatibility.
This is achieved through the use of Uniform resource Identifiers (URIs).
The placement of artefacts is discussed at section 4.5.8 and a method is proposed for
deciding where an artefact should be positioned in the Location Class structure. This
method also demonstrates how any search could be subsequently conducted.
To assist selection and correlation, every artefact recorded in the Location class must
have a corresponding entry in the Type Identifier class. This is detailed in Chapter 5. In
this way, all artefacts are meaningful - rather than just being data.
Fundamental to the Type Identifier Class is the use of the immediate sub-classes Who,
What, When, Where, How and Why (5WH). These guide the examiner along investigative
lines when considering the types of evidence to select for extraction.
Chapter 5 also highlights, at section 5.1.5, how the same data can have multiple uses
and how some of these uses may not be immediately apparent to an examiner.
The Reference class relates to provenance Levels 2 and 3 - see section 2.9.1. This is
not the physical location of data but how this data can be represented and also its meaning.
A class system is set up to represent the various reference sources reinforced by object
properties from artefacts in the Location class. The object properties indicate the type
of provenance provided by the reference. In so doing they allow an examiner, or others
reviewing the evidence, to understand the foundations upon which it is built. This aids
assessment of reliability.
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Later review of this class shows that, whilst it is competent in addressing Level 2,
further work is required when considering Level 3 provenance.
Chapter 6 tests DESO by addressing a simple scenario - understanding the links formed
when a USB memory stick is inserted into two desktop computers. Monolithic tools
are used to address particular investigative processes. DESO is then implemented to
understand how it can assist these tools.
In an evaluation at Chapter 7, DESO is found to assist in understanding which artefacts
are available and, then, which are necessary to achieve the investigative objective. In
doing so, the various digital evidence tools are used for extraction of data not as complete
solutions.
Chapter 8 takes DESO’s evaluation forward by suggesting new areas for further work.
Ideas include: grouping sets of artefacts to form How and Why Type Identifiers; and a
method for using the provenance rating from the Reference Class to inform the selection
of artefacts.
9.2 Conclusions
This thesis argues that an ontology can:
• allow an examiner to understand the available artefacts on any particular digital
evidence source;
• allow an examiner to select from the available artefacts based on the needs of
particular enquiry;
• allow an examiner to compare artefacts; and
• assist an examiner by documenting the provenance of an artefact so that its relaibility
can be assessed.
DESO has been shown to successfully address these challenges, although it is accepted
that the research marks a starting point and not a final solution.
The overall insight is that the field of Digital Evidence is short of a controlled vocabu-
lary to record and discuss artefacts. Until such time as one is formed, the effectiveness
of any Digital Evidence tools will be severely hampered because they are limited both in
their accuracy and, also, their ability to share and correlate results.
The contributions of the research will first be discussed followed by the identified
limitations of the work and lessons learned.
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9.3 Contributions of the research
9.3.1 Controlled vocabulary for recording artefacts
One of the key contributions of DESO is that it provides a controlled structure and
vocabulary for the recording of Digital Evidence artefacts.
When other artefact recording systems were reviewed, they either lacked this structure
and vocabulary or concentrate on recording artefacts after they have already been extracted.
The described utility of DESO comes from the use of an ontology. The structure of its
Location class avoids ambiguity when considering an artefact’s source and, as will be later
described, is also extensible to cope with changes in technology.
The use of a controlled vocabulary is crucial because it provides a common means of
communication - allowing the findings from different examiners and tools to be combined
and compared. It also brings a precision where, previously, terms were ambiguous.
For example, a piece of data listed as a “Created Date” may be put forward as, for
example, the date that a file was first stored on a device. But DESO, by its specification of
both the location of this artefact, and also documenting the evidence behind it, works to
ensure that all those using this data are able to assess its reliability.
One issue arising from the implementation of DESO is that it may highlight the paucity
of research behind artefacts currently put forward as evidence.
9.3.2 Extensibility / adaptability
Key to DESO’s utility is the adaptability provided by the use of URIs for instances - ie
the artefacts - and the use of an ontology formed of Triples. As shown in Sections 4.5.2
and 4.5.2, this means that classes can be rearranged, refined and expanded as technology
changes.
To illustrate this point, consider the artefacts listed in repositories such as the Artifact
Genome Project - described in section 2.9.8. The location of the artefacts it documents are
“hard-coded” - ie the full path is explicitly stated. But this does not lend itself to flexibility
if there are any changes.
For example, if an artefact is listed as being found in the future operating system
“Windows 11”, this may be coded as such. But how will this be represented if a Service
Pack of Windows 11 is introduced and, with its implementation, the artefact is no longer
found in all subsequent versions of the operating system?
In contrast, as discussed at section 4.5.2, with DESO the class structure can be remod-
elled to represent the addition of a Service Pack. The position of the artefact can then
be changed to reflect that it is only found in versions of the operating system before this
Service Pack was introduced.
The contribution of this feature is that DESO can tolerate the changing nature of
technology - both in the actual technology itself and also the types of artefacts that are to
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be found on it. This assists in allowing an examiner to understand the available artefacts
on any given Digital Evidence source.
9.3.3 Organised on investigation lines
A further contribution of DESO is the ability to organise and search artefacts from an
investigative perspective.
It has been shown how existing artefact records and monolithic tools represent sources
of Digital Evidence from a purely technical perspective. They offer selections on the
source of the evidence, such as Internet History, rather than the contribution that this source
can make to an investigation.
The danger of this approach is that it relies on the skill, knowledge and experience of
the examiner. The technical sources have to be transformed to satisfy the investigative lines
of enquiry. Using the example of Internet History, consider an examiner who is tasked
with establishing whether a suspect viewed a particular document. For an effective enquiry,
the examiner has to know that, as well as containing a list of websites visited, the Internet
History can include a record of files viewed and the names of the volumes upon which they
were contained.
If the examiner is not fully aware of this, then potentially useful evidence can be missed.
As variety increases, so does this danger.
DESO’s Type Identifier Class aims to alleviate this danger. It breaks down these
technical sources into the evidential artefacts they provide - categorising them along the
investigative Who, What, Where, When, How and Why lines of enquiry.
This is achieved by ensuring that, for every artefact listed in the Location class, it has
an object property pointing to an entry in the Type Identifier Class. An artefact cannot be
completed without entries in Location, Type Identifier and Reference classes. This ensure
that DESO is a collection of useful artefacts rather than just a list of technical data.
If this is followed through to the Internet History, the artefacts could include a destina-
tion search on Google Maps in the internet history (Where), the time of this search (When)
and the volume name of a file subsequently opened on a storage device (What). This not
only gives a much richer picture of the data but it is also efficient - only the data relevant to
the enquiry is extracted.
This contributes a solution for the Selection problem because an examiner will be able
to search for the relevant 5WH sections of data across the whole range of devices being
examined. This is an improvement on speculative review and a reliance on past experience.
It also reduces the volume of data that must be extracted to those items that are
demonstrably relevant to the line of enquiry. This is in contrast to current approaches
where data are first extracted and then, afterwards, reviewed for any relevance to the case.
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9.3.4 Artefact placement and search
At section 4.5.8, a method was detailed for parsing DESO to initially place artefacts into
an appropriate Location sub-class and then subsequently conduct searches. This involves
methodically working down the appropriate Location class section until either the last
identifiable class is found or, instead, the end of the class structure is reached.
Whilst limitations were identified with this approach - as detailed in the critical evalua-
tion at section 7.2.2 - this is still a good starting point to launch further research. Current
artefact repositories do not have a mechanism for searching. They are hampered by a
lack of a controlled vocabulary which means that artefacts must be searched on, akin to, a
keyword basis rather than a methodical approach.
9.3.5 Comparison of disparate sources
DESO not only provides a controlled vocabulary for documenting the Location that an
artefact can be found, it also assigns a Type Identifier for the artefact that can be found at
that location.
This assists an examination because it allows for the comparison of data which represent
the same issue even though they are found in disparate sources. As example, a Media
Access Control (MAC) address may be found on a mobile phone handset, wireless hot
spot logs and mobile phone network records.
At present, there is no consistent terminology to unify these data for comparison.
DESO allows this comparison to take place and ensures that all sources report using the
same data format.
This approach also yields benefits when an examiner has one artefact of a specific type
and wishes to find other artefacts of the same type which can be compared. DESO can be
searched for this Type Identifier.
The contribution of this vocabulary is that it addresses availability, selection and
correlation. An examiner no longer has to rely on their personal experience and recollection
to understand the existence of artefacts and how they can be combined. Instead, this
existence and utility is now documented.
The aggravating factor of volume is addressed because the examiner can hone in on
the artefacts that are useful to the enquiry rather than collating large amounts of data. This
means that searching through this data for patterns using keyword or “Big Data” techniques
is not always necessary.
9.3.6 Mechanism for reporting and exchange of data
There has been no identified method for reporting digital evidence artefacts with precision.
When either presenting to a judicial hearing - such as a criminal court - or disseminating
intelligence to other parties, there is a difficulty in identifying the data that has been
9.4 Identified limitations of the approach 160
extracted from a device and what it represents. DESO’s contribution to this issue is
two-fold.
First, in reporting evidential findings, data can be presented with the DESO artefact
Location and Type Identifier. This saves the examiner’s time.
It also means that any other examiner can locate this item of data from the same source
without the requirement to use the same tool as the original examiner.
And, any other party can gauge the reliability of the findings by checking the Reference
used to justify this artefact. There may be questions if an examiner is looking to put
forward a case using artefacts for which no research has been conducted - purely relying
on the stated output of a monolithic tool.
But second, this controlled vocabulary also contributes to the issue of data sharing. If
the report from a monolithic tool is shared, the indistinct nature of the terms it contains
can cause confusion.
Instead, if supplying the data together with the respective DESO Locations and Type
Identifiers, then accuracy is improved.
9.3.7 Description of provenance
Whilst not an explicit research objective, the ability to describe the provenance of Digital
Evidence has been a useful by-product.
Section 2.9.1 details how this provenance is described as three levels: the first relating
to the location of the data itself, including any item’s physical seizure and the position of
the data within that device; the second is justification for the representation of the data -
how, for example, a segment of binary can be represented as an IP address; and the third
relates to the meaning of this data - for example, what does this IP address represent? Is it
the last assigned external IP address when connected to a wireless router or the source IP
address of a received email?
The description of these three levels provides a reference point for a debate on Digital
Evidence. When evidence is presented to court, which of these levels is reached and by
what means? Logically, all three should be fulfilled but, in delineating these separate
requirements, proper consideration can be given to the issues and any identified gaps.
9.4 Identified limitations of the approach
9.4.1 Limited testing
DESO was developed organically with a number of prototypes discarded before a structure
was found that fulfilled the objectives. Though this method of development is a form of
continuous testing it has only had one person performing it. Further testing should involve
the wider digital evidence community to ensure that it also understands the structure and
use of the ontology.
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The number of artefacts recorded in DESO has been purposely limited - so far only 31
instances. But with a settled structure, the population could increase to stress test DESO
and properly gauge its extensibility.
In testing the application of DESO, this has also been limited to its use with monolithic
tools. This was chosen because of the potential benefit to the field - monolithic tools
are still widely used. But further testing should include the application of DESO to an
actual criminal case, either past or present. The difficulties in conducting this testing are
acknowledged - particularly with regard to disclosure issues - but this approach could be a
useful way to prove DESO’s value - or otherwise.
9.4.2 Outstanding issues
Whilst DESO has fulfilled the objectives, there are still outstanding issues to be resolved
before more detailed testing takes place. These are principally outlined in chapter 8,
Further Work. They include:
• A notation system for precisely articulating the position of artefacts in a machine-
readable form; and
• The specification of How and Why Type Identifiers and queries.
9.4.3 Criteria for success
The success of DESO will principally depend on exponents in the Digital Evidence field
submitting artefacts for inclusion. For this to happen, there has to be a belief that the
ontology is worthwhile and has the support of the community - effectively, ontological
commitment. When other forensic evidence fields are reviewed, some sort of national or
international intervention is required to attain critical mass for these classification systems.
At the moment, it is not possible to state which body would take this task on.
Further, DESO will also require maintenance. The class system will have to be
monitored and revised to take into account new locations and types of evidence. Again,
other fields have required some sort of supervisory body to be responsible for this task.
Finally, examiners may need some sort of incentive to submit artefacts to DESO - for
this requires effort and there must be a reason. But the submission and use of DESO
artefacts could be a useful career boost for an examiner - and those looking to enter the
field such as students. The length of time taken to publish a paper in a peer-reviewed
journal is too long to keep up with rapid technological changes. Inclusion of artefacts in
DESO could be a faster route to recognition and use.
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9.5 Lesson learned - the obscurity of ontologies
The use of ontological concepts when creating DESO has been valuable but has also caused
a number of problems. The first is due to imprecise use of the term - which can mean
anything from a short statement of concept to a large complex model. This can lead to
difficulties in communicating what is being referenced.
The second is that, whilst well-known in the informatics arena, the term “ontology” is
not known to many outside this circle. This presents difficulty in presenting DESO because
an ontology must be explained before DESO’s function is conveyed. The obscurity of the
term could also lead to some resistance in encouraging take up.
Whilst the use of an ontology would still be recommended for future work, it may be
better not to use the actual word - instead calling it a “model” or “classification”. This may
make the material more accessible.
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Appendix A
Generation of test data
1. Windows 7 and OS X 10.6.8 operating systems were installed on hard disks using
default settings. All media had been previously wiped using Encase version 6.19. A
USB drive was formatted using the FAT 32 file system.
2. Sample files were copied on to the USB drive which was then inserted into both the
Windows and OS X machines and those files accessed.
3. Both computers were then re-imaged
Appendix B








Effectiveness - Does the
ontology address the pur-
pose?





Ontology: the recording of meta-data re-
garding digital evidence storage formats.
Builds a standard terminology for repre-
senting meta-data concerning integrity and
provenance as well as the file content itself.
Concept Yes Not generally. But may be of
use for RQ3 to document ex-
tracts of data from sources -
ie rather than extracting all
of the data from a device,
just extract the small, rele-
vant portion and use the on-
tology to document it.
Cyber Forensics On-
tology [41] 2006
Ontology: Describes the cyber forensics
domain but specific concept is not clear.
Stated aim is to assist with curriculum de-
velopment. Includes sub-classes of ‘Tech-
nology’ and ‘Profession’ - one is mapped
to the other. This assists in finding the cor-
rect layers for specialization, certification,







Ontology: Classifies ‘Events’ - either nat-
ural or artificial - and the relationships be-
tween them. Uses this event ontology with
sort-hierarchy in order-sorted logic. Mar-
ries these events to time and location.
Concept but fully de-
veloped with predi-
cate logic to act as an
upper level ontology.
Yes Does not assist with avail-
ability and selection. May
assist with correlation but in-
sufficient detail to assess.
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Effectiveness - Does the
ontology address the pur-
pose?




Ontology: Represents Event Logs - as part
of Forensics of Rich Events - and Prove-
nance - in terms of processing. Uses two
base classes: Entity and Event to represent
tangible ‘objects’ and how they are changed
in state over time. Uses three methods of in-
teracting with event log based data: search,
hypothetical entity correlation, and auto-
mated notification.
Concept Yes - for event logs and
other temporal and linear
data sources.
Does not assist with avail-
ability and selection. Does
provide a mechanism for cor-
relation but insufficient de-
tail to assess. The outlined
“Events” may assist with re-
liance (RQ7) as they could
show Level 3 provenance -
the meaning of an artefact.
A Small Scale Digital
Device Forensics on-
tology [128] 2007
Ontology: Small-scale digital devices No
ontological structure is detailed.
A notional proposi-
tion - not fully devel-
oped as a concept.
No No - even from the perspec-
tive of a taxonomy, the pro-
posed ontology is not helpful
as there is insufficient detail
Ontology for Com-
plex Mission Scenar-
ios in Forensic Com-
puting [130] 2008
Ontology: Describes complex mission sce-
narios - those in which information changes
continuously and quickly or scenarios re-
quiring a large quantity of resource - such
as personnel
Concept. Not possible to assess from
the detail supplied. The on-
tology just appears to be a
formalisation of an organisa-
tion structure with no stated
object or data properties.
Insufficient detail to assess.
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Name /Date




Effectiveness - Does the
ontology address the pur-
pose?





Ontology: Not called an ontology but has
ontological purpose: to provide a standard-
ized means of representing computer crime-
related materials. Uses object oriented mod-
elling to facilitate the sharing of digital evi-
dence
Concept As a mark-up language - yes. This is a language for de-
scribing that artefact data
that has been located so does
not assist with availability
and selection. Will not assist
for correlation as there are no
unifying terms to allow com-
parison of data.
Dialog - digital in-
vestigation ontology
[147] 2009
Ontology: Four separate ontological con-
cepts: Crime Case; Evidence Location; In-
formation; and Forensic Resource. Only
one section - the Windows registry is mod-
elled in detail. This represents two classes -
information and information location - then
uses specific rules to draw inferences on
those entries.
Concept - though
a section on the
Windows registry has
been further detailed.
Not possible to assess - the
related concepts are too high
level. The classifications are
very high level taxonomies
with no stated data or object
properties.
Its Evidence (later refer-
enced as Information) Loca-
tion ontology could be use-
ful in modelling availability.
Further, its system for tag-
ging data could be useful
for correlation but, for both,




Ontology - the broad arena of cyber crime
Aims to build an ontology that can be ap-
plied to the data mining of cyber crime. De-
fines five broad areas that can capture the
details of a case. Acts as a recording sys-
tem.
Concept - details five
main classes and one
set of sub-classes.
Does not details data
or object properties.
Insufficient detail to assess. No. Appears to be simply a
database of crime investiga-
tion. Insufficient detail to as-
sess with respect to the RQs.








Effectiveness - Does the
ontology address the pur-
pose?






Ontology: the domain of network com-
ponents and how attacks are launched on
them. Uses classes for such topics as at-
tack; attacker; system; and location. Links




Yes - in terms of modelling
attacks. But this appears to
a form of notation. It is un-
clear how the results would
be used other than as a stor-
age of knowledge from a par-
ticular incident. There is no
standardisation of terms etc.
No - the ontology does not
standardise the terms that are
used so cross incident cor-
relation could be problem-
atic. If it was married with
an upper level ontology then









Neither: no actual ontology or taxonomy
specified.





Chain of Custody of
Digital Evidence [72]
2011
Taxonomy: covers the chain of evidence
for digital evidence. Models the sources
of digital evidence that may be collected;






Insufficient detail. This just
documents the issue.








Effectiveness - Does the
ontology address the pur-
pose?





Ontology: The component and concepts
of the smart phone environment. Provides
a common terminology to allow queries
across differing smart phone functions.
Concept - though
there is brief mention
of classes.
Yes - from a high level
though more detail would be
required for further assess-
ment.
Yes - if the common terms
of the smart phone environ-
ment were applied to other
scenarios then this would as-





Ontology: a number of lightweight ontolo-
gies are proposed to aid semantic represen-
tation of heterogeneous data. Two are cov-
ered - one for storage media and the other
for network traffic analysis.
Concept. Attempted
to review full on-
tologies but they are
no longer available
at supplied link or
on other open-source
searching.
Yes - from a high level
through more detail would
be required for further assess-
ment.
Possible assistance for selec-
tion, RQ3 as the ontology al-
lows specific elements to be
targeted instead of all data.
But there is no assistance in
how to choose an element.
For correlation, no. It uses
a number of small ontologies





Ontology: To represent subjects, actions
and events for compilation into a time-line.
Converts digital evidence artefacts into for-




Set notation used but
stops short of defin-
ing boundaries on the
members of a set.
Yes. Though critically relies
on effective interpretation of
timestamps - which is not de-
tailed.
Yes - with conditions.
Doesn’t assist with avail-
ability and selection but
could assist with correlation









Effectiveness - Does the
ontology address the pur-
pose?






Taxonomy: To represent file types. Breaks
down file types into music, video and im-
ages then further sub-classes for JPEG;
PNG etc. Each sub-class is itself sub-
divided according to whether it is “suspi-
cious”.
Concept. Appears to
be a bare taxonomy
with one class and no
object / data proper-
ties.
Yes - from a high level
through more detail would
be required for further assess-
ment.
No. Insufficient detail to as-
sess.




Ontology: aims to be sufficiently com-
plete and accurate to model any digital in-
cident. Has three layers into which ex-
tracted “knowledge” is placed: Common;
Specialised; and Traceability. The knowl-
edge is, effectively, the results from various




Partially - although there
may be shortcomings in its
ability to model any digital
incident. It is only set up
to handle the output from a
limited set of tools. There
is no mechanism for correlat-
ing semantically equivalent
data in different formats (un-
less this is the knowledge lay-
ers) and there is no mecha-
nism for interpreting times-
tamps correctly. Bearing in
mind that this ontology is
aimed at presenting a time-
line, this may be a problem.
Does not address availabil-
ity and selection. May assist
with correlation in the way
that it forms a time-line from
extracted data. However, no
unifying terms specified for
this to be effective.
187
Name /Date




Effectiveness - Does the
ontology address the pur-
pose?
Does it Assist with the Re-
search Questions (RQ)?
F-DOS [7] 2015 Ontology: to formally model the smart
phone content for the purpose of forensic
investigation Creates two layers: one as a
mapping of the technical detail for a spe-
cific device which feeds into the other - an
abstracted representation of data categories





Yes - from a high level
through more detail would
be required for further assess-
ment.
Insufficient detail to assess.
DFAX [57] 2015 Ontology: DFAX represents the procedural
aspects of digital forensics. Models the evi-
dence chain to assist the representation of
provenance. Uses CybOX tags.
Goes beyond concep-
tual - partial develop-




Yes - from a high level
through more detail would
be required for further assess-
ment.
It is a representational tool
of what exists - not what can
be found - so no assistance
with availability and selec-
tion. Its representation of
events using multiple arte-
facts could assist with RQ7
to document Level 3 prove-








Effectiveness - Does the
ontology address the pur-
pose?





Ontology: documents artefacts classified as
being ‘curated’. Ontological concept is not
definitive - making assessment problematic.
When an artefact is identified it is entered
using three fields - Location; CuFA require-






Insufficient detail to assess.
No actual typing of artefacts
- just notation.
No. Impractical to assess
due to lack of detail. Mecha-
nism for joining disparate in-




Log Files [179] 2016
Taxonomy: structured representation of log
files with unknown formats. Uses a number
of modules: the first looks for columns in
the data; the others are ‘experts’ for fields
such as IP address, email, date / time etc
that independently look at each column and
assign it a ranking on how close it is to their
respective formats. The ‘expert’ with the
highest score is used to allocate the column
to a UCO label - see below entry.
Concept. Only the
column splitting mod-
ule was reported as
being tested.
Yes Yes - assists with correlation
(RQ4). Any encountered
log files could be fed into
the application and a knowl-
edge base built up of the data
to be found in them - this
may assist with availability
RQ1. One complication is
interpretation - this method
uses a low level data format
and incorrect interpretation
could lead to errors. Cau-
tion is required in assigning
a semantic reference to these








Effectiveness - Does the
ontology address the pur-
pose?
Does it Assist with the Re-
search Questions (RQ)?
UCO: A Unified Cy-
bersecurity Ontology
[236] 2016
Ontology: focusses on the cyber security
domain and provides a core cybersecurity
ontology that facilitates data sharing across
different formats and standards and allows
reasoning to infer new information. Classes
are purely focussed on network intrusion
scenarios. Suggests how the ontology can
be linked to other sources, such as dbpedia,
to enrich knowledge.
Concept Yes - with reservations. Al-
though this is meant to be
a high-level ontology there
is, still, insufficient data to
make a proper assessment.
The last entry in Github for
this project was from a high
level and more detail would
be required for further assess-
ment.
Does not assist with avail-
ability or selection. For cor-
relation in the network inves-
tigation arena, it should as-
sist as it provides a unifying
language for heterogeneous





Ontology: an architecture to enable forensic
investigations. Uses four layers for knowl-
edge, integration, reasoning and querying.
Aims to extract output from various tools
into a common format to allow querying.
Concept. Purpose
of layers is stated
but there is no de-
tail of the mecha-
nism by which any of
the conversion can be
achieved.
Insufficient detail to assess. Does not assist with avail-
ability and selection - it re-
lies on all the data first being
extracted. If the concept was
successfully implemented it




Ontology: To classify malware in such a
way as it can be presented at a criminal trial
Five classes listed.
Nothing else. No ex-
ternal listing
Insufficient detail to assess Insufficient detail to assess.
